Why South Korea needs to get the public onside with foreign policy

How increased public engagement could engage a politically polarised and protest-ready population

Jeffrey Robertson

Government and governance, International relations, National security, Arts, culture & society | Asia, East Asia

19 July 2017

South Korean policymakers need greater public buy-in to put the country’s foreign policy onto surer footing, Jeffrey Robertson writes.

South Korea faces some momentous foreign policy challenges: addressing North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs; seeking redress of China’s economic sanctions against the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) deployment; strengthening relations with Japan; and dealing with the Trump administration. But with every step, South Korea faces a greater challenge – and it’s not North Korea, China, Japan, or the US. Rather, it’s South Korea’s own population. How do you engage politically polarised and protest-ready citizens?

Foreign policy engagement has never been a strong point for South Korea’s presidential administrations. This can be blamed on culture, security or even recent history.

Culturally, South Korea’s public administration inherits a degree of Confucian scholarly aloofness. Administrators are meant to be benevolent, and deserving of obeisance, leading to a sense of separation and a reduced need for discussion or explanation. An individual or group can petition (a lower subordinate position), but can’t expect discussion or consultation before decisions are made.

In security terms, South Korea has survived because it feels vulnerable. Foreign policy is a sensitive subject. As scholar Hoon Jaung once noted, until recently foreign policy was decided “in the secret garden of the president”. For this reason, practitioners have a tendency to hold their cards close to their chest. Public engagement only helps the enemy.

More on this: Moon sweeps to victory, yet regionalism still a powerful force

While democratisation greatly improved public engagement, the presidential system still limits the necessity of public outreach. This was highlighted under the ‘imperial presidency’ of Park Geun-hye, which became notorious for neglecting the press and the National Assembly.

There are definite benefits to improving foreign policy public engagement. First, an engaged public shoulders a degree of responsibility for decisions. The public buys into policy and accepts its consequences. Recent public demonstrations on foreign policy issues, such as the May 2008 protests against US beef imports, and the June 2015 protests against the Japan ‘comfort women’ deal, resulted from a distinct lack of public engagement.

Public engagement also helps build a constituency, strengthening the foreign ministry’s bureaucratic position.

Second, an engaged public allows decision-makers to become aware of gaps between national interest and public knowledge. At worst, it allows decision-makers to avoid issues if the gap can’t be narrowed. Brexit serves as a warning. On the night of the referendum, ‘What is the EU?’ became a trending search term on Google. The level of public knowledge regarding the EU made the referendum a highly risky strategy.

Finally, engagement strengthens the public’s support for national objectives, and signals to partners a state’s broad intentions.

So, what are the options for South Korea to improve public engagement? The public is politically polarised and public trust is at historical lows. Public engagement may be crucial, but it’s also fraught with risk. One option that has to date eluded South Korea’s foreign policy administrators is the white and green paper processes.

A ‘white paper’ is a strategic level process designed to engage the public on core issues. The public is invited to address terms of reference detailed in a public discussion paper on the state’s international engagement through public submissions, roundtables, and seminars. This allows the public to better understand and influence the country’s broad strategic priorities.

The terms of reference are used to guide public responses, but at the same time give valuable insight into stakeholder opinions, including those who will protest any government position.

The final result is a strategic document, which guides (rather than determines) policy for the next five to seven years, increasing continuity, whole-of-government coordination, and awareness of policy direction amongst parliamentarians, the press, epistemic communities, foreign partners, and the broader public.

South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) currently publishes a “diplomatic white paper”, but this annual policy document acts more as a condensed retrospective report on the administration’s achievements rather than a prospective strategic document.

More on this: South Korea's crisis is an opportunity for reform

A ‘green paper’ is a contextual level process designed to engage the public on a specific issue. Green papers can be used prior to legislative implementation to provide options to address a specific issue and engage the public to test support and/or opposition. They can also be used after legislative implementation to engage the public on the processes to fulfil policies.

A good example of a foreign policy green paper is the 2006 European Union Green Paper on the Diplomatic and Consular Protection, which provided suggestions and invited comment on the implementation of Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

South Korea’s MOFA engages the policy elite on specific issues but rarely extends this to the broader public and even more rarely on specific core issues.

Amidst an alarming heightening of tensions in the region, South Korea’s foreign policy deserves substantially more attention than it currently attracts. It often remains ignored and neglected amongst scholars and policymakers.

Public engagement is a hidden problem in South Korea’s foreign policy that will inevitably become more visible as the government presents solutions to issues involving North Korea, China, Japan, and the US. In light of President Moon Jae-in’s Berlin address on re-engaging with North Korea, public engagement may well prove to be the most important foreign policy problem.

Back to Top
Join the APP Society

Leave your Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Time limit is exhausted. Please reload CAPTCHA.

Press Ctrl+C to copy

Republish

Close