In 2022, living with COVID-19 guided decision-making in much of the region. From managing Omicron outbreaks at the start of the year to lifting restrictions for overseas travellers, Pacific nations have re-opened to the rest of the world and the pandemic with it.

The virus has revealed the devastating consequences of the dual crises of pandemic and climate change, along with the difficulty of returning to normal as the economic impacts continue to devastate some communities. However, the pandemic response has continued to show the Pacific’s resilience, as nations have shown ingenuity and embraced regional cooperation to deal with the virus.

In Melanesia, low vaccination rates remained a source of concern as Vanuatu and Solomon Islands reported their first cases of community transmission early in the year. The outbreaks placed immense strain on local health systems, with COVID-19 patients reportedly dying on the hospital floor due to a bed shortage in Honiara. Papua New Guinea remains the Pacific nation with the lowest vaccination rate, with just 3.4 per cent of the population fully vaccinated as of 26 November 2022, according to the World Health Organization.

An important development for Papuans living close to the Torres Strait came in October, with the reinstatement of a free movement treaty with Australia. The treaty, which was suspended for two and a half years during the pandemic, enables coastal communities to cross the international border with permits to continue traditional trade relationships.

More on this: Supporting climate displaced peoples

In Fiji, the first Pacific state to welcome back international travellers, the economy is slowly getting back on track. The country’s net revenue in June 2022 exceeded forecasts by 8.5 per cent, however pre-existing economic and unemployment issues – compounded by the pandemic – remain.

In Polynesia, the double impacts of natural disasters and the pandemic were stark. Tonga’s recovery following the January Hunga-Tonga-Hunga-Ha’apai eruption and resultant tsunami was complicated by the country going into lockdown, with non-government organisations such as Red Cross forced to limit services for weeks due to restrictions.

The adoption of a ‘contactless aid’ system – conducted mostly by community members – has highlighted the benefits of localising humanitarian assistance.

Tuvalu was the last Pacific state to lose its COVID-free status on 2 November this year. Despite a high vaccination rate of 97 per cent, cases exceeded 2,000 in less than three weeks. In response to a request from Tuvalu for support, members of the Fiji Emergency Medical Assistance Team went on their first international assistance mission to help with managing the outbreak.

Samoa experienced significant outbreaks early in the year, sparking a series of lockdowns. Schools closed, re-opened, then closed again, meaning children had to be taught via remote classes that were broadcast on national television stations. Then, after reaching a 98 per cent vaccination rate, the country reopened its borders in August.

More on this: Can Asia and the Pacific get on track to net zero?

Palau’s borders reopened to tourists in May, but visitor numbers remained low, with only one-twelfth of the number of annual pre-pandemic tourists arriving in 2022. Palau’s tourism industry had already suffered a hit after China banned tour groups in 2018. In response, Palau is looking to increase two-way travel with Taiwan.

Elsewhere in Micronesia – which was home to some of the last of COVID-free nations at the beginning of 2022 – a number of countries reported community transmission in the second half of the year. The Federated States of Micronesia reported its first case in July, followed by Marshall Islands in August. Kiribati was affected by the start of year surge, when more than half of the passengers arriving on a flight from Fiji tested positive.

Now that every Pacific Island country had COVID-19 in the community, some remnants of the pre-pandemic world are coming back, with regional meetings such as the Pacific Islands Forum being held in person this year for the first time since 2019. However, the economic devastation the pandemic has wrought on the Pacific, from the loss of tourism and national lockdowns, has left many Pacific states in debt stress and recession.

For most of 2021 and the first half 2022, the focus was on vaccinating the Pacific. Now, the attention has shifted to how the region manages ongoing domestic issues and reconnects with the world, with the economic crisis being just one of the myriad of security issues the Pacific will face in 2023.

As for COVID-19, with restrictions by-and-large removed, the pandemic is no longer at the top of the region’s long list of challenges.

The post COVID-19 – the Pacific response: 2022 in review appeared first on Policy Forum.

Political discourse and representation in Solomon Islands are dominated by older men, making it easy to forget that this cohort of influential people are, in fact, the minority of the population. With seven in 10 Solomon Islanders under age 34, Solomon Islands’ youth population is particularly visible on the streets of Honiara, where large groups of young people can be seen in public spaces and at events.

There are, however, few youths in positions of influence or formal decision-making structures in Solomon Islands. Youths are rarely seen in politics and government, and are less likely to be employed.

This situation is shaped by economics and politics, as well as social norms that may support or obstruct their participation in these realms. The cultural diversity of Solomon Islands makes generalisations about social norms difficult, but it is commonly believed that youth must obey their parents and respect elders. In practice, this norm means that youth are often relegated to low status work as labourers.

This happens on a family level where youth will often be busy running errands and doing chores, leading to a feeling that they have little agency over their lives. In the formal economy, businesses take advantage of the low status of young women, intentionally hiring them to do low-paid work in shops, bars, and casinos.

More on this: How young people are reshaping the Pacific’s digital landscape

There has been a lot of talk at the political level about youth unemployment, but little action. Youth struggle to find stable, fulfilling employment, both in Solomon Islands and overseas, with many educated workers now doing menial tasks under seasonal and other non-ongoing arrangements.

In 2019, the government took over the administration of the successful Youth at Work project – which aimed to support young people into formal employment or entrepeurship – before sidelining and ultimately discontinuing it.

Moreover, the ability of youth to influence political decisions about work, foreign investment and employment is limited. It is common for established members of parliament to spend nominally apolitical constituency funds, as well as their own business profits, during elections.

Youth vying for election generally do not have access to either the funds or the status to ‘buy their way in to the game’ of running for national office.

Instead, youth leaders emerge at the local and provincial levels, often by working in partnership with established leaders and running local projects or services. For instance, there are currently some people under 35 years of age who serve as members of provincial assemblies. An analysis conducted in 2016 found that young women who are able to demonstrate service to their community, have support from chiefs, and are better educated, are able to win support in elections as community officers.

However, this local influence has not yet translated to increased representation in governmental structures and more formal decision-making processes, such as national government committees.

More on this: Is aid to Tonga reaching those who need it?

One major barrier for young Solomon Islanders, particularly young men, is that they are often characterised as ‘conflict risks’. However, as a recent report pointed out, blaming “wayward youth” for riots conveniently shifts the blame away from the adults and systems that socialise young men into violence.

However, young people today have more access to education and information than older generations and can find new ways to express their needs and aspirations. Increased access to education and new communication technologies provide opportunities for youth to engage with political discussions and civil society activities.

Civil society advocacy, particularly through social media in urban areas, is contributing to an increase in some young people’s political engagement on a variety of issues, including anti-corruption, the environment, climate change, and transport.

Young women are also being heard in more forums. For years, young women have endured a sort of invisibility, with many youth projects involving more men than women. Of the few women’s projects that exist, young, unmarried women have rarely been targeted, and reporting by gender, in the absence of age breakdowns, obscures whether or not young women are reached.

However, targeted programs for young girls, at least in urban and peri-urban areas, are increasing. Examples include established local non-government organisations (NGOs), such as the Young Women’s Christian Association, and newer initiatives, such as international NGO projects focusing on the safety and health of young women.

A number of international organisations like the World Bank, are also investing in efforts to specifically identify barriers young women face to employment, which is an encouraging sign of more intersectional approaches to gender and social inclusion.

However, more can be done. The connection between youth organisation and development needs to be strengthened, particularly in rural areas.

In various rural areas, youth groups are active, often organising sporting, cultural and economic activities. These groups can build trust and engagement among youths that can potentially broaden into other activities. Unfortunately, these networks tend to get little support from the development sector.

Encouragingly, many local community decision-making structures are inclusive of youth. For example, many councils of chiefs around the country have youth representatives in their decision-making meetings. Solomon Islands Development Trust, the oldest local NGO working nationally on development, has mandated youth representatives in their village committees and activities for a long time, and other agencies with committee work are frequently adopting this practice.

Layers of youth disadvantage, and the invisibility of young women, require further attention. This includes greater youth participation in research, policy and planning, and mandating their inclusion in decision-making processes. Policymakers need to pay particular attention to the specific disadvantage of young women, the establishment of activities for youth to inform and lobby elected representatives about their concerns, and levels of investment in youth employment and entrepreneurship programs.

Through these actions, Solomon Islands has the potential to transform the general view of young people from ‘risk’ to asset.

This article is based upon a paper published by ANU Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) as part of its ‘In brief’ series. The original paper can be found here.

The post Creating a new future for youth in Solomon Islands appeared first on Policy Forum.

Tonga is one of the most natural disaster prone nations on earth. From October to April each year, the Pacific Island kingdom is buffeted by frequent cyclones, which damage infrastructure, knock out mobile communication and destroy homes.

However, at the peak of the 2021-22 cyclone season, Tonga’s misfortune doubled. Between 20 December to 11 January, the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai volcano experienced a series of massive eruptions, shooting ash 58 kilometres high and causing loud booms, which were heard as far away as Alaska.

The eruption – now known to be the largest the world has seen since Krakatoa in 1883 – subsequently caused a major tsunami, which smashed into Tonga’s coastal areas on 15 January.

Whilst the initial effects of these disasters have now subsided, the damage to people, livelihoods and the environment has been ongoing. The World Bank estimated that the damages amounted to US$90 million with 19,250 people affected, including 10,000 children.

To make matters worse, Tonga detected its first case of COVID-19 in the community only a few days after the eruption, even as volcanic ash was still visible in the air. Behind the headlines was the trauma caused by death and displacement.

More on this: Supporting climate displaced peoples

These events also led to an overwhelming outpouring of ‘ofa (love), through the mobilisation of resources by Tongans and others across the world. Yet whilst these ‘ofa have been gratefully accepted in ‘the friendly isles’, a number of important questions about the efficacy of this humanitarian assistance have come to the fore.

Not least amongst these have been concerns about the ability of the stretched Tongan government to absorb, coordinate and distribute assistance to its citizens.

The primairy providers of aid to Tonga after the disaster were Australia and New Zealand, who delivered emergency supplies including hygiene kits, kitchen kits and other essential supplies. This came in addition to the millions already committed to Tonga in development programs.

The Government of Tonga also received US$8 million in emergency funding from the World Bank to support response and recovery efforts. Other bilateral partners such as the United Kingdom, Japan, China and France also showed their ‘ofa by sharing their expertise in different areas to support Tonga in the aftermath of the disaster.

More on this: Tonga's transnational disaster response

Meanwhile, non-government organisations (NGOs) and their overseas partners have helped Tonga in the emergency response phase. The Church Leaders Forum and other leading NGOs targeted an area of care often neglected by aid providers in post-disaster assistance – psycho-social support.

The aim of such programs is to not only provide the material building blocks for recovery, but also to help victims share experiences and recover a sense of normalcy in the wake of the tragedy.

However, whilst much of this assistance has helped Tongans rebuild their lives, some may have languished in a state of bureaucratic and logistical limbo. At recent regional security conference, some people conveyed their anecdotal concerns about containers of aid being left at the docks.

As a developing nation, the capacity of the Tongan government to properly manage the large amounts of aid being delivered is limited. This is in large part due to logistical and bureaucratic capacity constraints, making coordination difficult – especially in times of crisis. This can mean that it is unclear what is needed where, making it difficult to distribute critical resources to the people who need them most.

As such, it is crucial that development partners work in concert with the Tongan government and communities to ensure that distribution is coordinated effectively and consistently across all levels.

With the next cyclone season looming, it’s the Tongan government and its international partners need to address these capacity issues now. This is no easy task, but with the frequency and severity of disasters set to increase as global temperatures increase and sea levels rise, it is vital to the kingdom’s future. Malo e ‘ofa!

The post Is aid to Tonga reaching those who need it most? appeared first on Policy Forum.

The introduction of Australia’s Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) represents a new era for Pacific migration. Commencing in mid-2023, the visa will allow for 3,000 workers to come to Australia annually.

In contrast to previous labour mobility schemes, the PEV offers the opportunity for permanent residency, including for family members. However, it is not clear how the new visas will be allocated across the Pacific.

While people from larger Pacific Island countries (PICs) may regard the visa as an opportunity to move to greener economic pastures, for the people of Kiribati, it could offer a lifeline in the face of climate displacement.

As part of the first permanent migration scheme for workers from the Pacific and Timor-Leste, the PEV is modelled on New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category, which began in 2001.

Visas will be allocated via ballot, although how many will be allocated to each country remains unknown. The Australian federal Labor government initially announced a proportional selection formula that offered higher quotas for countries with larger populations.

More on this: What do Pacific workers think about Australia’s Engagement Visa?

However, given that climate-displaced people are not specifically recognised under the 1951 United Nations refugee convention, many have argued that the visa should give consideration to the countries that are most impacted.

Kiribati is a prime example of a nation that could benefit massively from such a recalibration. Located in the Pacific Ocean, halfway between Australia and Hawai‘i, Kiribati is one of the most climate change vulnerable nations on earth. Beyond the droughts and famine it is already facing, expected sea-level rise will make its islands largely unhabitable within this century.

The PEV program could also offer significant material developmental benefits. The economy of Kiribati is small, and its prospects for growth are limited by its rapidly growing population of nearly 120,000 people.

With a minuscule private sector, the over-burdened government is in dire need of economic revenue expansion and access to markets, as well as employment for its citizens.

Importantly, many I-Kiribati have experience in the sectors in which Australia is facing a shortage of skilled workers. This has been shown most clearly via the large number of I-Kiribati healthcare professionals that have migrated since the introduction of the 2006 Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative.

More on this: The future of New Caledonian sovereignty

This growth has reinforced the demand for the skills of I-Kiribati workers from Australian employers, and demonstrates their value to the Australian economy and society. It also validates the Kiribati training and recruiting systems.

The result is a win-win relationship in which I-Kiribati workers meet skills needed in Australia whilst building their economic resilience and, via remittances, supporting families at home.

To maximise benefits for low-lying islands, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) could examine how to integrate the aims of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security – the Pacific’s primary framework for cooperation on security issues – into PEV-style migration programs.

This could help the PIF determine its position on the PEV program, and address the emerging concerns of some member states about the impacts of brain drain and the climate crisis. Simultaneously, this assures Australia of a fully utilised program.

The introduction of the PEV has reinforced Australia’s economic links with Pacific Island countries. However, it could also serve as an opportunity for the Australian Government to take on the mantle of regional climate leadership. By prioritising low-lying island states that have limited options in the face of sea-level rise, Australia could prove it is truly part of the Pacific family.

This article is based upon a paper published by ANU Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) as part of its ‘In brief’ series. The original paper can be found here.

The post Can the Pacific Engagement Visa support climate displaced peoples? appeared first on Policy Forum.

What does the historic agreement to establish a ‘loss and damage’ fund at this United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt mean for small island developing states, particularly in the Pacific? How can negotiating parties ensure the fund is operationalised by COP28 in Dubai, rather than allowing countries to stall – as has been seen with previous initiatives? And with Australia looking to co-host the 2026 instalment of the conference with Pacific Island nations, what impact would a successful bid have on the region and the Australian public? Dr Siobhan McDonnell and Dr George Carter, who negotiated on behalf of Pacific Island countries at COP27, join Professor Sharon Bessell and Dr Arnagretta Hunter to discuss the talks and to look ahead to the next conference in Dubai. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3EUs29x

Siobhan McDonnell is a legal anthropologist with over 20 years of experience working with Indigenous people in Australia and the Pacific on land use, gender, and climate change. She is a Senior Lecturer at ANU Crawford School of Public Policy and Chief Investigator for the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Project on Climate Change and Gender in the Pacific.

George Carter is a Research Fellow in Geopolitics and Regionalism at ANU Department of Pacific Affairs and Director of the ANU Pacific Institute.

Sharon Bessell is Professor of Public Policy and Director of both the Children’s Policy Centre and the Poverty and Inequality Research Centre at ANU Crawford School of Public Policy.

Arnagretta Hunter is the Human Futures Fellow at ANU College of Health and Medicine, a cardiologist, physician, and a Senior Clinical Lecturer at ANU Medical School.

Policy Forum Pod is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, Subscribe on Android or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum or join us on the Facebook group.

The post Podcast: The loss and damage consensus at COP27 appeared first on Policy Forum.

The recent climate talks in Egypt have left us with a sobering reality: the window for maintaining global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius is closing fast and what is on the table currently is insufficient to avert some of the worst potential effects of climate change. The nationally determined contribution targets of Asian and Pacific countries will result in a 16 per cent increase in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 from 2010 levels.

The Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan and the package of decisions taken at COP27 are a reaffirmation of actions that could deliver the net-zero resilient world our countries aspire to. The historic decision to establish a loss and damage fund is an important step towards climate justice and building trust among countries.

But they are not enough to help us arrive at a better future without, what the United Nations Secretary-General calls, a “giant leap on climate ambition”. Carbon neutrality needs to at the heart of national development strategies and reflected in public and private investment decisions. And it needs to cascade down to the sustainable pathways in each sector of the economy.

At the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), we are working with regional and national stakeholders on these transformational pathways. Moving away from the brown economy is imperative, not only because emissions are rising but also because dependence on fossil fuels has left economies struggling with price volatility and energy insecurity.

More on this: Indonesian nationalism and the Ashmore Reef debate

A clear road map is the needed springboard for an inclusive and just energy transition. We have been working with countries to develop scenarios for such a shift through national roadmaps, demonstrating that a different energy future is possible and viable with the political will and sincere commitment to action of the public and private sectors.

The changeover to renewables also requires concurrent improvements in grid infrastructure, especially cross-border grids. The Regional Road Map on Power System Connectivity provides us the platform to work with member states toward an interconnected grid, including through the development of the necessary regulatory frameworks for to integrate power systems and mobilise investments in grid infrastructure. The future of energy security will be determined by the ability to develop green grids and trade renewable-generated electricity across our borders.

The move to net-zero carbon will not be complete without greening the transport sector. In Asia and the Pacific, transport is primarily powered by fossil fuels and, as a result, accounted for 24 per cent of total carbon emissions by 2018.

Energy efficiency improvements and using more electric vehicles are the most effective measures to reduce carbon emissions by as much as 60 per cent in 2050 compared to 2005 levels. The Regional Action Programme for Sustainable Transport Development allows us to work with countries to implement and cooperate on priorities for low-carbon transport, including electric mobility.

Our work with the Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Cross-border Paperless Trade also is helping to make commerce more efficient and climate-smart, a critical element for the transition in the energy and transport sectors.

Even with mitigation measures in place, our economy and people will not be safe without a holistic risk management system. And it needs to be one that prevents communities from being blindsided by cascading climate disasters.

More on this: What can we expect at COP27?

We are working with partners to deepen the understanding of such cascading risks and to help develop preparedness strategies for this new reality, such as the implementation of the ASEAN Regional Plan of Action for Adaptation to Drought.

Finance and investment are uniquely placed to propel the transitions needed. The past five years have seen thematic bonds in our region grow tenfold. Private finance is slowly aligning with climate needs.

The new loss and damage fund and its operation present new hopes for financing the most vulnerable. However, climate finance is not happening at the speed and scale needed, and it needs to be accessible to developing economies in times of need.

Innovative financing instruments need to be developed and scaled up, from debt-for-climate swaps to Sustainable Development Goal bonds, some of which ESCAP is helping to develop in the Pacific and in Cambodia. Growing momentum in the business sector will need to be sustained. The Asia-Pacific Green Deal for Business by the ESCAP Sustainable Business Network (ESBN) is important progress. We are also working with the High-level Climate Champions to bring climate-aligned investment opportunities closer to private financiers.

Climate actions in Asia and the Pacific matter for global success and wellbeing. The past two years have been a grim reminder that conflicts in one continent create hunger in another, and that emissions somewhere push sea levels higher everywhere. Never has our prosperity been more dependent on collective actions and cooperation.

Our countries are taking note. Member states meeting at the seventh session of the Committee on Environment and Development, which opens on 29 November, are seeking consensus on the regional cooperation needed and priorities for climate action such as oceans, ecosystems, and air pollution. We hope that the momentum begun at COP27 and the Committee will be continued at the 79th session of the Commission as it will hone in on the accelerators for climate action.

In this era of heightened risks and shared prosperity, only regional, multilateral solidarity and genuine ambition that match with the new climate reality unfolding around us – along with bold climate action – are the only way to secure a future in which the countries of Asia and the Pacific can prosper.

The post Can Asia and the Pacific get on track to net zero? appeared first on Policy Forum.

COP27 has come to a close with an agreement over the establishment of a ‘loss and damage’ fund, one of the key finance goals for Pacific states coming to the conference. Tuvalu’s Minister of Finance, Seve Paeniu, called the result ‘a major breakthrough and a victory for the Pacific Island countries.’

However, work is not over, as the fund is yet to be set up and who will bear responsibility for resourcing it remains undecided.

The loss and damage fund was widely welcomed by Pacific leaders, yet there has been a sense of disappointment over the lack of heightened ambition to keep global temperature increases below 1.5 degrees Celsius.

Although the goal was maintained, a proposed resolution to ensure that emissions peak by 2025 was removed. An attempt to commit states to phase down all fossil fuels, rather than just coal, also failed.

Pacific states used COP27 to discuss climate initiatives outside of the negotiation room, not just inside the formal multilateral negotiations. Tuvalu joined Vanuatu in calling for a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty, and used a side event to discuss its national contingency plan amidst scientific predictions that its islands may become uninhabitable by 2050. The plan was announced less than a week after Tuvalu declared a State of Public Emergency due to prolonged drought.

More on this: Nouméa discord

The island nation is also experiencing its first community outbreak of COVID-19, with over 2,000 cases recorded since the virus was first detected on 2 November. All health facilities across Tuvalu are at an emergency status, whilst several members of the Fiji Emergency Medical Assistance Team (FEMAT) have flown from Nadi on their first international mission to assist with the outbreak.

Papua New Guinea (PNG)’s Enga province has reported 48 cases of sorcery accusation-related violence (SARV) cases this year, though the true number is likely higher. Four women are reported to have died and 12 allegedly tortured in just one incident.

Non-government organisations (NGOs) and churches are at the forefront of the effort to respond to SARV, with a focus on reconciliation and community reintegration.

Advocate Anton Lutz has found that across just four provinces, there are an average 1,553 cases of SARV a year. Lutz is pushing for more government funding for infrastructure to accommodate women fleeing violence and sorcery accusations across the country.

More on this: What can we expect at COP27?

In Solomon Islands, a report has found that women’s sexual and reproductive health continues to be undermined by misconceptions surrounding contraception and pregnancy.

The report, released by the Solomon Islands Planned Parenthood Association in October, found that since 2013, contraception use amongst women has decreased, whilst non-medical abortion attempts have increased.

With post-abortion complications making up 2.4 per cent of admissions to the National Referral Hospital, the report recommended reforming Solomon Islands’ abortion laws to protect women and reduce burden on the health system.

Tuvalu and Kiribati are both experiencing acute food insecurity due to climate change related drought. A UNICEF study has found that 91 per cent of those under the age of five in Kiribati, and 71 per cent in Tuvalu, live in food poverty. This finding reveals that out of the eight food groups, only four or less are consumed by a majority of children in either country.

Vanuatu has been the target of a cyber attack, leaving the government without access to its internal systems for over a week. Despite all government ministries and departments being affected, the Vanuatu government has refused to pay the ransom demanded by the hackers.

After two years of uncertainty, Marshall Islands has formally legislated its decision to maintain its Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) membership. This development leaves Kiribati as the only Micronesian member to remain outside PIF following the 2021 leadership dispute.

The post Pacific security snapshot: 24 November 2022 appeared first on Policy Forum.

The COP27 summit commenced in Egypt over the weekend, with Pacific leaders advocating for stronger international commitments on climate change. Pacific demands include scaling up efforts to keep global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, and a commitment by developed countries to double their 2019 funding for climate adaptation efforts by 2025.

Pacific delegates are also advocating for a loss and damage finance facility, which Pacific Islands Forum Chairman Frank Bainimarama said must be ‘in the order of $750 billion, with at least 10 per cent of climate finance destined for small island states’. The establishment of a loss and damage fund has previously been blocked by the United States, Australia, and European Union countries, but the fund is on the formal agenda at Sharm el-Sheikh.

The 2022 Young Pacific Leaders TechCamp for Climate Change got underway in Auckland, featuring representatives from 16 Pacific Island countries. The event, sponsored by the American Department of State, is intended to generate innovative solutions to the impacts of the climate crisis through technology and knowledge sharing.

Many delegates used the opportunity to advocate for Indigenous-centred solutions. Inangaro Vakaafi, the only representative from Niue at the conference, stated that “in this whole climate crisis, this whole search for climate justice, I think we need Indigenous liberation.” Participants returned home with grant-funded projects to mobilise climate change stakeholders in their communities.

More on this: Does New Zealand’s Indigenous diplomacy measure up?

In Samoa, the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN) met in person for the first time in three years for its 20^th anniversary. The PTCN is designed to promote intelligence sharing and investigative assistance, with this year’s theme of ‘reconnections and reflections’ intended to create a platform for exploring shared challenges and opportunities.

The PTCN meeting took place as Pacific states are increasingly impacted by the transnational drug trade, both as points of transit and production. The effects of this are evident in Fiji, where drug-related offences have gone up by 750 per cent, from 200 in 2013 to over 1,500 in 2020.

The Pacific’s centrality to the Asian drug trade has led Jeremy Douglas, the regional representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, to highlight the need for Pacific law enforcement to pay more attention to external threats.

Delegates from 14 Pacific states have signed the Regional Action Framework for Noncommunicable Disease (NCD) Prevention and Control in the Western Pacific at the 73^rd session of the World Health Organization Regional Committee in Manila.

More on this: Has COVID-19 deepened West Papua’s HIV epidemic?

In addition to emphasising health risks, the framework focuses on the economic impacts of NCDs, such as decreased labour productivity and increased pressure on health services. NCDs are the single biggest killer in the Pacific Island region, taking the lives of at least six people every day in Solomon Islands alone.

The 2022 Fijian general election date has been set for 14 December. Writing for Radio New Zealand, political commentator Dr Shailendra Singh said cost of living is likely to be the central election issue.

Nearly 30 per cent of Fiji’s population experienced poverty in 2020 and up to half of all citizens are reportedly struggling financially.

Violence has broken out on Papua New Guinea’s Kiriwina Island, leaving an estimated 24 people dead. The conflict is said to be linked to an unresolved death from two months ago, allegedly the result of a fight that took place at a soccer match just after the national elections. There were no police stationed on the island when the fighting commenced, and though the situation has de-escalated, tensions remain.

Finally, after more than six weeks without a high-level court in Kiribati, Attorney General Tetiro Semilota has been appointed as acting Chief Justice. Semilota is the first woman and only i-Kiribati to hold the position.

The post Pacific security snapshot: 10 November 2022 appeared first on Policy Forum.

In December 2021, New Caledonians were faced with their third and final independence referendum provided for by the 1998 Nouméa Accord. The vote was meant to provide clarity about the future of the Pacific territory, which was first colonised by France in 1853, following a period of violence between 1976-1988. Unfortunately, it did anything but.

The referendum proved controversial after a request by pro-independence parties to delay the vote on account of the devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was denied by French President Emmanuel Macron. In response, the independence movement called on their supporters to boycott the vote.

The result was a landslide victory for the French loyalists, with approximately 96.5 per cent of votes cast against independence, but a referendum in which more than half of Caledonia’s registered voters abstained.

With such a large proportion of New Caledonians seemingly questioning the legitimacy of the referendum, the territory’s future is still clouded by uncertainty. So what happens next?

In the wake of the vote, the French Council of State rejected a legal challenge attempting to dismiss the result as illegitimate. According to the council, the fact that only 43 per cent of eligible voters participated did not ‘invalidate the sincerity of the vote’.

More on this: Is New Caledonia’s referendum a double dead end?

Loyalist Philippe Dunoyer from the Caledonia Together party claimed the ruling ‘put an end to the Nouméa Accord’.

He said the first target for change would be the restricted electoral rolls, which have limited voting on key issues to those with New Caledonian citizenship since the 1990s. This has meant that 40,000 French residents, who pay taxes in the territory and in some cases were born there, have been restricted from voting.

Despite Dunoyer’s claims, however, it seems that the Accord may remain in effect for the foreseeable future. Enshrined in the French constitution, the Accord describes the transfer of administrative power to local authorities as ‘irreversible’. According to Mathias Chauchat, a law professor at the University of New Caledonia, there is a contradiction between the irreversibility of this power transfer and the notion of the accord lapsing.

“The two concepts cannot be made to coexist,” he said. “Either the Accord is void or it is irreversible.”

The chair of a delegation of the French Senate Law Commission who visited New Caledonia agreed, saying that it will remain in effect until a new agreement has been reached. If that fails, the ‘irreversible’ delegation of self-governing powers is protected, according to the French Senate Law Commission.

Reaching a new agreement may be difficult, however, given the number of parties and amount of division on the issue of sovereignty in New Calendonia.

Even among pro-independence parties, there are diverging visions of territorial sovereignty. The Palika party suggested negotiating an agreement of sovereign independence in ‘partnership’ with France, which could be ratified by a United Nations-run referendum. On the other hand, the largest pro-independence party Caledonian Union still prefers complete independence, also through a United Nations-administered vote.

Meanwhile, moderates in the anti-independence camp – such as the Caledonia Together party – have often shared the concerns of the indigenous Kanak people about the management of the nickel-dependent economy, the importance of expanding trade and diplomatic relations in the region, and the need to address the high cost of living and inequality.

More on this: New Caledonia’s thirty-year referendum process may fall at the final hurdle

Caledonia Together founder Philippe Gomès envisioned a self-governing New Caledonian ‘nation’ that remains officially part of France. He argued that the referendum question should not have asked for a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to independence, but that a third, less polarising option should have been offered.

Other local politicians have suggested independence in ‘association’ with France, a United Nations concept that sites between full integration and complete independence, which has been adopted by several Pacific Island states. The Cook Islands and Niue have a such a relationship with New Zealand, meaning their people are citizens of both countries, they use New Zealand currency, and they receive financial aid from their larger Pacific neighbour.

Yet, hardline anti-independence groups like the Future with Confidence group want a more radical post-Accord agenda that recognises the cultural identity of the mostly non-Kanak Southern Province, favours majority rule in the cabinet, and expands the electorate to include new French migrants.

Kanak leaders fear that if such changes to New Caledonian citizenship are introduced, they would be demographically drowned and essentially recolonised. Indigenous Kanak people remain the largest ethnic group at about 41 per cent of the total population, but are still short of a majority – and their representation would only dilute further if French migrants were offered citizenship.

A potential game changer to these demographic politics, however, is Polynesian migration to New Caledonia. The 2019 census showed that Polynesians comprised approximately 12 per cent of the territory’s population, meaning that together Polynesian and Kanak are in majority.

Whilst Polynesians have long made up a significant portion of the population, since the late 1980s they have become an increasing political force via the establishment of a number of minor political parties, such as Oceanian Awakening (OA).

In 2019, OA won seats in municipal councils, the southern provincial assembly, the Congress, and the executive cabinet, and its stated aim is to be an independent ‘communitarian’ party that ‘go[es] beyond hateful, radical and racist discourses’.

Whether this Pasifika demographic majority tips the domestic political balance in favour of Kanak pro-independence groups remains to be seen, and to this point OA have remained neutral on the question of New Caledonian sovereignty, despite supporting Palika in their formation of coalition government.

However, the outlook for post-referendum discussions is already looking bleak. In September 2022, France’s new overseas minister Jean-François Carenco announced that no more referendums would be held, and instead invited all sides to discuss the territory’s future status in Paris in October. Pro-independence groups have refused to attend, maintaining that they will only talk to negotiate New Caledonia’s transition to full sovereignty.

In the challenging times ahead, it’s important that the French government heed the words of former overseas minister Edouard Philippe, who said that ‘the art of peace’ is rooted in ‘uninterrupted dialogue’ and a ‘custom of working together’.

This article is based on part two of a paper published by ANU Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) as part of its ‘In brief’ series. Part one of the original paper can be found here.

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The long-awaited US-Pacific Partnership talks in Washington ended with a joint declaration on 29 September, celebrated by Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General (SG) Henry Puna as a ‘critical space of consensus.’

The partnership outlined commitments from the United States in areas of fisheries, leadership development, climate and oceans. The agreement was met by praise from some Pacific leaders, including Fiji Prime Minister and Forum Chair Frank Bainimarama, who said he had “new reassurance that America’s might and resources are with our people across the Pacific.”

However, the non-profit organisation Pacific Elders Voice (PEV) expressed concern that the agreement did not reflect island state concerns. The PEV claimed that the summit was overly concerned with geopolitics and left other crucial issues, including economic growth, climate change, and nuclear and maritime security, with little more than ‘statements of shallow aspiration.’

More on this: Implications of the Biden presidency for the Pacific Island region

As PEV’s focus on climate change induced damage was also reinforced by the recent declaration of a La Niña weather event for the third year in a row in the Pacific. This presents increased likelihood of floods in southwest Pacific countries such as Fiji, whilst Kiribati’s drought is expected to worsen.

Furthermore, Salesa Nihmei, the Pacific Regional Environment Programme’s (SPREP) meteorology and climatology adviser, noted that an increasing prevalence in water borne diseases is likely for the south and west Pacific. Drought-prone Papua New Guinean (PNG) islands and Tuvalu will be increasingly vulnerable to water shortages, crop failure and food insecurity.

Training has commenced for a delegation of 34 officers of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force in China. Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare assured Australia during his visit to Canberra this month that the Soloman Islands security pact with China does not include plans for a Chinese military base.

However, Australia’s Office of National Intelligence Director-General Andrew Shearer has continued to express concern, suggesting that Chinese policing tactics ‘could incite further instability and violence in the Solomon Islands.’ Sogavare has attributed the decision to pursue training in China to Australia’s failure to protect Chinese infrastructure in the Honiara riots of November last year – a claim that is refuted by Australian officials – noting that the pact will allow Chinese police to protect multi-million dollar Chinese infrastructure projects.

Police in Tonga are also receiving financial assistance from the Chinese government, which donated $65,000 to upgrade the Tonga police headquarters in Longolongo. This donation was made a week before the annual South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting (SPDMM) in Tonga.

More on this: Will Fiji’s 2022 elections further cement democracy?

The SPDMM is attended by PNG, Fiji and Tonga – the only states with militaries in the Pacific – along with regional allies including Australia, New Zealand, France and Chile. Ministers will visit areas affected by the volcanic eruption and tsunami which hit the Kingdom in January this year. The purpose of these visits is to serve as a ‘reminder’ of the importance of ‘com[ing] to each other’s aid’, after 84 per cent of Tonga’s residents were impacted by the ashfall from the eruption.

Fiji is facing electoral uncertainty as there remains no date for the 2022 general election. Leader of the opposition National Federation Party, Professor Biman Prasad, has accused Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimamara of ‘holding the nation to ransom’ as time runs out for the election to be held before 9 January 2023.

Professor Prasad has criticised that the elections will likely be held over the holiday period, arguing that this will inconvenience families and non-government organisations. Further, he asserted that the timing will make it difficult for the diplomatic community to effectively send and support members for the Multinational Observer Group to monitor the election.

Talks on New Caledonia’s new statute, intended to take place in Paris, are proceeding with no representation from the pro-independence movement. The two largest pro-independence groups, the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) and the Union nationale pour l’indépendance (UNI), have refused to send delegates to the negotiations, citing insufficient details being given about what the talks will entail.

In PNG, the 2022 election has been deemed the most violent since the country’s independence, leaving 90,000 people displaced since May. Most of those affected are women and children, with an estimated 25,000 students impacted by ongoing school closures in Hela, the Southern Highlands, and Enga provinces.

Finally, the snap election in Vanuatu has been held, however who will form government remains unclear. Despite this, Gloria Julia Kings has been confirmed as Vanuatu’s first woman member of parliament since 2008.

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