On 19 December, Admiral Yudo Margono was inaugurated as the next Chief of the National Armed Forces (TNI), replacing the retiring General Andhika Perkasa. The only candidate nominated by President Joko Widodo for the position, Admiral Margono will only be the third navy leader to serve as joint chief of the military.

The appointment of Admiral Margono, who had been Chief of Staff of the Navy since May 2020, is unsurprising. Early in his first term, President Widodo made the maritime domain a centrepiece of his foreign policy strategy, with a plan to turn Indonesia into a ’global maritime fulcrum’. Given this maritime focus, it’s logical that an admiral should lead Indonesia’s defence forces.

As Admiral Margono steps into the role, Indonesia’s military is facing a challenging geopolitical environment – with the maritime domain in particular becoming more contested.

The South China Sea will likely become his main challenge. This issue has been bubbling away through President Widodo’s nearly two terms as president, not only as a result of China’s intrusion in the North Natuna Sea, but because the various disputes have provoked powers from outside the region to build their presence in Southeast Asian maritime areas.

The 2021 announcement that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines as part of a new ‘AUKUS’ partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom is another significant maritime issue facing Indonesia. Indonesian officials went on record about their concerns around the potential impact of the deal on regional security and non-proliferation, and President Widodo reportedly registered his misgivings with the then-Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison.

More on this: Indonesian nationalism and the Ashmore Reef debate

For a country that has long prided itself on maintaining a neutral posture in great power conflicts, it is crucial that Admiral Margono support the development of Indonesia’s armed forces so that the country is able to respond to emerging threats on its own terms.

But there is a long road ahead, given the military’s historical underperformance. Indonesia ranked just 13th out of 26 countries in Asia for military capability in the 2021 Lowy Institute Asia Power Index – this performance needs to improve if the country is to be a more influential regional military power.

So how will the new armed forces chief try to set the military on the right course?

During the fit and proper test Admiral Margono faced in the house of representatives, he described four priorities for his leadership.

The first was the acceleration of the development of human resources in Indonesian military assignments, based on high levels professionalism and “spirit”.

The second was to increase the capacity of the armed forces, specifically in terms of its defence infrastructure. After a 2021 disaster in which an Indonesian submarine sank during routine exercises off the coast of Bali – costing the lives of all 53 crew – there has been significant criticism of the country’s ageing fleets.

More on this: Can Indonesia realise its dream of world-class universities?

Third was increasing the military’s capacity to carry out multi-domain and combined arms operations by strengthening the interoperability of the navy, air force and army. This has been a focus of the Indonesian military for some time, with the country establishing the Joint Regional Defense Command in 2019.

Finally, he wanted to improve the implementation of bureaucratic reform and the organisational culture within the TNI to support all duties and responsibilities of the armed forces.

This bureaucratic reform is necessary to ensure good governance in the military, to stamp out any corruption, and to enhance its performance.

Beyond these priorities, Admiral Margono may be able to strengthen bilateral defence relationships with Indonesia’s neighbours.

He already has a strong relationship with Australia, having been appointed Member in the Military Division of the Order of Australia in recognition of his ”exceptional service in strengthening the Australian and Indonesian ties” in 2022.

He was also awarded a prestigious military honour from Singapore President Halimah Yacoob this year.

Maintaining strong relations with these two countries is of particular importance. Indonesia’s parliament finally ratified the Indonesia-Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement after 15 years of negotiations, and a recent claim of sovereignty over Australia’s Ashmore Reef by Indonesian Minister Sandiaga Uno highlighted the risk of misunderstandings in the region.

However, his relationship with the United States might not be as close as his predecessor’s, which could lead to a more neutral position on competition between United States and China.

Admiral Margono’s promotion to the TNI head comes at a time of major change, both within Indonesia and the Indo-Pacific broadly. To meet the region’s evolving threats and opportunities, he must find a way to improve Indonesia’s capabilities in an increasingly contested region.

Most importantly, given his naval background, he should be able to orient the military towards a more maritime-oriented posture, which is an important step considering Indonesia’s geographical landscape and likely future challenges.

The post Challenges and expectations for Indonesia’s new armed forces chief appeared first on Policy Forum.

Across political, military, and economic domains, the United States and the post-Cold War international order it leads is being challenged, especially by China and Russia. This reality suggests that the world is never static — and it offers middle powers an opportunity to play a role in calibrating the international order.

In recent years, Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index noted the emergence of the Philippines as a ‘middle power’, with diplomatic influence and defence networks as its greatest strengths.

But what exactly does it mean to be a middle power?

Giovanni Botero defined middle powers as entities that possess “force and authority sufficient to maintain itself without the need for the help of another.” Andrew Cooper observed that middle powers form a “niche” in building a world order.

In essence, a middle power, as Andrew Carr suggested, “can protect its core interests and initiate or lead a change in a specific aspect of the existing international order.”

More on this: Inclusive development in the Philippines

Tanguy Struye de Swielande said that there are five determinants of a middle power: it should have medium-sized (material and immaterial) capabilities, a status that’s recognised by other states, self-conception about that status, and have both regional and systemic impact. Among the five, he argued, regional impact and self-conception are the most prominent indicators.

So how does the Philippines measure up?

The Philippines Government made a regional impact when it won the arbitration in 2016 against China’s claim in the South China Sea. The United States, Australia, Japan, and Western European states, among others, expressed support for the ruling.

Former President Rodrigo Duterte, who was perhaps the country’s most anti-American leader in recent times, even acknowledged that the ruling contributes to strengthening the rules-based international order at the United Nations in 2020 and 2021.

These acknowledgements of the country’s regional and systemic impact are significant – but what about the country’s self-conception?

The new government seems to be warming to the idea that the country can occupy a middle power role. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, under the presidency of the recently elected Ferdinand Marcos Jr, officially celebrated its inclusion as middle power in the Lowy rankings in August.

In his speeches before the United Nations General Assembly and Asia Society this September, Marcos Jr consistently reiterated his government’s support for the international rules-based order. This demonstrates a willingness to embrace a ‘niche’ leadership role, identified by scholars as key for middle powers.

More on this: Should the Philippines’ helicopter deal with Russia go ahead?

However, these are only initial steps. For decades, the Philippines’ strategic culture has been geared toward reliance on the United States for its external defence rather than building its own capabilities, undermining its legitimacy as a middle power candidate.

Further, Bruce Gilley argued that middle power status is an unstable category in an unstable world. It requires “a delicate psychological disposition: to accept that one is near the top of global leadership, that one can make a difference, but to avoid falling into delusions of grandeur because it will lead to great regrets, a massive hangover, every time reality snaps back into place.”

In other words, the Philippines may ultimately lose its middle power status if it fails to fully recognise itself as one. This means policymakers need to recognise the county’s agency in shaping the region’s future, rather than just accepting whatever major powers dish up.

For example, in recent engagements with the United States, some have framed the Philippines as victims or dependents of “American imperialism.” But these binary narratives betray international realities, which beg for a more nuanced view and a more active approach.

Of course, one-time rhetoric does not necessarily have a meaningful impact on foreign policy, but recent studies argue that narratives are increasingly becoming a significant part of international affairs. They are a significant tool used to influence foreign policy, and provide guidance for strategic communication, policy implementation, and national mobilisation.

If the Philippines is to be a middle power, it must also consider policy. For instance, the country’s defence modernisation must befit a middle power. That is, the administration should not just focus on acquiring platforms, munitions, and enabling technologies to replace old ones – it should also consider the tactical, doctrinal, operational, and strategic implications of these decisions.

Since defence networks are one of its key strengths, the Philippines’ leadership must recognise the value of its military’s interoperability with key allies and partners. In so doing, the Philippines could enhance its diplomatic credibility in shaping a favourable regional order which reflects its national interests.

Embracing a middle power narrative will be a litmus test for the country’s statecraft in the turbulent years to come. There is much work to do to make this a reality, but hard times also create opportunities – it’s up to the Philippine state to make the most of them.

The post The Philippines must embrace a middle power narrative appeared first on Policy Forum.

Located along one of the world’s most important shipping lanes, the Strait of Malacca, and with claims to parts of the strategically significant South China Sea, maritime law enforcement is a significant component of Malaysia’s national security policy.

With approximately 19 agencies currently involved in maritime policy-making, calls are growing for the Malaysian Government to create a National Maritime Single Point of Contact (NMSPOC), which would centralise and streamline maritime law enforcement in the country.

Bringing together so many agencies with diverse and sometimes competing interests under one roof can be a fraught process, but Malaysian policymakers can learn from Australia’s efforts during the creation of the Australian Border Force (ABF).

The only continent to be occupied by a single state without a land border, Australia spans the Pacific, Southern and Indian Oceans, and neighbours archipelagic nations like Indonesia, New Zealand and several Pacific Island nations. Understandably, given Australia’s geography, it has significant maritime interests and security concerns, like Malaysia.

However, over the last decade, Australia’s maritime border security strategy has undergone significant transformation.

On 1 July 2015, the federal government merged the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) into the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), and created the ABF as the department’s ‘operational arm’. The ABF is now housed within the Department of Home Affairs, which was created in late 2017.

But the formation of the ABF was not an easy task.

More on this: Coast guard diplomacy and maritime security in Southeast Asia

The first challenge was to bring two different organisations, with different cultures and working environments, together effectively.

The creation of the ABF represented a significant change in the way Australia executed its border security strategy. It revamped its approach to tackling the diverse maritime challenges it faces, including transnational crime and irregular migration.

Through the creation of the ABF, the Australian Government took a more securitised approach that centralised border control. In line with this move, the leadership of the organisation’s leadership sought to create a disciplined, enforcement-focused culture. Uniforms were introduced for some ABF personnel, and all immigration and border protection staff became subject to drug and alcohol testing, rather than just operational personnel.

By examining the effectiveness of these efforts, Malaysia’s policymakers can make more informed decisions around creating a professional work culture and an organisation that functions well.

The second major challenge was legislative.

With the establishment of the ABF, the statutory authority of ACBPS was abolished, and the new Australian Border Force Act 2015 formed the legislative basis for the ABF’s new operational mandate.

Legislative consolidation plays a crucial role in centralising operations that require the involvement of different kind of enforcement bodies. Most Malaysian maritime enforcement agencies are subject to different legislation and operate under various ministerial jurisdictions.

More on this: Race, politics, and prospects for reform in Malaysia

Consolidated legislation that creates clear lines of accountability, similar to the Australian Border Force Act, will be an important step for Malaysian policymakers in streamlining the country’s maritime law enforcement efforts.

This process of consolidation can also have budgetary benefits.

A centralised border control agency, which is home to officials with diverse capabilities and experiences, can incentivise collaboration and increase efficiency, thereby saving the department money.

Malaysia should also look to create culture of collaboration in its NMSPOC.

It’s worth noting that it took considerable time and effort for the ABF to reach its current level of maturity, and strong political will played a key role in shaping the ABF as Australia’s leading front-line border agency.

The success of the ABF in becoming into a more integrated, effective, and efficient maritime border protection and enforcement platform sets a good example for Malaysia. As a fellow maritime nation, it deals with many similar challenges when it comes to maritime law enforcement.

In positive signs for further collaboration, the two countries have been working together in this domain for some time already. The ABF was actively involved in various workshops to help shape the NMSPOC since 2018, and it has been working with the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) on Operation Redback. Operation Redback XVI, an initiative involving both the ABF and the Malaysia Coast Guard that concluded in November 2021, focused on countering people smuggling and addressing maritime crime.

In the years to come, Malaysian policymakers should build on this collaboration and learn from the ABF, as it streamlines its own maritime border management and seeks to tackle cross-border maritime crime more effectively.

This work is supported by the Australia-Malaysia Maritime Exchange Virtual Fellowship. Views are the author’s own.

The post Policing Malaysia’s maritime border appeared first on Policy Forum.

A recent incident where the Australian warship HMAS Parramatta was closely tracked by a Chinese warship in the South and the East China Sea has sparked questions about Australia’s role in the contested area.

During the intercept, Chinese military assets, including a guided-missile destroyer and a nuclear-powered attack submarine, reportedly warned the Australian warship that it was in ‘China’s territorial waters’ and told it that it ‘must leave’.

Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles claimed the ‘regional presence deployment’ that the HMAS Parramatta conducted was routine, citing ‘freedom of navigation’ and ‘the global rules-based order’, and highlighting Australia’s role in a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’.

But does Australia really need to be doing this? Regional presence deployments have their pros, but they have their cons too.

For one, the defence minister’s argument is fair enough. Australia and its partners do have the freedom to challenge China’s illegal and excessive claims in the South China Sea. At the 2016 South China Sea arbitration, the tribunal made it clear that China’s claimed ‘nine-dash line’ does not have any legal basis under international law.

Illegal practices like the nine-dash line must be challenged to protect international law and regional presence deployments do this. In other words, there must be countries that are willing explicitly challenge illegal claims. This practice is known as being a ‘persistent objector’.

More on this: The truth behind China’s fishing ban in the South China Sea

Some might suggest leaving this to the United States, but while the US Navy has been doing similar exercises for many years, these can lack legitimacy, because the United States is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Australia, on the other hand, is a party to UNCLOS. This gives the Australian Defence Force a stronger hand internationally when the country claims its regional presence deployments are intended to defend the UNCLOS.

Still, Australia must approach its role as a persistent objector carefully.

Any military exercise in the South China Sea should be precisely calculated to challenge China without provoking responses that could escalate to live fire, or even open war in the South China Sea.

As it stands, some experts believe the current possibilities of miscalculation are too high. Law of the sea expert Professor Donald Rothwell noted that Australian assets are often sailing through these waters without allied back-up – if things were to turn sour, Australia could be caught out.

Moreover, Australia must consider how ASEAN countries respond to regional presence deployments. Some countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, tend to welcome more extra-regional power engagement in the region.

More on this: The US-ASEAN summit and the South China Sea Code of Conduct

On the other hand, other countries, such as Indonesia, tend to be more cautious about outside military presence. They are concerned it might destabilise the region and increase tensions for little payoff.

This might be a reasonable concern. After all, China has responded negatively to increasing Australia’s military engagement. For instance, an Australian P-8A Poseidon surveillance plane was recently targeted by a laser from a Chinese warship while in flight over Australia’s northern approaches.

Also, while Australia is well-suited to being a persistent objector as a party to UNCLOS, existing tension on other issues between China and Australia can affect that role. Chinese decision-makers might raise questions about the intentions of objection in the South China Sea if other tensions, like over trade policy, heat up.

In all, while its role as a persistent objector in the South China Sea is reasonable and important, Australia must be very careful not to provoke an open escalation in the disputed area.

It should challenge China’s illegal claim, but acknowledge that regional presence deployments are not the only way. Given sensitivities to other tensions and concerns among ASEAN countries, it should combine its military operations with other actions to make its intentions clear.

For instance, in 2020 many countries sent diplomatic notes to the United Nations Secretary General requesting China uphold the 2016 tribunal ruling in response to Malaysia’s extended continental shelf proposal. This is also a form of challenge and action like this can broaden Australia’s objection to the nine-dash line claims.

While the Australian objection in the South China Sea is important, it carries risk, and the worst-case scenario could provoke China into an open escalation. With so much on the line, Australia has to be very careful and pursue a balanced approach.

The post Australia’s role in peace in the South China Sea appeared first on Policy Forum.

In effect from 1 May to 16 August, China unilaterally began its annual summer fishing ban for important seas in East and Southeast Asia last month. The ban makes it illegal for vessels from any country to catch fish in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the waters north of 12 degrees latitude in the South China Sea (SCS), and is enforced by the Chinese Coast Guard.

China has applied the ban since 1999. As the state-run People’s Daily explained, China considers the ban “part of the country’s efforts to promote sustainable marine fishery development and improve marine ecology.”

But is China’s fishing ban policy solely based on concern for the marine environment? Or is it just a strategy to allow China to wedge its adversaries and project its claimed sovereignty over the area?

The problem of marine fishery sustainability is indeed a longstanding and unresolved issue, particularly in the SCS. Fishery resources are essential to the 190 million people residing in the coastal areas of the SCS, over 77 per cent of whom depend on pelagic fishery resources for their daily protein intake or family income.

This high demand requires a strong supply. Annual catch production in the SCS accounts for over 12 per cent of all fish caught in the world, resulting in overfishing in the SCS.

Since the 1980s, the fishery stocks in the SCS have been decreasing rapidly. As of 2008, SCS fishery reserves have collapsed. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been a major cause of this overfishing and has contributed to the deterioration of the marine environment.

More on this: Fisheries diplomacy and the South China Sea

Scientists also found that rising sea temperatures as a consequence of global warming will be a supporting factor for the decreasing fish stocks in the SCS.

In this context, the original application of the fishing ban was likely intended to genuinely contribute to solving this very real problem.

However, environmental and political concerns are not mutually exclusive – China can use environmental policy as a tool to project power in the contested SCS.

In recent years, China has strengthened its ability to supervise fishing in the area, in particular by giving its coastguard legal license to fire on and tow foreign vessels.

In 2018, control of the coastguard was moved from the State Council to the Central Military Commission, and several combat capable ships previously assigned to the Chinese Navy have recently come under its jurisdiction. These moves have given it an ‘unequivocally military character’ that ‘facilitates unilateralism and aggression in disputed waters.’

Virtually every year as the ban begins, strong protests emerge from other claimants of the sea, especially the Philippines and Vietnam.

More on this: Saving the South China Sea fishery

This year, Vietnam condemned the fishing ban by describing it as ‘a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction’ under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Philippines took a similar line, saying that it was ‘over areas that extend far beyond China’s legitimate maritime entitlements’, and noted its continued opposition to the annual moratorium.

However, these protests may be fruitless. China’s fishing ban is a strategy that is difficult to counter.

China’s invocation of concern for the environment combined with a more militarised coastguard makes it very difficult to prevent it projecting its power in the South China Sea during the moratorium.

China has put itself in a win-win scenario, no matter how other claimants react.

If Vietnam and the Philippines oppose China’s fishing ban, China can construct an image of two countries that do not care about the sustainable fishing in the SCS, arguing that they put their national interests above environmental sustainability.

But if Vietnam and the Philippines accept China’s unilateral policy not to fish in the SCS during the May-August period, they are implicitly recognising China’s right to enforce that ban in waters they claim, essentially conceding sovereignty over the sea.

It is worth considering that China’s choice to do this unilaterally may have prevented other countries from joining sustainable fishing efforts because they fear their acquiescence could be interpreted as recognition of China’s claims to the area, and caused unnecessary clashes that could escalate dangerously.

Policymakers should learn from this and keep an eye out in the rest of the region and the world for governments that may look to use environmental issues as a political instrument.

The Philippines and Vietnam are stuck between a rock and a hard place – revealing that China’s ban is not all about fishing after all, but a deliberate attempt to wedge its adversaries. Considering China’s choice to do so unilaterally and its harsh enforcement, it is clear the fishing ban, while serving some fish-related purposes, is also a strategy implemented by China for projecting its maritime power in the South China Sea.

The post The truth behind China’s fishing ban in the South China Sea appeared first on Policy Forum.

In May, United States President Joe Biden hosted the first in-person US-ASEAN leaders’ summit at the White House since the pandemic started. The summit occurred during an important time, with the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy intensifying with Southeast Asia at its forefront.

The US-ASEAN joint vision statement reiterated the commitment of the partnership in addressing issues such as the COVID-19 recovery, economic connectivity, technological innovation, and climate change. Promoting maritime security and cooperation was also among its top priorities, specifically the importance of finalising and implementing the South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC).

The evolution of the CoC dates back to 1992, when ASEAN issued its first statement on territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Endorsing the concept of a CoC in 1996, they then signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in 2002, with draft guidelines being adopted in 2011.

While the DoC has already played a significant role in stabilising the area, a CoC would be an upgraded version that would take yet another step towards regional peace and stability.

On many occasions, both ASEAN and China officials have stated that it is in their national interest to finalise a CoC as soon as possible.

ASEAN claimants want a CoC to ensure peace and security in the disputed area and to uphold international law, and China wants to make sure that the dispute remains exclusively between ASEAN claimants and China, minimising the involvement of extra-regional powers in the disputed area.

For these reasons, both parties have reiterated their commitment to a CoC, but there are still contentious issues that prevent both parties from concluding it.

More on this: Towards a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea

Some of the questions that arose during negotiations include whether the CoC is legally binding, its scope, and the role of extra-regional powers in enforcing it.

It was in this context that the US-ASEAN Summit took place.

On the second day of the summit, United States Vice President Kamala Harris hosted a working lunch on maritime security. The United States has committed to ensure maritime security in the region by intensifying cooperation with ASEAN coast guards to tackle issues such as illegal fishing, transnational organised crime, and importantly, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

The summit served to reiterate the growing maritime security cooperation in the region.

The first ASEAN-US Maritime Exercise was conducted in 2019, and other bilateral agreements are proliferating across Southeast Asia. Maritime security cooperation between the United States and ASEAN navies and law enforcement agencies is only increasing.

In addition to the United States’ growing interest, the European Union’s release of an Indo-Pacific strategy has underscored its commitment to a naval presence in Southeast Asia. Again with specific emphasis on the South China Sea dispute, it espouses the need to protect freedom of navigation in the region.

More on this: ASEAN’s dilemma in the South China Sea

Ultimately, the summit and these other developments show that extra-regional powers continue to be involved in the South China Sea, and China’s alarm bells are sure to be ringing as a result.

Even despite China and ASEAN’s differences on a potential CoC, the warming US-ASEAN relationship and their increased maritime security cooperation is likely put pressure on China to negotiate a CoC with renewed urgency.

It is worth noting though that China has also ramped up its naval presence and bases across the region.

For example, the recent Solomon Islands-China security pact raised concerns for the United States and its allies.

Amidst this turbulence, committing to a CoC in the South China Sea would mark a significant step forward for peace and security in the region.

With the situation quickly evolving, the US-ASEAN summit should provide a boost in momentum on this ahead of ASEAN and China resuming their in-person CoC negotiations.

It sends a clear message to China that ASEAN and the United States have a strong commitment and shared interest in maintaining a rules-based order in the region.

Hopefully, that commitment can trigger a sense of urgency for China to finalise a CoC, giving ASEAN claimants more leverage. If the recent summit can provide that boost, negotiators from the ASEAN countries can enter their talks with China more confident that they can finalise a CoC that protects international law and sovereignty in the region.

The post The US-ASEAN summit and the South China Sea Code of Conduct appeared first on Policy Forum.

In its newly released Indo-Pacific Strategy, the United States has placed its Coast Guard in the centre of its maritime security strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

The Strategy says that the country would expand the presence and cooperation of the United States Coast Guard in Southeast and South Asia and the Pacific Islands, with a focus on advising, training, deployment, and capacity building. So, how can Southeast Asian coastguards benefit from this? And how must current regional coast guard arrangements change to respond to the United States’ strategy?

Last year, the Indonesian Sea and Coast Guard and United States Coast Guard jointly created a maritime training centre in Batam, which aims to increase the capacity and capability of the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA).

With more American commitment in the region, this kind of cooperation can be expanded – not only with BAKAMLA, but also with other coast guards across Southeast Asia.

More on this: ASEAN's response to the invasion of Ukraine

Rather than doubling down on its military presence, the United States’ choice to build up its coast guard in the region is probably better for Southeast Asian maritime security.

While there might be some positive impacts stemming from the United States’ current military presence, increasing this yet again poses the risk of provoking China and increasing tension in the South China Sea. The choice to use the coast guard instead signals to the region that the United States is primarily focused on law enforcement activities and technical support.

In addition, a larger navy presence would not substantially help with the region’s maritime law enforcement. Southeast Asia should be ultimately responsible for its own maritime security, but with American technical support. An increased role for the coast guard in the region can boost cooperation and help achieve this goal.

For instance, last year BAKAMLA initiated the very first ASEAN Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), with the same goal – to boost cooperation among Southeast Asian coast guards. The Chief of BAKAMLA said that the ACGF can be a space for information sharing and confidence-building, especially when it comes to the South China Sea.

There have been similar developments within the larger Asian region, including China, with the Head of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) taking place in December last year.

More on this: AUKUS and ASEAN's waning centrality

Of course, a United States Coast Guard presence in the region is not new, but in this context an increasing commitment to coast guard presence could positively impact region’s maritime security, specifically in the South China Sea.

Ideally, the ACGF would not only expand its cooperation with the United States, but also with China, to maintain the centrality of ASEAN nations to the region’s maritime security.

Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. In the last few years, China’s coast guard has acted assertively in the South China Sea, to the disapproval of Southeast Asian nations. This has created trust issues among parties that have hamstrung cooperation.

That said, it may be worth the ACGF exploring cooperation with China on less tense issues, such as natural disaster management.

Overall, an increase in cooperation between coast guards in the region will have a positive impact on its maritime security. Hopefully, the ACGF can take advantage of this move, and position coast guards as a leading space for cooperation on regional maritime security into the future.

The post Coast guard diplomacy and maritime security in Southeast Asia appeared first on Policy Forum.

Since it was established in 1967, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a cornerstone of Southeast Asian countries’ foreign policy, and the organisation was crucial in securing peace and security during the Cold War.

Moreover, before the establishment of ASEAN, there was much more conflict between Southeast Asian countries, making the region fragile, and its establishment has led to a more prosperous and peaceful region.

Indeed, former President of the United Nations Security Council Kishore Mahbubani even argued that ASEAN deserved to be awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for what it has done in maintaining peace and security in the region.

But today, this peace may be under threat. Many Southeast Asian countries face a huge test for their peace and security in the form of the South China Sea dispute, which might be one of the most complicated issues ASEAN has faced.

Above all, the question the region faces is to what extent ASEAN, as a regional organisation, can have a role in resolving the South China Sea dispute. Regretfully, ASEAN alone has little sway over how things will turn out in the South China Sea.

Of course, it must be noted that the South China Sea dispute is not an intra-ASEAN conflict. It is a conflict involving some ASEAN maritime member states, namely Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and the Philippines, but the primary claimant, China, is not an ASEAN member state.

More on this: Is American assertiveness in the South China Sea good for Indonesia?

Even though Indonesia is not a party to the dispute, it has a strong interest in the dispute and has been involved in many escalations and confrontations along China’s illegally claimed nine-dash line in the South China Sea.

However, it doesn’t affect all of ASEAN’s member states directly. Other ASEAN countries, such as Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, are neither a party to the dispute nor have they directly confronted China in the South China Sea.

It is important to note here that there are two broad categories of ASEAN member states, maritime-based ASEAN countries, which are mostly claimants to the dispute, and land-based ASEAN countries, that are not directly involved in the dispute.

Crucially, these ASEAN land-based member states, such as Laos and Cambodia, have often heavily relied on China. For both Laos and Cambodia, China is their most significant source of development through development assistance projects and foreign direct investment.

For instance, China’s foreign direct investment in Cambodia was $860 million dollars in the first 11 months of 2020, a significant increase on the previous year. With this huge reliance on China, these member states will not let ASEAN undermine their relationships with China over a situation in which they are not even involved.

More on this: Women, peace and security in ASEAN

Even among the maritime-focused countries of ASEAN, domestic politics has influenced positions towards China.

For example, in the case of the Philippines, in the move from former President Benigno Aquino III to President Duterte there has been a shift of tone to a softer foreign policy attitude towards China.

On top of all this, the economic interest of all ASEAN member states is tending, in general, towards a conciliatory approach to China. In the last several years, China has offered a huge number of infrastructure projects to ASEAN member states as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.

Even if ASEAN wanted to step in and help resolve the dispute, with member states depending economically on China, it would be difficult for the grouping to take a strong position against the issue.

Also, ASEAN’s origins need to be accounted for. The organisation is not meant to create a military alliance, such as NATO, where all the members agree that a threat to one of its member states means a threat for all. It has never regarded a single country as a common enemy for all member states.

Even during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, ASEAN always tried to position itself as neutral in the conflict. This is what is happening again today amidst growing US-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, and ASEAN reiterated its neutral position by introducing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

Therefore, even though China directly threatens the interests of many ASEAN member states in the dispute, it seems the organisation will stand by for now, despite its desire for peace in the region.

The post ASEAN’s dilemma in the South China Sea appeared first on Policy Forum.

The United States Vice President Kamala Harris visited Vietnam last month during a pivotal point in time for Southeast Asia.

Her visit comes in the wake of the Afghanistan chaos and the COVID-19 pandemic, and as Chinese activities in the South China Sea are posing a growing challenge to the international order in the region.

This was Harris’ first visit to Southeast Asia and the second recent high profile bilateral meeting between Vietnamese and American officials, after United States Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made his successful three-nation tour in July 2021.

These visits, along with the virtual East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2021, demonstrated the increasing strategic importance of Southeast Asia to US foreign policy since the Biden-Harris administration took office.

During this last visit, the United States moved to set the geopolitical equation in the South China Sea by upgrading its ties with Vietnam to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

More on this: Vietnam and the South China Sea’s roiled waters

This move to strengthen ties comes after China refused to acknowledge the United States’ freedom of navigation interests in the South China Sea, it being a crucial principle of international law, and five years after the South China Sea ruling that rejected China’s claims to much of the ocean territory.

Throughout Harris’ three-day visit, leaders from both nations discussed their common legacy of war, strategic interests, and shared vision for the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

This visit demonstrated to the international community how the former adversaries have overcome past grievances in pursuit of mutual economic and strategic interests when it comes to addressing the impacts of COVID-19, the climate crisis, supply chain maintenance, and ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

The relationship between Vietnam and the United States dates back to the Cold War era after Vietnam gained independence from France in 1945. A decade later, both the United States and Vietnam lost tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians during the Vietnam War.

More on this: The South China Sea then and now

Vietnam’s relationship with China has also been marred by conflict, notably in the 1974 Battle of the Paracel Islands and the 1988 Johnson South Reef Skirmish.

Both the Paracel islands and Johnson South Reef are in the South China Sea and remain disputed.

As far as maritime order and safety is concerned in the South China Sea, the new strategic partnership between the United States and Vietnam will make China more responsive by building pressure for a legally binding United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea verdict, as well as strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two nations.

The last few decades have shown a vast improvement in their bilateral relationship, which has shifted from purely a security partnership to including economic cooperation. Here, it is important to underscore the rise of Vietnam’s export market in the United States – bilateral trade between the nations increased by 19.8 per cent to $90.8 billion in 2020.

During her visit, Harris reaffirmed that the United States is committed “to a strong, prosperous, and independent Vietnam, as well as a free, open, healthy, and resilient Indo-Pacific region”. She also announced that the United States will donate an additional one million COVID-19 vaccinations to Vietnam.

Harris’ visit shows the advancement of the strategic partnership between Vietnam and the United States as important allies in Southeast Asia, and highlights their mutual objectives and concerns about maintaining ASEAN’s centrality in the region and an international law-based maritime order in the South China Sea.

The post Changing tides for the United States and Vietnam appeared first on Policy Forum.

Martyn is the founding Editor of Policy Forum and has inspired us since we began in November 2014. We owe him a great debt. Martyn’s vision was to create a place where Crawford School, The Australian National University, and global experts from academia, business, and the policy world could share ideas and analysis on the policy challenges affecting our region and beyond. This has been achieved, and much more besides.

Under Martyn’s editorship, Policy Forum has published more than 2,400 pieces from around 1,700 authors, including not only academics, but senior business leaders, politicians, and prime ministers, and leaders of multilateral institutions.

Policy Forum has been unapologetically broad in its coverage and provided a platform for academics everywhere to engage with policy audiences from around the world. Some of the academics with whom we have worked had their first ‘break’ on Policy Forum before going on to becoming leading public commentators in their areas of expertise.

Our first podcast series, Policy Forum Pod, commenced in 2016. We now have a well-established weekly series that is very popular and listened to around the world. Thanks again to Martyn, we later added the National Security Podcast and Democracy Sausage with Mark Kenny to our podcast repertoire. Combined, these podcasts had more than half a million downloads this year alone, and they have a rapidly growing audience.

Along with the written pieces and podcasts, Policy Forum also has highly engaged social media audiences. Our engagement effectively bridges the divides that ordinarily exist between academia and mainstream social media users.

Martyn leaves Policy Forum at the end of 2020 to take on exciting new challenges. He leaves behind a great team in Angus, Connie, Julia, Gil and Pat, and all the great things that you have come to expect from Policy Forum will continue.

On Martyn’s departure, Angus Blackman, a key, established member of the Policy Forum team, will take on the editorship role and oversee the podcasts.

Please join me in thanking Martyn and wishing him the very best in his new role in 2021.

My best wishes to you all, and especially for the new year.

The post Moving on, stepping forward appeared first on Policy Forum.