On 19 December, Admiral Yudo Margono was inaugurated as the next Chief of the National Armed Forces (TNI), replacing the retiring General Andhika Perkasa. The only candidate nominated by President Joko Widodo for the position, Admiral Margono will only be the third navy leader to serve as joint chief of the military.

The appointment of Admiral Margono, who had been Chief of Staff of the Navy since May 2020, is unsurprising. Early in his first term, President Widodo made the maritime domain a centrepiece of his foreign policy strategy, with a plan to turn Indonesia into a ’global maritime fulcrum’. Given this maritime focus, it’s logical that an admiral should lead Indonesia’s defence forces.

As Admiral Margono steps into the role, Indonesia’s military is facing a challenging geopolitical environment – with the maritime domain in particular becoming more contested.

The South China Sea will likely become his main challenge. This issue has been bubbling away through President Widodo’s nearly two terms as president, not only as a result of China’s intrusion in the North Natuna Sea, but because the various disputes have provoked powers from outside the region to build their presence in Southeast Asian maritime areas.

The 2021 announcement that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines as part of a new ‘AUKUS’ partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom is another significant maritime issue facing Indonesia. Indonesian officials went on record about their concerns around the potential impact of the deal on regional security and non-proliferation, and President Widodo reportedly registered his misgivings with the then-Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison.

More on this: Indonesian nationalism and the Ashmore Reef debate

For a country that has long prided itself on maintaining a neutral posture in great power conflicts, it is crucial that Admiral Margono support the development of Indonesia’s armed forces so that the country is able to respond to emerging threats on its own terms.

But there is a long road ahead, given the military’s historical underperformance. Indonesia ranked just 13th out of 26 countries in Asia for military capability in the 2021 Lowy Institute Asia Power Index – this performance needs to improve if the country is to be a more influential regional military power.

So how will the new armed forces chief try to set the military on the right course?

During the fit and proper test Admiral Margono faced in the house of representatives, he described four priorities for his leadership.

The first was the acceleration of the development of human resources in Indonesian military assignments, based on high levels professionalism and “spirit”.

The second was to increase the capacity of the armed forces, specifically in terms of its defence infrastructure. After a 2021 disaster in which an Indonesian submarine sank during routine exercises off the coast of Bali – costing the lives of all 53 crew – there has been significant criticism of the country’s ageing fleets.

More on this: Can Indonesia realise its dream of world-class universities?

Third was increasing the military’s capacity to carry out multi-domain and combined arms operations by strengthening the interoperability of the navy, air force and army. This has been a focus of the Indonesian military for some time, with the country establishing the Joint Regional Defense Command in 2019.

Finally, he wanted to improve the implementation of bureaucratic reform and the organisational culture within the TNI to support all duties and responsibilities of the armed forces.

This bureaucratic reform is necessary to ensure good governance in the military, to stamp out any corruption, and to enhance its performance.

Beyond these priorities, Admiral Margono may be able to strengthen bilateral defence relationships with Indonesia’s neighbours.

He already has a strong relationship with Australia, having been appointed Member in the Military Division of the Order of Australia in recognition of his ”exceptional service in strengthening the Australian and Indonesian ties” in 2022.

He was also awarded a prestigious military honour from Singapore President Halimah Yacoob this year.

Maintaining strong relations with these two countries is of particular importance. Indonesia’s parliament finally ratified the Indonesia-Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement after 15 years of negotiations, and a recent claim of sovereignty over Australia’s Ashmore Reef by Indonesian Minister Sandiaga Uno highlighted the risk of misunderstandings in the region.

However, his relationship with the United States might not be as close as his predecessor’s, which could lead to a more neutral position on competition between United States and China.

Admiral Margono’s promotion to the TNI head comes at a time of major change, both within Indonesia and the Indo-Pacific broadly. To meet the region’s evolving threats and opportunities, he must find a way to improve Indonesia’s capabilities in an increasingly contested region.

Most importantly, given his naval background, he should be able to orient the military towards a more maritime-oriented posture, which is an important step considering Indonesia’s geographical landscape and likely future challenges.

The post Challenges and expectations for Indonesia’s new armed forces chief appeared first on Policy Forum.

Across Southeast Asia, coastal areas are facing unprecedented threats from urbanisation, coastal development, and climate change. Moreover, decisions about how land in these areas is used are often made exclusively by those holding political power, who are far removed from the communities that will feel their impact.

As a result, land grabbing, community displacement, and damage to both the natural environment and traditional livelihoods are becoming more common.

One area where these effects are being keenly felt is between Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore in the western Tebrau Strait, also referred to as the Johor Strait, where a number of large infrastructure and industrial projects are underway. As well as being a site of rapid industrial development, the area is home to essential seagrass and mangrove ecosystems that are the major lifeline for local artisanal fishing communities.

In areas such as these, establishing a fully-protected marine park is rarely an option, as industrial and urban development is engraved in the area’s master plan and takes priority on the grounds of economic development. Marine parks can also exclude local communities, as fishing within its boundaries is prohibited.

Scenarios such as these are not uncommon across Southeast Asia, as governments across the region pursue economic development in order to move their citizens out of poverty. But as this industrialisation takes place, natural habitats and traditional livelihoods are often sacrificed in the name of ‘progress’.

More on this: The 1MDB scandal and Malaysia’s 2022 general election

The cruel irony is that the most vulnerable members of the community – such as the small fishing communities – are most affected by such changes.

Small-scale fisheries are estimated to make up 90 per cent of global employment in capture fisheries, where fish are caught in the wild. However, participation numbers in Southeast Asia are likely vastly underestimated as workers are often informal, unlicensed, or have supplementary jobs.

It’s these communities that are often the overlooked victims of coastal development projects, especially if they aren’t represented by an umbrella entity that can advocate on their behalf. Across the region, but especially in Southeast Asia’s more authoritarian countries, these marginalised communities have few options when it comes to resisting planning decisions.

However, efforts can still be made to find mutually beneficial solutions that can have positive outcomes for everyone and preserve what remains of precious natural habitats.

Finding these solutions requires the creation of platforms for discussion that bring together all local stakeholders. These platforms create avenues to ensure that all members of the community are heard and invested in the future economic and environmental success of coastal areas.

One potential solution that could be expanded at scale throughout the region is the establishment of ‘community-conserved’ areas. This is an innovation to the standard exclusionary marine park concept – which generally restricts nearly all human uses of an area – as it allows multiple uses of the seascape, yet works to ensure its sustainability and collaborative preservation.

More on this: Policing Malaysia’s maritime border

An organisation this author works with, Kelab Alami, has had some success in its efforts to establish a community-conserved area in Johor, Malaysia. By working to bring developers as well as government agencies to the table with the local community and scientists, Kelab Alami has been able to highlight the importance and credibility of local knowledge – and established the fishermen as vital habitat experts whose views and inputs are invaluable to science and conservation.

Empowering the community through the recognition of their wisdom and expertise has also strengthened their voice in mobilising for their rights, and has enabled local youth to take ownership over documentation and research efforts for their seagrass, mangrove and island habitats, and resident fauna.

This local community now has a forum to engage with external entities, local and government agencies, and surrounding businesses and developers to ensure local participation and collaboration in spite of myriad institutionalised power hierarchies that traditionally make it harder for them to have a say in local decision-making. The focus of these platforms is not to apportion blame, but to find solutions and mitigate further damage.

The community-conserved areas concept has the potential to protect the natural environment and promote economic development.

First and foremost, it could help protect local fish stocks from industrial fishing activities, protecting the livelihoods of these small fishing communities. This can also give rise to other economic opportunities, such as the development of an ecotourism industry. In Johor, ecotourism has become a supplementary source of income for local fishermen – who have been employed as boat captains and facilitators in local habitat and fishing heritage tours.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has named 2022 the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture. In doing so, the FAO noted that small-scale fisheries are the way forward in helping poor coastal communities climb out of poverty, ensuring the long-term sustainability of marine resources and reducing habitat damage.

As such, it is essential that coastal development in Southeast Asia invests in innovative multi-stakeholder platforms. By bringing together everyone who is invested in sustainable development as equal partners in an authentic community, policymakers in the region can nurture inclusive solutions for the benefit of all.

The post Preserving Southeast Asian fisheries appeared first on Policy Forum.

In late October 2022, Indonesian news headlines were plastered with Minister Sandiaga Uno’s controversial claim that Australia’s Ashmore Reef belongs to Indonesia. Uno, who is Indonesia’s Minister of Tourism and the Creative Economy, asserted that Indonesia should protect “every inch” of its territory.

His statement came after the Indigenous people of Timor Sea called for Australia cede control of the reef. Traditional fishing practices have been allowed in the reef since 1974, when Indonesia and Australia signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU).

However, the peoples of Rote, Alor, Sawu, and Timor islands have demanded that Australia go further and recognise their full sovereignty over the reef, due to their centuries-long fishing and cultural practices in the area. They have even threatened to challenge Canberra on the issue in Australian court.

Soon after Uno’s statement, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs backtracked, clarifying that the Ashmore Reef does not belong to Indonesia. The Ministry confirmed their recognition that Indonesia’s territory is equivalent to that controlled by its former coloniser – in this case, the former Dutch East Indies territory. The Ashmore Reef was never claimed by the Dutch, but was ceded to Australia in the 1930s by the British.

Moreover, since Indonesia’s independence, the country has never formally claimed ownership over the reef, either internationally or domestically.

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The 1974 MoU was an attempt to clarify the question of Indigenous peoples’ ancestral practices, as it recognised that Timor Sea peoples could continue to use the reef as they always had done, whilst maintaining Australia’s sovereignty over them under international law.

It seems clear that the Indonesian government has no real intention of claiming the Ashmore Reef, nor the legal ability to do so. However, the controversies in Indonesian media over Uno’s demands offer some important lessons for the practice of diplomacy at the intersection of domestic and foreign politics.

First, high ranking Indonesian politicians should be more careful in making controversial statements that go against government policy, especially when it comes to important relationships with neighbouring countries.

The disparity in public statements shows an embarrassing lack of coordination between Minister Uno and the foreign ministry. To remedy this, elected officials and civil servants need to ensure that they are coordinating closely, rather than talking across one another.

More on this: The 1MDB scandal and Malaysia’s 2022 general election

This is even more important when issues of foreign policy collide with domestic nationalist narratives. Nationalism, particularly regarding territorial integrity, is deeply ingrained within Indonesian domestic politics.

This public sensitivity is derived from Indonesia’s recent historical experience with other neighbours. For example, in 2002 the International Court of Justice ruled against Indonesia in its longstanding dispute with Malaysia over ownership of the Sipadan and Ligitan islands.

This ‘loss’ had a deep psychological impact on Indonesian citizens. As such, it may be tempting for politicians to invoke these memories and concerns for electoral gain, particularly on the 20^th anniversary of the Sipadan-Ligitan decision.

Certainly, a concern with defending one’s country is not a bad thing, when properly applied. However, by baselessly accusing other countries of impinging on Indonesia’s territorial integrity, leaders risk inflaming public sentiment, which can in turn create pressure to escalate proceedings diplomatically.

Instead of making provocative statements, Indonesian officials should take responsibility for educating the public about the truth. Given the importance of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, it is important that any debate over the ownership of Ashmore Reef in Indonesia be ended on the basis of the 1974 MoU.

Moreover, this should also be a lesson for Indonesian politicians as to the importance of consulting with their departments before speaking to the media.

If they do, they might manage to avoid embarrassment in the future.

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Malaysia’s infamous ‘1MDB scandal’ – which saw former Prime Minister Najib Razak jailed for his involvement in the misuse of the national sovereign wealth fund – was pivotal in the outcome of the country’s 14^th general election (GE14).

Ahead of GE14, it seemed that a political climate change was needed in order for the status quo to shift, and the 1MDB allegations provided it.

After 61 years in power, Razak’s party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), and its right-wing government coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), were defeated at the polls in 2018. In their place, the new Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition swept into power.

But this supposed ‘alliance of hope’ was short-lived. In only two years, PH collapsed under the weight of internal divisions and the COVID-19 pandemic, opening the door for UMNO to reclaim the prime ministership via Ismail Sabri Yaakob.

But after three prime ministers in a chaotic four years, what impact will the 1MDB fallout, and anti-corruption more broadly, have on the county’s general election on 19 November?

More on this: What next for Malaysia’s fallen prime minister Najib Razak?

Now that the scandal has been investigated and Najib – its most prominent antagonist – has been jailed, the immediacy seems to have come out of the issue somewhat, meaning Malaysian voters are unlikely to unite around that cause again.

In fact, Najib may even retain some public support, even from his jail cell. In a Bloomberg poll, conducted between August-September 2022, 11 per cent of respondents said Najib was their preferred prime minister.

It is, however, unclear how many of the respondents were polled after his imprisonment in late August, but the former leader still retains significant influence in Malaysia’s political debate.

However, Najib isn’t the only senior UMNO figure who’s been the subject of corruption investigations and controversy. UMNO president and BN chairman Ahmad Zahid Hamidi is currently facing 47 charges, including criminal breach of trust, corruption, and money laundering, over alleged wrongdoing involving a charity. He denies the charges and the trial is set to resume in January 2023.

In August 2022, declassified documents revealed that Zahid was involved in the procurement process for the controversial Littoral Combat Ship project as defence minister, something he’d previously denied.

The project involved awarding a nine billion ringgit contract to Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn (BNS) for six naval combat ships, five of which were meant to arrive the same month as the documents were declassified. However, the ships are yet to be delivered and a former BCS managing director has been charged with three counts of criminal breach of trust, to which he has pleaded not guilty.

More on this: Race, politics, and prospects for reform in Malaysia

None of this controversy has deterred Zahid, however, with speculation rife that he might be installed as prime minister if BN wins the election.

Indeed, the corruption allegations that are plaguing the country’s political elite have not been a central feature of the current campaign.

Corruption is being discussed, for example by the political coalition Perikatan Nasional, which includes ‘political and governance clean up’ as one of its 12 core values. Most of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR)’s 72 candidates have also publicly declared their assets as part of the campaign. But these are exceptions rather than a general trend, and may not be enough impress the voters.

GE15 will still be historic – but for different reasons.

Voter turn-out will be one of the most interesting and telling statistics to look out for. Significant changes were made ahead of this election which could raise participation, such as lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 and the commencement of automatic voting registration for all eligible Malaysians.

On the other hand, the monsoon season might impede some people from voting, as may the possibility of contracting COVID-19, with the Malaysian Government requiring people who test positive for the virus to isolate at home. There is also the potential that voter dissatisfaction and disenchantment, given the unfulfilled electoral pledges made during the GE14 and political turmoil that’s since unfolded, might suppress the turn-out.

It will also likely be the last election campaign for some prominent political figures, such as the 96-year-old two-time prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, who is recontesting his Langkawi seat, and Tengku Razaleigh, who is currently the country’s longest-standing member of parliament, having served for nearly 50 years.

Moreover, even once the ballots are cast, the result might not be clear or stable. The last two years saw politicians party-hopping at a speed that left bystanders bewildered.

UMNO president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi already warned unnominated candidates against conducting ‘betrayals’ that could undermine the party, with the backstabbing that led to the downfall of the PH coalition in 2020 clearly fresh in everyone’s mind. Whether Zahid’s threats are enough to prevent this kind of politicking though remains to be seen.

If the results remain unclear until after election day, it could make obtaining a mandate even more difficult, making maintaining any ruling coalition more difficult still.

While many voters may be eager to see some stability return to Malaysian politics and policymaking, a close election will likely mean the country’s volatile political landscape will remain well beyond GE15.

The post The 1MDB scandal and Malaysia’s 2022 general election appeared first on Policy Forum.

The rain arrived earlier than usual in Thailand this year. In May, Khon Kaen city’s Mittraphap railway community in the country’s northeast was inundated for several days, with flood waters rising to people’s knees. Since then, the informal settlement – which is home to over 700 families – has flooded frequently.

In September, Typhoon Noru crossed the South China Sea and the already-saturated northeast region braced for more floods from the Category 4 storm. Some cities along the typhoon’s path were prepared with evacuation and risk reduction action plans. But in the Mittraphap community, there were no flood mitigation measures or evacuation plans for the informal settlement. The community was inundated and remained underwater for weeks.

As a result of climate change and unplanned urbanisation, flood patterns are changing and flood risks are growing. For communities on the margins like Mittraphap, each flood is a serious economic setback, and the increased frequency of floods means that they may never fully recover before the next disaster strikes.

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Cities are at the front line of climate change and other crises such as conflicts and the COVID-19 pandemic. But what’s clear from the experience of the Mittraphap community – and others like it – is that their impacts are unevenly distributed within cities, with marginalised groups often bearing the greatest burden.

In response, policymakers need to better plan for more inclusive, equitable, resilient, and sustainable cities to address the current problems and prepare for future challenges. To achieve this, cities must plan for a better future for those people on the margins, including the urban poor and people living in informal settlements. This is a major challenge, especially in cities in the Global South, where most rapid urbanisation has occurred over the last decade.

One issue facing communities like Mittraphap in Khon Kaen is that planning decisions are often made with limited public participation from marginalised communities.

For example, in 2015, authorities decided to relocate a regional bus terminal further away from the community. This removed a major source of income from local people, many of whom made a living selling food to passengers at the bus terminal. With limited access to welfare and state assistance, decisions like these can have serious consequences.

More on this: Should cities be built with pandemics in mind?

The relocation of the bus terminal nine kilometres out of town also did not consider commuters’ needs, much less the dependence of the community on the bus terminal for daily income. Better consideration of the local communities could have helped.

But poorly considered planning decisions don’t just lead to material changes in communities’ wellbeing – they are interconnected with environmental changes and can have devastating consequences.

The vulnerability of the Mittraphap community to the impacts of climate change isn’t simply a result of limited resources, poor housing conditions, and tenuous land rights and tenures. Their climate vulnerability is also a result of policy and planning decisions. In order to protect its business centre, Khon Kaen city diverts floodwaters, leaving low-lying settlements more vulnerable.

Cities are shaped by policy decisions that are shaped by political and economic influence. Often this means that special interests with greater resources and access to those in power, such as developers, have an outsized impact on decision-making. The informal economy accounts for 55.7 per cent of the overall labour force in Thailand, but there is little recognition or representation of these workers in the planning decisions that affect them.

It shouldn’t be that way. In Thailand and throughout the Global South, the urban poor and low-income communities build and maintain cities with their labour. It’s incumbent on policymakers to engage with these people and consider their needs before making planning decisions with potentially catastrophic consequences.

But as the interwoven issues of urbanisation, urban poverty, vulnerability, and disasters are become more complex, as cities in the Global South continue to grow and the climate changes, the future of cities needs to be defined by more than just participation. For our cities to truly thrive, they must be shaped by marginalised people – like those of Thailand’s Mittraphap railway community – based on principles of human rights and justice.

The post Cities of the future in an unequal world appeared first on Policy Forum.

In June this year, the QS World University Rankings released its annual list of the world’s best universities. As usual, no Indonesian institutions were in the top 100, nor were there any among the top 50 in Asia.

The low quality of Indonesian higher education institutions, especially in regards to research, has long been a concern for policymakers and those working in the sector. However, positive change in the university sector has been difficult to achieve so far.

To create world-class research universities, Indonesia should focus on developing world-class scholars. There is no instant recipe for this, but policymakers can draw lessons from examples elsewhere in Asia.

Professor Wang Gang Wu, a renowned sinologist and former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong (HKU), once shared his experience of helping to turn the university into one of the world’s best.

When Professor Wang was elected as Vice-Chancellor in the mid-1980s, he realised that to create a world-class research university, there should be a focus on world-class scholarship and publishing in international journals, which are important for global rankings. However, this was easier said than done.

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He found that the older generations of academics at HKU were not familiar with writing for international publications, even though many were great teachers.

As many who’ve worked in universities know, rapid institutional and cultural change can be extremely difficult to achieve, so he made a long-term investment in a new generation of scholars, most of whom were educated abroad.

As a result of his efforts and those of many others, HKU made major strides, and in 2022 the university ranked number 21 in the world and third in Asia by QS.

Indonesia can learn from this story.

Indeed, in the last several years, Indonesian policymakers have started to recognise the importance of high quality research and publishing in international journals to their universities’ global rankings. In an attempt to promote behavioural change, the government decided to require lecturers to publish in reputable international journals that are indexed in Scopus – a major academic abstract and citation database – in order to become a full professor.

However, unlike in the HKU example, the government failed to grasp that these changes cannot happen overnight. Indonesian scholars face a number of barriers to publishing in international journals, including limited English-language skills, poor institutional knowledge of funding and other processes, and, perhaps more importantly, an academic culture that takes time to change.

More on this: Indonesia’s gender equality report card

As a result of the government’s failure to account for these challenges, the policy has become a major burden for Indonesian scholars and unintentionally created a number of academic integrity issues. In order to publish in international journals, some scholars have allegedly turned to plagiarism or enlisted ‘ghost writers’.

But there is a better way to change things.

Learning from what has been done by Professor Wang and others at HKU, Indonesian policymakers and university leaders should focus on nurturing a new generation of scholars whose research skills can be developed over time.

Currently, however, most Indonesian universities do not provide a good environment for scholars to develop. In order to facilitate this, the culture of Indonesian universities needs to change.

Excessive teaching requirements is one issue that needs attention. Teaching requirements in Indonesian universities often exceed those abroad, particularly in developed countries. For example, many faculty in the United States only teach one or two courses semester, while Indonesia academics often co-teach more than five courses.

In some universities with a limited number of academic staff, scholars are forced to teach subjects that are outside of their area of expertise. This does no favours to students, who deserve a quality education delivered by experts in their field, and robs scholars the opportunity to really think, research, and produce high-quality work.

In many universities in developed countries, selected staff are even able to take a paid ‘research sabbatical’ from teaching for six months to a year in order to produce a major publication. This sort of opportunity is rarely afforded to Indonesian scholars.

In addition to a large amount of teaching, Indonesian academics are also expected to undertake a significant amount of administrative work for their university. This can include sourcing grant money, accreditation administration, and other administrative tasks. These are jobs that would be undertaken – or at least supported – by skilled non-academic staff in many universities in developed countries.

Given the huge amount of non-research work Indonesian scholars are saddled with, it is little wonder that progress on improving the country’s research output has been extremely slow.

What’s clear is that the current system isn’t working. Indonesian scholars often aren’t able to devote the time that’s necessary to produce world-class research and attempts to change this through policy have fallen flat. Change in the sector can be hard, but without it, Indonesia’s dream of having world-class universities will remain an illusion.

The post Can Indonesia realise its dream of world-class universities? appeared first on Policy Forum.

In August 2022, Malaysia’s Federal Court upheld the conviction of former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and its 12-year sentence.

For years, it appeared that the 1MDB scandal – which saw billions of dollars stolen from Malaysia’s ‘1MDB’ sovereign wealth fund – would gain little traction in Malaysia.

But in 2018, elections in Malaysia saw outraged voters end Najib’s party’s political reign in the country, ousting the ruling coalition for the first time in six decades. Under the newly elected government, investigations were reopened and charges were laid against Najib, his wife Rosmah Mansoor, and others.

Many courts, from Malaysia’s Federal Court to the United States Department of Justice, have been slowly getting to the bottom of one of the world’s greatest financial scandals.

At the time, onlookers knew that if the trials fairly convicted Najib, they could usher in a new era in Malaysia for political trials. But they also knew that if he walked free with his name cleared, his political career would be spared.

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After two years, on 28 July 2020, Najib was found guilty of all seven charges and was sentenced to 12 years in jail and slapped with massive fines. Then, on 8 December 2021, Malaysia’s Court of Appeal upheld the verdict and on 23 August 2022 the Federal Court upheld them again. With that, the judicial process came to an official end.

However, that does not necessarily mean that the political and personal story for Najib has also ended.

In early July 2022, weeks before the verdict by the Federal Court was handed down, a political deputy within Najib’s old coalition, Mohamad Hasan, continued to show his desire to free Najib.

He stated in an interview: “[e]verybody has to pay their dues. But if we want to pardon, [Najib] has to go through the process. He’ll have to go inside first.”

Hasan refers to the process laid down in Article 41(1) of the Federal Constitution, which provides the Agong (King) the power to grant royal pardons or reprieves for any punishment.

Receiving a royal pardon is not unheard of for politicians in Malaysia. In 2018, Anwar Ibrahim received a royal pardon after more than two decades of prolonged court cases. This allowed him a return to politics in 2018, though the pardon is currently being challenged.

In the case of Najib, it is worth noting that fellow former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad issued a statement in which he foreshadowed the possibility of a royal pardon, saying that “[f]or Najib, it is highly likely that he will be pardoned after being imprisoned”.

Whether this pardon comes is instrumental for the shape of Malaysia’s political future. If he does not receive a royal pardon, on top of his sentence, he will be disqualified from standing for elections for the duration of the sentence, including the one scheduled for November this year, and for a further five years upon his release from prison.

More on this: Race, politics, and prospects for reform in Malaysia

But how likely is a royal pardon will materialise, and how soon might it come?

He has already applied for a pardon, but as it stands, the chances of him receiving it seems low. The King, Sultan Abdullah Sultan Ahmad Shah, has been quoted as emphasising the risks for Malaysia’s law-making if the royal pardon is abused – though he did not mention Najib by name.

He was joined in his comments by the Sultan of Selangor, the head of one of Malaysia’s 13 states, Sharafuddin Idris Shah Alhaj, who recently revoked royal titles held by Najib and his wife in the wake of their convictions. The Sultan emphasised, also without naming names, that royal pardons cannot be abused purely for the ‘benefit of certain parties’.

However, this view is not necessarily held across Malaysia. While they no longer hold titles in Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan, Najib and his wife still hold their titles in Pahang, Perak, Melaka, Kedah, Perlis, Sabah, and Sarawak.

While hardly unanimous, these comments show that Najib’s fall from royal grace is underway, making a royal pardon highly unlikely, at least any time soon.

One thing, however, is for sure. While Najib was on bail during the appeal process, he is now actually in jail. The Malaysian people can also now see that he is being treated like any other prisoner, with rumours of special treatment, including that he had been given a house, debunked.

As to the future, Malaysia is notorious for its politicians making unpredictable comebacks. Najib also continues to enjoy the backing of his party and has significant power as a ‘kingmaker’ behind the scenes.

Malaysia is also not alone in this in the region. Earlier this year, the Marcos family was rehabilitated in the Philippines after 30 years, with Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr being elected president in June.

As such, Najib may feel that he still has a few years left in which he can plan his comeback and wait for a royal pardon to materialise.

With a national election imminent, it is a critical time in Malaysian politics. A win by Barisan Nasional, the coalition Najib used to lead, in the upcoming general election can arguably be seen as a positive step towards receiving such a pardon, especially since it had supported Najib’s bid for a royal pardon.

Long-term, if the country can demonstrate that even those in high public office will be held accountable for their actions, it should restore some of the faith of the Malaysian public, which was shattered in the wake of the 1MDB revelations. However, it remains to be seen which concerns are more pressing for the electorate, especially considering the current economic woes and the ongoing recovery from both the COVID-19 pandemic and the current floods.

The post What next for Malaysia’s fallen prime minister Najib Razak? appeared first on Policy Forum.

Across political, military, and economic domains, the United States and the post-Cold War international order it leads is being challenged, especially by China and Russia. This reality suggests that the world is never static — and it offers middle powers an opportunity to play a role in calibrating the international order.

In recent years, Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index noted the emergence of the Philippines as a ‘middle power’, with diplomatic influence and defence networks as its greatest strengths.

But what exactly does it mean to be a middle power?

Giovanni Botero defined middle powers as entities that possess “force and authority sufficient to maintain itself without the need for the help of another.” Andrew Cooper observed that middle powers form a “niche” in building a world order.

In essence, a middle power, as Andrew Carr suggested, “can protect its core interests and initiate or lead a change in a specific aspect of the existing international order.”

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Tanguy Struye de Swielande said that there are five determinants of a middle power: it should have medium-sized (material and immaterial) capabilities, a status that’s recognised by other states, self-conception about that status, and have both regional and systemic impact. Among the five, he argued, regional impact and self-conception are the most prominent indicators.

So how does the Philippines measure up?

The Philippines Government made a regional impact when it won the arbitration in 2016 against China’s claim in the South China Sea. The United States, Australia, Japan, and Western European states, among others, expressed support for the ruling.

Former President Rodrigo Duterte, who was perhaps the country’s most anti-American leader in recent times, even acknowledged that the ruling contributes to strengthening the rules-based international order at the United Nations in 2020 and 2021.

These acknowledgements of the country’s regional and systemic impact are significant – but what about the country’s self-conception?

The new government seems to be warming to the idea that the country can occupy a middle power role. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, under the presidency of the recently elected Ferdinand Marcos Jr, officially celebrated its inclusion as middle power in the Lowy rankings in August.

In his speeches before the United Nations General Assembly and Asia Society this September, Marcos Jr consistently reiterated his government’s support for the international rules-based order. This demonstrates a willingness to embrace a ‘niche’ leadership role, identified by scholars as key for middle powers.

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However, these are only initial steps. For decades, the Philippines’ strategic culture has been geared toward reliance on the United States for its external defence rather than building its own capabilities, undermining its legitimacy as a middle power candidate.

Further, Bruce Gilley argued that middle power status is an unstable category in an unstable world. It requires “a delicate psychological disposition: to accept that one is near the top of global leadership, that one can make a difference, but to avoid falling into delusions of grandeur because it will lead to great regrets, a massive hangover, every time reality snaps back into place.”

In other words, the Philippines may ultimately lose its middle power status if it fails to fully recognise itself as one. This means policymakers need to recognise the county’s agency in shaping the region’s future, rather than just accepting whatever major powers dish up.

For example, in recent engagements with the United States, some have framed the Philippines as victims or dependents of “American imperialism.” But these binary narratives betray international realities, which beg for a more nuanced view and a more active approach.

Of course, one-time rhetoric does not necessarily have a meaningful impact on foreign policy, but recent studies argue that narratives are increasingly becoming a significant part of international affairs. They are a significant tool used to influence foreign policy, and provide guidance for strategic communication, policy implementation, and national mobilisation.

If the Philippines is to be a middle power, it must also consider policy. For instance, the country’s defence modernisation must befit a middle power. That is, the administration should not just focus on acquiring platforms, munitions, and enabling technologies to replace old ones – it should also consider the tactical, doctrinal, operational, and strategic implications of these decisions.

Since defence networks are one of its key strengths, the Philippines’ leadership must recognise the value of its military’s interoperability with key allies and partners. In so doing, the Philippines could enhance its diplomatic credibility in shaping a favourable regional order which reflects its national interests.

Embracing a middle power narrative will be a litmus test for the country’s statecraft in the turbulent years to come. There is much work to do to make this a reality, but hard times also create opportunities – it’s up to the Philippine state to make the most of them.

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The success or failure of emissions reduction efforts in developing countries will determine the world’s ability to address global climate change – roughly 85 per cent of the world’s population live in developing countries, and they contribute 63 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions.

However, achieving emissions mitigation in developing countries is challenging. Given their growth trajectory, these countries’ demand for energy – and in turn, emissions – will continue to increase. The transition these economies will need to undergo to lower their emissions, even as their energy demand soars, will involve solving com­plex problems that are often beyond their capacity.

Our new study provides insights into challenges of environmental protection in developing countries, using Vietnam as a case study.

The study assesses Vietnam’s situation, and shows that balancing environmental protection with economic development in developing countries is easier said than done.

It reveals that while there is a consensus that environmental protec­tion is important, when it comes to how governments actually manage the trade-off between environmental protection and economic development, views diverge.

More on this: Harnessing offshore wind for green growth in Vietnam

For example, people often support measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve local air quality, such as halting the construction of new coal power plants. On the other hand, proposals that mention increased energy prices associated with measures can face resistance.

Nothing comes for free, especially for countries with fewer resources, and energy transition is no exception – although it is worth it.

The transformation of the global economy to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 will require an addition of about $3.5 trillion in annual average spending on physical assets.

In Vietnam’s case, meeting a net zero emissions target by 2050 will cost the country around $368 billion between 2022 and 2040, or about 6.8 per cent of its GDP annually.

This is before opportunity costs – or the price of missing out on what these resources could have been used for if they weren’t tied up in transition. For example, the foregone benefits of having resources allocated to other infrastructure, like building hospitals and schools or upgrading transport systems, stack up over time.

More on this: Carbon pricing insights from Vietnam

Dilemmas over how to allocate limited resources to competing priorities like these are not easy to handle, especially in developing countries where these resources are less abundant.

Of course, energy transition will ultimately generate social benefits in many cases. However, these benefits are often less tangible than the costs – and therefore difficult to justify to the public.

That said, if governments stress how emissions reduction policies will develop the country’s domestic economic fortunes, they seem to gain more political support. Underlining the community health benefits may also help their popularity.

Given this, activists and politicians should focus on the ways that emissions reduction can lower human health costs and save money by preventing local pollution, among its other socioeconomic benefits. This may better con­vince the public, and eventually governments, to allocate more resources to emissions mitigation.

As well as arguing for the importance of minimising the damage caused by climate change, they must make the case to their governments to build up their renewable energy industries to help them save on energy costs in the long term.

Outside of developing countries, international support will also be vital in speeding up their emission reductions efforts. They need developed countries to provide more technical and financial support – if they have that, developing countries can better contribute to addressing global climate change.

Ultimately, the clock is ticking, and emissions reduction targets are unlikely to be met without the strong cooperation of developing countries. While this will carry a cost, policymakers both within and from outside the developing world must make the case for a rapid transition as compelling as possible, and secure the resources these countries need to execute it.

The post Why there is no such thing as a painless transition appeared first on Policy Forum.

During a recent interview with an Indonesian national television, Indonesian President Joko Widodo was asked about his loyal volunteers constantly proposing an extension of his tenure, in which ‘Jokowi’ – as he is famously called – played down the calls is simply ‘discourse’.

This comes after his statement earlier this year that he has no intention to extend his tenure by changing the 1945 Constitution.

Despite this, loyal supporters of Widodo have raised this possibility repeatedly, particularly during the pandemic. One argument for this was to ‘save the economy’ without having to spend money holding an election.

Extending the president’s term would violate the principles of constitutionalism, especially the limitation of executive power. That the president is ultimately serving at the will of the people must be respected as the main foundation of a constitutional democratic state.

If Widodo extended his term, that would mean postponing the election, denying the Indonesian people the chance to exercise their democratic rights. On top of this, the economic argument is no longer relevant, since the national economy has promising growth and is showing signs of recovery.

More on this: Assessing the Jokowi Presidency

In fairness, Widodo has repeatedly denied that he would do this. Still, in response to Widodo’s refusal to extend his term, some of his supporters changed tack, floating the idea that he could run for vice president instead. Yet again, he said that he would not do this.

The persistence of these calls is worrying. Directly amending the 1945 Constitution would be the only way to make either of these courses of action possible, and yet when polled, half of Indonesian voters say they would be comfortable with the president serving a third five-year term.

The level of support that exists for this process reveals the divided nature of Indonesian politics. Half of Indonesian voters, based on their support of one figure, support a course of action that risks normalising amendments to the constitution led by politicians.

This kind of political division has been increasingly prevalent since 2014 and has continued to worsen. In this context, taking a drastic step to amend the constitution to keep incumbents in the political arena longer would damage Indonesia’s democratic culture.

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Even if Widodo successfully shuts it down on this occasion, future presidents could use this trend to tinker with the constitution in a partisan way. This would damage the health of the constitution and its legitimacy over time.

Besides, Indonesia needs elected changes of the guard that bring forth leaders who foster cooperation and compromise. Putting off this change prevents the political regeneration that can bridge the country’s political divide.

With this in mind, Jokowi must clearly refuse an extension of any kind, shutting down any further speculation, and allow the country to focus on far more important issues.

For instance, data protection has been a recurring problem, and the government has not taken serious action yet. The state also needs to focus on the revision of the Criminal Code, as some legal scholars and civil society organisations deem it at risk of being used as a tool to criminalise freedom of expression and criticism of government.

This is a chance for the president to go out on a high note. By putting this issue to bed, he can also help Indonesia to focusing on its other goals and preparing it for a successor in 2024.

While these repeated calls from some of his supporters are worrying, they do give the president an opportunity. By focusing on preparing a strong transition to the next president and ensuring his last acts in the role aim to address some of the countries serious political divisions, he can cement his legacy as one of Indonesia’s most important leaders and set the stage for a more united future in the process.

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