Appeasement at this point certainly seems an unlikely course for Trump to take. And while unlikely, appeasement has been tried before with the hotly debated “Sunshine Policy“ that Kim Dae-jung implemented in 1998 and the results of that were abandoned in 2008 and officially seen by the government as a failure in 2010.

In light of the U.S. recent argument for tighter sanctions, there have been a few articles popping up that have argued that tighter sanctions to further isolate the DPRK do little to actually achieve the ends that countries like the U.S. are looking for. In fact, the emphasis on sanctions to force the DPRK to give up nuclear power instead only shows that the pursuit of more nuclear power will insure the nation’s stability and force other countries to respect their presence. Instead of de-escalating a nuclear arms race, the U.S. stance on sanctions is only serving to reinforce it. While sanctions can achieve certain ends, as in the case of South Africa, cases in Iran and Cuba should serve to show that tougher sanctions don’t always achieve the desired result.

When it comes to working with China, unfortunately, as you allude to in your article when you talk about China’s core interests, the U.S. rhetoric is blind and insensitive. More ironically the president sees himself as understanding China well as he is quoted with having said, “I’ve read hundreds of books about China over the decades. I know the Chinese. I’ve made a lot of money with the Chinese. I understand the Chinese mind,” which seems farther and farther from the truth as the Trump administration promotes an “America First“ agenda.