Professor Sharon Friel joins Sharon Bessell and Arnagretta Hunter for a challenging conversation about the commercial determinants of health, and what can be done to save and improve lives.

You can listen here.

We discuss how there is no silver bullet fix, and it would take a multilevel and multi-pronged approach to commercial determinants of health and if it is done right, it could save a third of preventable global deaths. However, the implications are far more wide-reaching than that. If we take into consideration the indirect impact that industries have, from health and health inequities, income inequalities and changes to our lived environment, “well above half of the global burden of disease could be eliminated” Professor Friel states. The challenge is enforcing change across unregulated industries, and on transnational corporations.

“The most basic public health question is not whether the world has the resources or will to take such actions, but whether humanity can survive if society fails to make this effort.”

Sharon Friel is a Professor of Health Equity and an ARC Laureate Fellow in Planetary Health Equity at the ANU School of Regulation and Global Governance. Her research is focused on the intersection of social, commercial, political and environmental factors that contribute to health inequities and what changes policy and governance can make. Professor Friel and her colleagues have recently published a remarkable series of papers on The Commercial Determinants of Health in The Lancet.

Sharon Bessell is a Professor of Public Policy and Director of both the Children’s Policy Centre and the Poverty and Inequality Research Centre at the ANU Crawford School of Public Policy.

Arnagretta Hunter is the Human Futures Fellow at ANU College of Health and Medicine, a cardiologist, physician, and a Senior Clinical Lecturer at ANU Medical School.

Show notes | The following were mentioned during this episode:

Commercial determinants of health published in The Lancet by Sharon Friel, et al. (2023)

21st-century capitalism: structural challenges for universal health care by Susan Sell (2019)

The collateralization of social policy by financial markets in the global south – A freely available chapter can be found in the Routledge international Handbook of Financialization. by Lena Lavinas (2020)

Taxing Extreme Wealth An annual tax on the world’s multi-millionaires and billionaires: What it would raise and what it could pay for  by Oxfam (2022)

Policy Forum Pod is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, Subscribe on Android or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum.

The post Podcast: Global Health – holding industries accountable appeared first on Policy Forum.

Across Southeast Asia, coastal areas are facing unprecedented threats from urbanisation, coastal development, and climate change. Moreover, decisions about how land in these areas is used are often made exclusively by those holding political power, who are far removed from the communities that will feel their impact.

As a result, land grabbing, community displacement, and damage to both the natural environment and traditional livelihoods are becoming more common.

One area where these effects are being keenly felt is between Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore in the western Tebrau Strait, also referred to as the Johor Strait, where a number of large infrastructure and industrial projects are underway. As well as being a site of rapid industrial development, the area is home to essential seagrass and mangrove ecosystems that are the major lifeline for local artisanal fishing communities.

In areas such as these, establishing a fully-protected marine park is rarely an option, as industrial and urban development is engraved in the area’s master plan and takes priority on the grounds of economic development. Marine parks can also exclude local communities, as fishing within its boundaries is prohibited.

Scenarios such as these are not uncommon across Southeast Asia, as governments across the region pursue economic development in order to move their citizens out of poverty. But as this industrialisation takes place, natural habitats and traditional livelihoods are often sacrificed in the name of ‘progress’.

More on this: The 1MDB scandal and Malaysia’s 2022 general election

The cruel irony is that the most vulnerable members of the community – such as the small fishing communities – are most affected by such changes.

Small-scale fisheries are estimated to make up 90 per cent of global employment in capture fisheries, where fish are caught in the wild. However, participation numbers in Southeast Asia are likely vastly underestimated as workers are often informal, unlicensed, or have supplementary jobs.

It’s these communities that are often the overlooked victims of coastal development projects, especially if they aren’t represented by an umbrella entity that can advocate on their behalf. Across the region, but especially in Southeast Asia’s more authoritarian countries, these marginalised communities have few options when it comes to resisting planning decisions.

However, efforts can still be made to find mutually beneficial solutions that can have positive outcomes for everyone and preserve what remains of precious natural habitats.

Finding these solutions requires the creation of platforms for discussion that bring together all local stakeholders. These platforms create avenues to ensure that all members of the community are heard and invested in the future economic and environmental success of coastal areas.

One potential solution that could be expanded at scale throughout the region is the establishment of ‘community-conserved’ areas. This is an innovation to the standard exclusionary marine park concept – which generally restricts nearly all human uses of an area – as it allows multiple uses of the seascape, yet works to ensure its sustainability and collaborative preservation.

More on this: Policing Malaysia’s maritime border

An organisation this author works with, Kelab Alami, has had some success in its efforts to establish a community-conserved area in Johor, Malaysia. By working to bring developers as well as government agencies to the table with the local community and scientists, Kelab Alami has been able to highlight the importance and credibility of local knowledge – and established the fishermen as vital habitat experts whose views and inputs are invaluable to science and conservation.

Empowering the community through the recognition of their wisdom and expertise has also strengthened their voice in mobilising for their rights, and has enabled local youth to take ownership over documentation and research efforts for their seagrass, mangrove and island habitats, and resident fauna.

This local community now has a forum to engage with external entities, local and government agencies, and surrounding businesses and developers to ensure local participation and collaboration in spite of myriad institutionalised power hierarchies that traditionally make it harder for them to have a say in local decision-making. The focus of these platforms is not to apportion blame, but to find solutions and mitigate further damage.

The community-conserved areas concept has the potential to protect the natural environment and promote economic development.

First and foremost, it could help protect local fish stocks from industrial fishing activities, protecting the livelihoods of these small fishing communities. This can also give rise to other economic opportunities, such as the development of an ecotourism industry. In Johor, ecotourism has become a supplementary source of income for local fishermen – who have been employed as boat captains and facilitators in local habitat and fishing heritage tours.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has named 2022 the International Year of Artisanal Fisheries and Aquaculture. In doing so, the FAO noted that small-scale fisheries are the way forward in helping poor coastal communities climb out of poverty, ensuring the long-term sustainability of marine resources and reducing habitat damage.

As such, it is essential that coastal development in Southeast Asia invests in innovative multi-stakeholder platforms. By bringing together everyone who is invested in sustainable development as equal partners in an authentic community, policymakers in the region can nurture inclusive solutions for the benefit of all.

The post Preserving Southeast Asian fisheries appeared first on Policy Forum.

Demand for protein is changing.

Growth in the protein industry is rising, driven by growing global demand, especially in Asia and the Pacific. For many reasons, the growth of the plant-based meat market is especially bullish and is projected to increase from $4.6 billion in 2018 to $85 billion in 2030.

But does Australia have enough plant-based sources to take advantage of the growing demand for these emerging proteins?

Currently, Australia produces most of its protein as livestock. While the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has projected that global demand for meat will reach 455 million tonnes by 2050, a 76 per cent increase from 2005, livestock production is under more community scrutiny than ever.

Its large carbon footprint, risks of animal welfare issues, and high land and water use are crucial costs of livestock production.

For example, lamb produces between 50 and 750 kilograms of carbon per kilogram of protein, beef produces between 45 and 640, and poultry produces between 10 and 30. Yet ‘pulse crops’ like chickpeas, broad beans, peas, lentils, lupin, and mung beans produce between four and 10.

In terms of land use, beef requires 37 to 2,100 square metres to produce one kilogram of protein, while lamb requires 100 to 165, poultry 23 to 40, and pulse crops between 10 and 43 square metres.

Plant-based alternate protein also has the advantages of versatility, affordability, and a lower non-carbon environmental impact. It is a growing market with increasing demand coming from new consumer behaviours such as a growing number of vegans, vegetarians, and flexitarians.

More on this: Podcast: Food, water and energy for all

Key sources of protein inputs for plant-based protein are also relatively inexpensive.

Per gram of protein, soybeans cost just $0.01 to produce, and wheat costs $0.03. This is much cheaper than cows at $0.32, pigs at $0.22, and chickens at $0.12.

Many traditional meat and poultry companies, including Tyson, Smithfield, Perdue Farms, Hormel Foods, and Maple Leaf, have entered the plant-based market, usually developing their plant-based meat products.

They should be incentivised to invest further by the Australian Government.

Currently, soybean, peas, lupin, and gram are the main sources of plant-based protein in the market. Fava beans, rapeseed, duckweeds, lentil, and quinoa are promising but currently niche sources.

Many unconventional sources of plant-based protein are poorly understood and technologically complicated. Policymakers should incentivise more exploration in this space – currently, more than 75 per cent of the global food supply comes from only 12 plant and five animal species.

Just three plant species – rice, maize, and wheat – make up nearly 60 per cent of calories the world consumes from plant-based sources.

Unconventional food plants such as white acacia, jatropha, bamboo, and edible flowers have great potential to be used as an alternate source of protein, fiber, and bioactive compounds, but few companies have taken this leap.

Discarded vegetable tissues such as seeds, stems, and leaves during post-harvest and industrial processing could also be an excellent source of bioactive compounds and protein, reducing waste in the process.

Australia can step up in this space. It should invest in a strengthened pulse crop industry with intensified pulse-based farming systems, looking to increase pulse area, yield, and quality. It should see this as a pillar of its vision of achieving a $100 billion agriculture industry by 2030.

More on this: The road to climate-smart agriculture

The country is ready for this. It has cutting-edge expertise in legume science in genetics, agronomy, adaptation, biochemistry, physiology, pathology, and food processing. Still, there is much room to grow. Currently, Australia is a tiny but promising player in the global pulse crop industry – it produces less than India, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Brazil. Investment in innovation and direct financial support can significantly increase pulse production in Australia.

By intensifying its pulse-based cropping systems, adding value, and implementing a market strategy, Australia could double its production by 2050, and even take the place of a leading actor in the global pulse crop industry alongside India.

Of course, pulse crops are not sustainable and profitable by default. Preparing pulse farmers for rising temperatures and ensuring sustainable water and land use takes work and pushing them towards intensive and sustainable farming is not an easy job. Besides, shifting to a new farming system or modifying an existing one is a slow process, even if it is sustainable and profitable.

The significant challenges for plant-based protein missions are supply chains, sustainability, safety, consumer acceptance, nutritional value, and climate change.

Pulse-focused innovation could help with these issues. It could take the form of government-encouraged research into plant genetics and food technologies that remove barriers like texture, quality, appearance, price, and flavour, to encourage even more uptake of plant-based protein.

Investing in farming system improvements, smart soil management, modern seed technology, and digital information systems can also help prepare the sector for a stronger plant-based protein industry.

In terms of direct support, governments could also incentivise farmers to adopt new technology, improve cultivation, and gather high quality data on their pulse crops.

An agricultural sector that is investing in plant-based protein can help unlock yet more of Australia’s economic potential and reduce industry emissions in the process. While this means facing many multifaceted challenges, the dream of a strong plant-based protein industry to support Australia’s future is worth investing in.

The post Going green, eating clean, and embracing the bean appeared first on Policy Forum.

Russia and Ukraine supply more than 30 countries that are net importers of wheat with at least 30 per cent of their overall wheat imports. Both countries are also top global exporters of barley, maize, and fertilisers.

Ukrainian grain is used to feed some of the world’s most vulnerable people. The country supplies over half of the wheat distributed by the World Food Programme, to alleviate hunger and boost food security in many developing countries.

Naturally, Russia’s invasion has affected sowing and harvesting in Ukraine. It has also affected availability and production in the rest of the world. In early March 2022, prices were reported to have increased by more than $2.60 per bushel for wheat, more than $0.90 per bushel for corn, and $0.60 for soy. Prices of fertiliser have risen too.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), global food prices in real terms reached an all-time high in March 2022. Although prices fell in June, they are much higher compared to last year.

Egypt, for instance, is highly dependent on wheat from the two countries and has seen its estimated annual cost of food and energy alone rise to 40 per cent of its foreign exchange reserves. Many other countries have been affected by lower imports, high international food prices and high transportation costs.

But rising prices aren’t the whole story. The invasion of Ukraine is contributing to food insecurity in multiple ways.

The invasion, and sanctions Russia earned for itself in the process, have also contributed to an exponential increase in energy and commodity prices.

This exacerbates the situation, especially because of how much energy is used in milling. Whether it be wheat, edible oils, animal feed, fertilisers, food processing, packaging, or transport or storage, agriculture requires energy and energy is getting more expensive.

This means food supply problems go far beyond Ukraine, Russia, and the countries that import their grain directly.

On top of power prices, international trade barriers are making things worse. Russia suspended grain and white and raw sugar exports to ex-Soviet states and suspended wheat, rye, barley, and maize exports to neighbouring Eurasian Economic Union states including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Further, port operations in Ukraine are unusable for commercial activities and very high insurance premiums for vessels have affected exports through the Black Sea. After the agreement signed between Ukraine and Russia, however, a solution seems to have been found for exports from Ukraine via the safe corridors.

More on this: Podcast: Food, water and energy for all

As far afield as the United States, farmers have had to grow crops that are not fertiliser-intensive, such as soybeans, on an additional two million acres, where normally they would have planted corn. This will have important implications for crop availability and prices in the country later this year.

The Center for Global Development estimates that interruptions and disruptions caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine will push 40 million people back into extreme poverty. This is in addition to the 150 million people pushed back into poverty globally due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as estimated by the World Bank.

So, what are policymakers doing to mitigate the damage?

The United States will use the Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, a strategic grain reserve of commodities and cash, to provide food assistance to Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen, as well as cover freight transportation and inland and internal transport, shipping, and handling.

The European Union activated its 2021 contingency plan for food supply and security in times of crisis to accelerate the mapping of the risks and vulnerability of the region’s food supply chain. It is looking to reduce overall dependency, including in terms of food, feed, and fertilisers, and considering alternative organic sources of nutrients.

Both the European Union and the United States are also considering allowing farmers to use fallow land – arable land that is not harvested for one crop year to allow it to recover. This would be a temporary measure to grow crops to address supply disruptions, enhance food security, and reduce inflationary pressures in the short term.

China, the largest crop market globally, is considered self-sufficient in terms of wheat and corn. But even there, domestic corn prices have increased due to other factors like fertiliser and energy prices. In April 2022, China lifted trade restrictions with Russia for wheat and barley.

To offset crop losses, production of wheat in Canada, the United States, and Australia is expected to increase compared to 2021. American corn exports have increased and new crop supplies from Brazil and Argentina have eased stress on markets.

More on this: The state of the global food market

India has positioned itself as a main wheat exporter and large shipments from India also helped to reduce stress on markets when the conflict struck. Nevertheless, in mid-May, the Indian government announced a suspension of wheat exports to protect domestic consumption and prices.

Overall, grain demand continues to exceed supply. In response to this set of issues, policymakers must reassess their concepts of food security.

For example, a country like Singapore, which is considered one of the most food-secure countries in the world, announced in 2019 an ambitious goal of producing 30 per cent of its nutritional needs at home by 2030.

Supply chain disruptions due to COVID-19 and the invasion of Ukraine have shown the value of this choice – its experience shows that focusing on food security can be a good thing.

Pure self-sufficiency, however, limits the variety of food products available. It also makes markets more vulnerable to climate events affecting agriculture.

Urban agriculture, including ‘vertical farming’, can help some developed cities provide foodstuffs, but it is unclear if this could ever be enough to feed growing urban populations. Trading only with trusted countries may also pose serious limitations in addition to possibly reshaping global value chains, for good or bad.

Because these problems are global and interconnected in character, they need global solutions. Rather than blindly pursuing self-sufficiency, policymakers across the world need to work together. Only then can they find longer term solutions.

Together, leaders must strengthen global value chains, protect market access, and invest in technological solutions to meet the food security challenge they all face.

The post The price of grain, the global supply chain, and the invasion of Ukraine appeared first on Policy Forum.

Over the last 15 years, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have ramped up their involvement international hydropower development, particularly in the Mekong River basin, which flows south from China through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

The Mekong River is crucial to the livelihood of those living near its banks, providing fresh water for irrigation, aquaculture, transportation, and fishing. While experts continue to analyse China’s development of dams on its portion of the Mekong, Chinese dam funding and construction in neighbouring countries in the lower Mekong basin (LMB) remain understudied.

The LMB encompasses five countries, but Laos contains over 80 per cent of the dams constructed by Chinese companies in the area.

Contrary to ‘debt trap’ arguments, Laos seems to be pursing these agreements with China with agency and freedom. While China is providing funding and know-how, these dam projects are being pursued of Laos’ own accord.

After all, these projects provide some big benefits. Between 2010 and 2011 alone, the total hydroelectric capacity in Laos from Chinese investments jumped from 200 megawatts (MW) to around 1,900 MW. As of 2019, it was estimated that Laotian hydroelectric capacity from dams with known Chinese involvement had reached 5,000 MW – enough electricity to power millions of homes.

However, these developments also have their have negative impacts. Officials view dams as a means of generating economic development, but many locals, experts, and non-government organisations contend that they are detrimental to the environment, especially fishing stocks, and that they exacerbate socio-economic issues.

Broadly, hydropower is viewed as a ‘green’ technology, but this is a reductive view. Researchers have shown that artificial bodies of water often contribute to decomposition in an area, accelerating the release of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide from organic matter.

More on this: Provincial players in China’s Belt and Road Initiative

In all, greenhouse gases from dams and reservoirs account for between one and two per cent of global emissions caused by humans, and this should factor into the calculations of decision-makers developing hydropower policies.

Further, the upfront cost of dams are deceptive, since dams regularly experience cost blowouts, and engineering difficulties in dam development often require costly adjustments to construction.

Finally, sometimes dams break – including while they are being built.

In 2018, Laos suffered a catastrophic dam collapse in the southern province of Attepeu. The collapse resulted in 71 confirmed deaths, at least 1,000 people missing, and tens of thousands impacted by the floodwaters, which reached as far south as Cambodia.

This collapse was of a relatively small dam, and it must serve as a warning to the Laotian government, which is supporting the construction of much larger dams.

Moreover, environmental assessments are not optimistic about the health of the Mekong basin in Laos.

The Xayaburi dam on the main stem of the Mekong has already affected the quality of sediment for agriculture, access to migratory fish, and water levels. Further construction along the tributaries in the basin has only added to the pain.

Yet Laos isn’t slowing down. It’s now entering phase two of the Nam Ou River Cascade Hydropower Project in northern Laos, which consists of seven dams with a combined hydroelectric capacity of 1,270 MW. Although the development predates the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has since been brought under the BRI umbrella.

This presents significant challenges to northern Laos, a region with low population density and high poverty levels. The dams will worsen water quality issues, disrupt transportation, impact agricultural production, and could reduce fish biodiversity by more than two thirds.

Laos also faces significant financial commitments on these projects. The country has a foreign debt crisis, and its difficulty paying down this debt has resulted in concessions to China for the use of its projects.

In September 2020, the state-owned China Southern Power Grid Company obtained majority control of Electricite du Laos, the Laotian SOE which maintains its electrical grid.

Then, in March 2021, the terms of this concession were finalised, with a 25-year agreement allowing China Southern Power Grid Company ‘to build and manage its power grid, including electricity exports to neighboring countries’ forming part of the deal.

More on this: China’s path to decarbonisation

Effectively, Laos handed over its control of its power to a Chinese SOE. This alarmed skeptics of China’s infrastructure investments and means Laos can’t challenge China if their electricity interests diverge.

From the Laotian government’s perspective, the opportunity to expand on its energy generation is seen as an avenue to generate economic productivity. Its objective is to become the centre of electrical generation and a major exporter of electricity to the region – or the ‘battery of Southeast Asia’.

This is also why Laos is upgrading its domestic grid to handle larger loads for export, which also aligns with regional ambitions for an upgraded Southeast Asian grid.

To understand China’s motivations, it is important to examine the role Yunnan province plays.

Bordering Laos and containing the Chinese portion of the Mekong, China’s Yunnan province has been a key advocate of downstream investment. China has constructed dams on its portion of the Mekong, but the availability of space in the province is limited for future dams.

To accelerate the development of China’s inner provinces, there have been calls to use infrastructure in Yunnan to connect Chinese firms to Southeast Asian markets and resources via a ‘bridgehead strategy’.

It would include projects such as roads, railways, and dams, which would in turn see electricity demand grow. With pre-existing ambitions for a regionally connected grid and Laos willing to host more dams, there is massive scope for Chinese enterprises to construct more dams. They could then use Laos’ grid concessions to import energy generated from these projects into China. Energy shortages in China make this a near certainty.

While these projects have potential and align with the region’s energy ambitions, policymakers in China need to carefully consider the environmental and social impacts of their dams. In Laos, leaders must ensure projects don’t develop beyond their means.

Ultimately, both countries must remember that the Mekong River continues to flow beyond their borders – if their projects aren’t carefully and responsibly executed, the whole of Southeast Asia will feel the pain.

The post Giving a dam in the Mekong basin appeared first on Policy Forum.

How many Australians lack access to safe and good-quality drinking water? What does it mean for people’s lives to not have access to water that meets Australian health and aesthetic standards for water quality? And how can policymakers ensure people in regional and remote Australia have agency and power in decision-making around their water services? On this episode of Policy Forum Pod, Dr Paul Wyrwoll and Evie Rose join Professor Sharon Bessell and Dr Arnagretta Hunter to discuss their new research about water access in Australia. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3ps6rxY

Paul Wyrwoll is a Research Fellow at the ANU Institute for Water Futures and Crawford School of Public Policy. He works on water economics and policy in Australia and the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on drinking water provision, large water infrastructure, and nature-based solutions to flood and water quality control.

Evie Rose is a PhD Candidate at Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University researching the policy challenges of drinking water security and quality in remote Aboriginal communities in Central Australia.

Arnagretta Hunter is the Human Futures Fellow at ANU College of Health and Medicine, a cardiologist, physician, and a Senior Clinical Lecturer at ANU Medical School.

Sharon Bessell is Professor of Public Policy and Director of both the Children’s Policy Centre and the Poverty and Inequality Research Centre at ANU Crawford School of Public Policy.

Show notes | The following were mentioned during this episode:

‘How many Australians lack safe and good-quality drinking water?’, Paul Wyrwoll et al, Policy Forum (2022)

‘Measuring the gaps in drinking water quality and policy across regional and remote Australia’, Paul Wyrwoll et al, NPJ Clean Water (2022)

Purple House

‘Securing supply: governing drinking water in the Northern Territory’, Liam Grealy and Kirsty Howey, Australian Geography (2020)

Policy Forum Pod is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, Subscribe on Android or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum or join us on the Facebook group.

The post Podcast: Australia’s drinking water divide appeared first on Policy Forum.

With a general public demanding action on climate change, how can the government start delivering on its targets? Just how much leadership, and what legislative and policy responses will be enough to protect our environment? And can Australia move beyond the political polarisation that has historically dominated its climate policy? On this episode of Policy Forum Pod, Mark Howden joins Arnagretta Hunter and Sharon Bessell to explore the current state of Australia’s environment and outline a pathway forward. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3bciwnE

Mark Howden is the Director of the Institute for Climate, Energy & Disaster Solutions at ANU and Vice Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). He is also the Chair of the ACT Climate Change Council.

Arnagretta Hunter is the Human Futures Fellow at ANU College of Health and Medicine, a cardiologist, physician, and a Senior Clinical Lecturer at ANU Medical School.

Sharon Bessell is Professor of Public Policy and Director of both the Children’s Policy Centre and the Poverty and Inequality Research Centre at ANU Crawford School of Public Policy.

Show notes | The following were mentioned during this episode:

Australia State of the Environment, 2021

Climate Change Bill 2022 

Seven megatrends that will shape the next 20 years, CSIRO (2022) 

Policy Forum Pod is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, Subscribe on Android or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum or join us on the Facebook group.

The post Podcast: The state of the environment appeared first on Policy Forum.

Australia is one of the world’s richest and most urbanised countries. Most Australians live in capital cities where secure access to high-quality essential services is normal. In these cities, water from the household tap is, typically, clear and both tastes and smells as it should.

Indeed, the vast majority of Australian city dwellers might assume that the United Nations 2022 Sustainable Development Report is correct in stating that 100 per cent of Australia’s population has ‘universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water’.

They would be wrong.

Australia’s national reporting on access to safe drinking water excludes water providers with less than 10,000 connections to the treated public water supply. This means that around two million people, who make up approximately eight per cent of Australia’s population, are not included in reporting on Sustainable Development Goal 6: ‘Clean water for all’.

Leave Sydney, Melbourne, or any city, and the drinking water story can be very different. In many regional and remote areas, residents know, or suspect, that their tap water is not what it should be.

Multiple problems can exist. Harmful microbes and chemicals may contaminate water, which can cause short- or long-term health impacts. ‘Hard’ water with high mineral content can cause build-up that shortens the lifespan of pipes and appliances.

Bad smell, taste, or colour – known as ‘aesthetic characteristics’ – may lead households to rely on bottled or trucked water or turn to sugary drinks. Emergency water restrictions, long-term boil water alerts, or lack of access to treated water can last months, and even longer during droughts.

More on this: Podcast: Food, water and energy for all

In recent years, multiple media stories have documented unacceptable drinking water quality across the country, in Laramba, Tenterfield, Pandanus Park, Wilcannia, Menindee, Walgett, Dulacca, Yass, Uralla, Stanthorpe, Cooper Pedy, Yuendumu, Murrurundi, Bourke, Palm Island, Borroloola, and Beswick.

Even more of these stories go unreported. Video testimonies and the report from the 2019 Citizen’s Inquiry in the Health of the Baaka (Lower Darling) River and Menindee Lakes show the consequences, and the deep concerns of families and their communities.

While drinking water quality challenges exist across Australia, lack of access to safe drinking water is prevalent in remote Indigenous communities, and it is a key barrier to improving health and overall wellbeing.

Recognising these problems, the Productivity Commission and Infrastructure Australia have highlighted that regional and remote drinking water supplies need urgent attention. State and territory governments have made some funding commitments and some have established new programs.

Importantly, the new National Agreement on Closing the Gap will include community infrastructure targets. The new federal government’s water policy platform includes new investments in town water supplies under the National Water Grid Fund, and a National Water Commission that could oversee progress on water quality and security.

These commitments are a good step forward, but regional and remote communities need much more.

Surprisingly for such a wealthy country, Australia has no national database to track water quality performance against the health- and aesthetic-based guidelines values of the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines (ADWG). Without one, decision-makers at the national level are ‘flying blind’ and cannot measure progress nor allocate funding to where its most needed.

To begin filling this critical knowledge gap, our research responded to this question:

How many people, and where, in Australia lack access to safe and good quality drinking water?

More on this: The water-climate change emergency

We collated the publicly available drinking water quality data from across Australia in 2018-19 and constructed the first national dataset that records exceedances against the ADWG. Our analysis found that at least 25,245 people in towns of less than 1,000 people across 99 locations accessed drinking water services that did not comply with health-based guidelines at least once over the 12-month reporting period.

When we broadened the scope to include larger towns and aesthetic guideline values for good quality, at least 627,736 people in 408 locations accessed drinking water that did not comply and 40 per cent of all locations where drinking water exceeded health-based guidelines were remote Indigenous communities.

A single non-compliance with health-based guideline values does not necessarily mean water is unsafe in the short term and some people may tolerate aesthetic characteristics of water that do not meet guideline values. Nevertheless, ongoing lack of access to safe, good quality water is affecting the health, wellbeing, and finances of many Australians.

This situation is an indictment of governments that have prioritised investments in irrigation water infrastructure.

Parents living in Canberra do not have to worry about their children’s health being at risk from poor quality drinking water. Why shouldn’t parents and children living in Wilcannia have the same right?

Our research shows that it is possible to build a long-term understanding of where Australia’s drinking water quality problems are and who is most at risk.

We also identify critical monitoring and reporting gaps. For example, many Sydneysiders may be surprised to learn that their state does not require local water utilities to publicly report on their drinking water quality. This means that around 1.2 million people in regional New South Wales cannot access information on what is in their tap water.

Across remote Australia, a lack of monitoring and reporting is common for small communities, and even in places serviced by government agencies.

Australia can, and must, do better. Along with committing to address the problems and funding improved water infrastructure, the federal government urgently needs to build a national drinking water quality database.

Such a database is not mission impossible. It will require resourcing, careful design, regulatory backing, and strong political commitment, but the public benefits would be substantial.

It will allow governments at all levels to implement targeted policy responses, inform long-term epidemiological research, increase transparency and accountability, and more.

A national drinking water quality database can be done. Now, the federal government needs to take this next step towards ensuring safe and acceptable water for all Australians, wherever they may live.

The post How many Australians lack safe and good-quality drinking water? appeared first on Policy Forum.

Droughts are one of the most widespread natural disasters in the world. Along with tropical cyclones, droughts also are among the most costly disasters for a population due to their ability to affect vast areas for a prolonged period of time.

Because drought is a prolonged water shortage, it can have flow-on effects on food security, prices, and trade far beyond the drought’s immediate location. Crucially, droughts are exacerbated by climate change and are expected to worsen as the globe warms.

The frequency of droughts has already increased by 29 per cent since 2000, compared to the two previous decades. By 2050 more than 75 percent of the world could face drought.

The World Bank estimates that up to 216 million people could be forced to migrate by 2050 due to the effects of climate change, including droughts, declining crop productivity, sea-level rise, and increasing incidence of extreme weather events.

Comprehensive, robust, integrated, and holistic drought resilience policies can also contribute significantly to other climate and water policy goals and create optimism across the world when it comes to water and food security.

In this context, Australia’s drought resilience policy, run by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), has set an ambitious goal to reduce drought severity by 30 per cent in the next eight years.

More on this: Podcast: Food, water and energy for all

The country is investing $150 million in the agriculture and food sectors in the hope of adding $20 billion in value. The government aims to do this by increasing the value of Australian food exports by $10 billion, along with producing an additional $10 billion worth of high-quality protein products by 2030, partly by boosting drought resilience.

This policy initiative could lead the way in the region and the world in tackling drought vulnerability.

Australian state and territory governments also provide aid to drought-affected communities through the National Drought Agreement, which focuses on immediate support for drought-affected farmers and long-term resilience and preparedness investment.

This has included expanding the Farm Household Allowance, concessional loans, rural financial counselling and information services, and an emergency rebate scheme for farms whose water infrastructure is affected by the disaster.

It also involved $36.9 million of investment over five years to improve water security and drought resilience in the Great Artesian Basin, where weather radars and climate guides will help farmers understand and manage climate risks.

Australia’s program of drought resilience policy is drawing global policy-making attention and can set an example for other countries to follow. Recurring drought and water scarcity have forced drought-affected countries to undertake ambitious institutional and regulatory reforms and infrastructural investment across the world, and Australia’s initiatives can help these governments prepare for the future.

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification has been working on improving drought resilience in collaboration with other agencies. Its calls for drought resilience policies from the Integrated Drought Management Program, a joint initiative of the World Meteorological Organization and the Global Water Partnership, are gathering steam.

Still, spending and ambition aren’t all that’s required. The achievement of drought resilience in Australia is not a given and will largely depend on carefully policy execution.

More on this: The water-climate change emergency

National capacity for monitoring adoption should be strengthened and the current drought resilience movement must promote restoration of cultivable land, crop diversification, and intensification, increasing the competitiveness of Australia’s agriculture.

The potential for water banking in the Murray Darling Basin to increase drought resilience has been assessed and justified by research and should be implemented. Water banking has been practiced in Arizona and California for drought management.

This would involve storing excess water in aquifers during wet years for long periods and then recovering it in droughts.

Farming system research can also contribute to drought resilience more than it currently does. Drought resilient farming systems can protect agricultural profitability, strengthen the economic resilience and water security of regional communities, and build on the example Australia is setting.

Depending on water availability, soil type, fertility status, and market demand, region-specific sustainable farming systems should be implemented as a top priority.

Crop diversification, intensification, and farming system research can underpin the three major missions of drought resilience, future protein sources, and trusted agri-food exports identified by the CSIRO.

If executed well, Australia’s drought resilience policy could be a lesson for many drought-vulnerable countries like India, Spain, China, Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa, and food producers in the European Union.

In Australia, drought resilience funding has been secured, a comprehensive drought plan is in place, and innovative technologies are on hand. Ultimately, if it can overcome obstacles like low rates of adoption by farmers, it can be a world leader in sustainable agriculture policy.

The post Making Australia drought-proof appeared first on Policy Forum.

In effect from 1 May to 16 August, China unilaterally began its annual summer fishing ban for important seas in East and Southeast Asia last month. The ban makes it illegal for vessels from any country to catch fish in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the waters north of 12 degrees latitude in the South China Sea (SCS), and is enforced by the Chinese Coast Guard.

China has applied the ban since 1999. As the state-run People’s Daily explained, China considers the ban “part of the country’s efforts to promote sustainable marine fishery development and improve marine ecology.”

But is China’s fishing ban policy solely based on concern for the marine environment? Or is it just a strategy to allow China to wedge its adversaries and project its claimed sovereignty over the area?

The problem of marine fishery sustainability is indeed a longstanding and unresolved issue, particularly in the SCS. Fishery resources are essential to the 190 million people residing in the coastal areas of the SCS, over 77 per cent of whom depend on pelagic fishery resources for their daily protein intake or family income.

This high demand requires a strong supply. Annual catch production in the SCS accounts for over 12 per cent of all fish caught in the world, resulting in overfishing in the SCS.

Since the 1980s, the fishery stocks in the SCS have been decreasing rapidly. As of 2008, SCS fishery reserves have collapsed. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing has been a major cause of this overfishing and has contributed to the deterioration of the marine environment.

More on this: Fisheries diplomacy and the South China Sea

Scientists also found that rising sea temperatures as a consequence of global warming will be a supporting factor for the decreasing fish stocks in the SCS.

In this context, the original application of the fishing ban was likely intended to genuinely contribute to solving this very real problem.

However, environmental and political concerns are not mutually exclusive – China can use environmental policy as a tool to project power in the contested SCS.

In recent years, China has strengthened its ability to supervise fishing in the area, in particular by giving its coastguard legal license to fire on and tow foreign vessels.

In 2018, control of the coastguard was moved from the State Council to the Central Military Commission, and several combat capable ships previously assigned to the Chinese Navy have recently come under its jurisdiction. These moves have given it an ‘unequivocally military character’ that ‘facilitates unilateralism and aggression in disputed waters.’

Virtually every year as the ban begins, strong protests emerge from other claimants of the sea, especially the Philippines and Vietnam.

More on this: Saving the South China Sea fishery

This year, Vietnam condemned the fishing ban by describing it as ‘a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction’ under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Philippines took a similar line, saying that it was ‘over areas that extend far beyond China’s legitimate maritime entitlements’, and noted its continued opposition to the annual moratorium.

However, these protests may be fruitless. China’s fishing ban is a strategy that is difficult to counter.

China’s invocation of concern for the environment combined with a more militarised coastguard makes it very difficult to prevent it projecting its power in the South China Sea during the moratorium.

China has put itself in a win-win scenario, no matter how other claimants react.

If Vietnam and the Philippines oppose China’s fishing ban, China can construct an image of two countries that do not care about the sustainable fishing in the SCS, arguing that they put their national interests above environmental sustainability.

But if Vietnam and the Philippines accept China’s unilateral policy not to fish in the SCS during the May-August period, they are implicitly recognising China’s right to enforce that ban in waters they claim, essentially conceding sovereignty over the sea.

It is worth considering that China’s choice to do this unilaterally may have prevented other countries from joining sustainable fishing efforts because they fear their acquiescence could be interpreted as recognition of China’s claims to the area, and caused unnecessary clashes that could escalate dangerously.

Policymakers should learn from this and keep an eye out in the rest of the region and the world for governments that may look to use environmental issues as a political instrument.

The Philippines and Vietnam are stuck between a rock and a hard place – revealing that China’s ban is not all about fishing after all, but a deliberate attempt to wedge its adversaries. Considering China’s choice to do so unilaterally and its harsh enforcement, it is clear the fishing ban, while serving some fish-related purposes, is also a strategy implemented by China for projecting its maritime power in the South China Sea.

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