On 19 December, Admiral Yudo Margono was inaugurated as the next Chief of the National Armed Forces (TNI), replacing the retiring General Andhika Perkasa. The only candidate nominated by President Joko Widodo for the position, Admiral Margono will only be the third navy leader to serve as joint chief of the military.

The appointment of Admiral Margono, who had been Chief of Staff of the Navy since May 2020, is unsurprising. Early in his first term, President Widodo made the maritime domain a centrepiece of his foreign policy strategy, with a plan to turn Indonesia into a ’global maritime fulcrum’. Given this maritime focus, it’s logical that an admiral should lead Indonesia’s defence forces.

As Admiral Margono steps into the role, Indonesia’s military is facing a challenging geopolitical environment – with the maritime domain in particular becoming more contested.

The South China Sea will likely become his main challenge. This issue has been bubbling away through President Widodo’s nearly two terms as president, not only as a result of China’s intrusion in the North Natuna Sea, but because the various disputes have provoked powers from outside the region to build their presence in Southeast Asian maritime areas.

The 2021 announcement that Australia would acquire nuclear-powered submarines as part of a new ‘AUKUS’ partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom is another significant maritime issue facing Indonesia. Indonesian officials went on record about their concerns around the potential impact of the deal on regional security and non-proliferation, and President Widodo reportedly registered his misgivings with the then-Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison.

More on this: Indonesian nationalism and the Ashmore Reef debate

For a country that has long prided itself on maintaining a neutral posture in great power conflicts, it is crucial that Admiral Margono support the development of Indonesia’s armed forces so that the country is able to respond to emerging threats on its own terms.

But there is a long road ahead, given the military’s historical underperformance. Indonesia ranked just 13th out of 26 countries in Asia for military capability in the 2021 Lowy Institute Asia Power Index – this performance needs to improve if the country is to be a more influential regional military power.

So how will the new armed forces chief try to set the military on the right course?

During the fit and proper test Admiral Margono faced in the house of representatives, he described four priorities for his leadership.

The first was the acceleration of the development of human resources in Indonesian military assignments, based on high levels professionalism and “spirit”.

The second was to increase the capacity of the armed forces, specifically in terms of its defence infrastructure. After a 2021 disaster in which an Indonesian submarine sank during routine exercises off the coast of Bali – costing the lives of all 53 crew – there has been significant criticism of the country’s ageing fleets.

More on this: Can Indonesia realise its dream of world-class universities?

Third was increasing the military’s capacity to carry out multi-domain and combined arms operations by strengthening the interoperability of the navy, air force and army. This has been a focus of the Indonesian military for some time, with the country establishing the Joint Regional Defense Command in 2019.

Finally, he wanted to improve the implementation of bureaucratic reform and the organisational culture within the TNI to support all duties and responsibilities of the armed forces.

This bureaucratic reform is necessary to ensure good governance in the military, to stamp out any corruption, and to enhance its performance.

Beyond these priorities, Admiral Margono may be able to strengthen bilateral defence relationships with Indonesia’s neighbours.

He already has a strong relationship with Australia, having been appointed Member in the Military Division of the Order of Australia in recognition of his ”exceptional service in strengthening the Australian and Indonesian ties” in 2022.

He was also awarded a prestigious military honour from Singapore President Halimah Yacoob this year.

Maintaining strong relations with these two countries is of particular importance. Indonesia’s parliament finally ratified the Indonesia-Singapore Defence Cooperation Agreement after 15 years of negotiations, and a recent claim of sovereignty over Australia’s Ashmore Reef by Indonesian Minister Sandiaga Uno highlighted the risk of misunderstandings in the region.

However, his relationship with the United States might not be as close as his predecessor’s, which could lead to a more neutral position on competition between United States and China.

Admiral Margono’s promotion to the TNI head comes at a time of major change, both within Indonesia and the Indo-Pacific broadly. To meet the region’s evolving threats and opportunities, he must find a way to improve Indonesia’s capabilities in an increasingly contested region.

Most importantly, given his naval background, he should be able to orient the military towards a more maritime-oriented posture, which is an important step considering Indonesia’s geographical landscape and likely future challenges.

The post Challenges and expectations for Indonesia’s new armed forces chief appeared first on Policy Forum.

How will the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review refresh affect Britain’s Indo-Pacific policy? What does AUKUS mean for the United Kingdom? And what’s the future of Australia-UK cooperation? In this episode of the National Security Podcast, the Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP — who was recently appointed as Britain’s first Minister of State for the Indo-Pacific — joins Professor Rory Medcalf in conversation. They discuss the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review refresh and the country’s subsequent tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, AUKUS, and Australia-UK relations. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3YrBfz4

The Rt Hon Anne-Marie Trevelyan MP is the United Kingdom’s Minister of State for the Indo-Pacific. She has previously served as Secretary of State for International Trade and International Development.

Professor Rory Medcalf AM is Head of ANU National Security College. His professional experience spans more than three decades across diplomacy, intelligence analysis, think tanks, journalism and academia.

We’d love to hear from you! Send in your questions, comments, and suggestions to NatSecPod@anu.edu.au. You can tweet us @NSC_ANU and be sure to subscribe so you don’t miss out on future episodes. The National Security Podcast is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and wherever you get your podcasts.

The post National Security Podcast: The United Kingdom’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Policy Forum.

In this episode of the National Security Podcast, Professor the Hon Gareth Evans – a longstanding and influential voice in Australian foreign and public policy – joins Professor Rory Medcalf in conversation. They discuss navigating the Australia-China and Australia-US relationships in an era of strategic competition, strengthening relations with Australia’s Indo-Pacific neighbours, the country’s credibility as a good international citizen, and the importance of diplomacy. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3FmtS4L

The Hon Gareth Evans AC KC FASSA FAIIA is a Distinguished Honorary Professor at The Australian National University (ANU), where he was Chancellor from 2010–19. He was a Cabinet Minister in the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments from 1983–96, in the posts of Attorney General, Minister for Resources and Energy, Minister for Transport and Communications and –from 1988–96 – Foreign Minister.

Professor Rory Medcalf AM is Head of ANU National Security College. His professional experience spans more than three decades across diplomacy, intelligence analysis, think tanks, journalism and academia.

We’d love to hear from you! Send in your questions, comments, and suggestions to NatSecPod@anu.edu.au. You can tweet us @NSC_ANU and be sure to subscribe so you don’t miss out on future episodes. The National Security Podcast is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and wherever you get your podcasts.

The post National Security Podcast: Australia’s new geopolitical outlook appeared first on Policy Forum.

What does the historic agreement to establish a ‘loss and damage’ fund at this United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt mean for small island developing states, particularly in the Pacific? How can negotiating parties ensure the fund is operationalised by COP28 in Dubai, rather than allowing countries to stall – as has been seen with previous initiatives? And with Australia looking to co-host the 2026 instalment of the conference with Pacific Island nations, what impact would a successful bid have on the region and the Australian public? Dr Siobhan McDonnell and Dr George Carter, who negotiated on behalf of Pacific Island countries at COP27, join Professor Sharon Bessell and Dr Arnagretta Hunter to discuss the talks and to look ahead to the next conference in Dubai. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3EUs29x

Siobhan McDonnell is a legal anthropologist with over 20 years of experience working with Indigenous people in Australia and the Pacific on land use, gender, and climate change. She is a Senior Lecturer at ANU Crawford School of Public Policy and Chief Investigator for the Australian Research Council’s Discovery Project on Climate Change and Gender in the Pacific.

George Carter is a Research Fellow in Geopolitics and Regionalism at ANU Department of Pacific Affairs and Director of the ANU Pacific Institute.

Sharon Bessell is Professor of Public Policy and Director of both the Children’s Policy Centre and the Poverty and Inequality Research Centre at ANU Crawford School of Public Policy.

Arnagretta Hunter is the Human Futures Fellow at ANU College of Health and Medicine, a cardiologist, physician, and a Senior Clinical Lecturer at ANU Medical School.

Policy Forum Pod is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, Subscribe on Android or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum or join us on the Facebook group.

The post Podcast: The loss and damage consensus at COP27 appeared first on Policy Forum.

Has the new federal government changed the way Australia does diplomacy? Will progress in reconciling internal divisions over race and gender change how Australia is perceived, and how the country carries itself, on the international stage? And after a comprehensive loss in the Victorian state election, is the Liberal Party suffering an identity crisis? On this episode of Democracy Sausage, Head of the International and Security Affairs program at The Australia Institute Allan Behm joins Professor Mark Kenny to discuss Australia’s diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific and the results of Victoria’s state election. Listen here: http://bit.ly/3u4ZxRL

Allan Behm is Head of the International and Security Affairs program at The Australia Institute. He spent 30 years in the Australian Public Service, was Chief of Staff to Minister for Climate Change and Industry Greg Combet, and Senior Advisor to the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Senator Penny Wong.

Mark Kenny is a Professor at ANU Australian Studies Institute. He came to the university after a high-profile journalistic career including six years as chief political correspondent and national affairs editor for The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, and The Canberra Times.

Show notes | The following were mentioned during this episode:

‘Sean Turnell speaks to 7.30 on how he coped in Myanmar prisons’, 7.30, Australian Broadcasting Corporation

Democracy Sausage with Mark Kenny is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum or join us on the Facebook group.

This podcast is produced in partnership with The Australian National University.

The post Democracy Sausage: Putting down the megaphone appeared first on Policy Forum.

In late October 2022, Indonesian news headlines were plastered with Minister Sandiaga Uno’s controversial claim that Australia’s Ashmore Reef belongs to Indonesia. Uno, who is Indonesia’s Minister of Tourism and the Creative Economy, asserted that Indonesia should protect “every inch” of its territory.

His statement came after the Indigenous people of Timor Sea called for Australia cede control of the reef. Traditional fishing practices have been allowed in the reef since 1974, when Indonesia and Australia signed a bilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU).

However, the peoples of Rote, Alor, Sawu, and Timor islands have demanded that Australia go further and recognise their full sovereignty over the reef, due to their centuries-long fishing and cultural practices in the area. They have even threatened to challenge Canberra on the issue in Australian court.

Soon after Uno’s statement, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs backtracked, clarifying that the Ashmore Reef does not belong to Indonesia. The Ministry confirmed their recognition that Indonesia’s territory is equivalent to that controlled by its former coloniser – in this case, the former Dutch East Indies territory. The Ashmore Reef was never claimed by the Dutch, but was ceded to Australia in the 1930s by the British.

Moreover, since Indonesia’s independence, the country has never formally claimed ownership over the reef, either internationally or domestically.

More on this: Can Indonesia realise its dream of world-class universities?

The 1974 MoU was an attempt to clarify the question of Indigenous peoples’ ancestral practices, as it recognised that Timor Sea peoples could continue to use the reef as they always had done, whilst maintaining Australia’s sovereignty over them under international law.

It seems clear that the Indonesian government has no real intention of claiming the Ashmore Reef, nor the legal ability to do so. However, the controversies in Indonesian media over Uno’s demands offer some important lessons for the practice of diplomacy at the intersection of domestic and foreign politics.

First, high ranking Indonesian politicians should be more careful in making controversial statements that go against government policy, especially when it comes to important relationships with neighbouring countries.

The disparity in public statements shows an embarrassing lack of coordination between Minister Uno and the foreign ministry. To remedy this, elected officials and civil servants need to ensure that they are coordinating closely, rather than talking across one another.

More on this: The 1MDB scandal and Malaysia’s 2022 general election

This is even more important when issues of foreign policy collide with domestic nationalist narratives. Nationalism, particularly regarding territorial integrity, is deeply ingrained within Indonesian domestic politics.

This public sensitivity is derived from Indonesia’s recent historical experience with other neighbours. For example, in 2002 the International Court of Justice ruled against Indonesia in its longstanding dispute with Malaysia over ownership of the Sipadan and Ligitan islands.

This ‘loss’ had a deep psychological impact on Indonesian citizens. As such, it may be tempting for politicians to invoke these memories and concerns for electoral gain, particularly on the 20^th anniversary of the Sipadan-Ligitan decision.

Certainly, a concern with defending one’s country is not a bad thing, when properly applied. However, by baselessly accusing other countries of impinging on Indonesia’s territorial integrity, leaders risk inflaming public sentiment, which can in turn create pressure to escalate proceedings diplomatically.

Instead of making provocative statements, Indonesian officials should take responsibility for educating the public about the truth. Given the importance of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, it is important that any debate over the ownership of Ashmore Reef in Indonesia be ended on the basis of the 1974 MoU.

Moreover, this should also be a lesson for Indonesian politicians as to the importance of consulting with their departments before speaking to the media.

If they do, they might manage to avoid embarrassment in the future.

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Last year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference in Glasgow (COP26) laid down the basic rules for the implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. At COP26, there was a stronger global response in a number of areas, in an effort to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Celsius.

This year’s COP27 in Egypt, however, will have to establish clear mechanisms to achieve – and in many cases go beyond – what was agreed in Glasgow. With a developing country holding the presidency, there are high expectations for agreements on key agenda items such as adaptation, loss and damage, finance, capacity building, justice, and climate empowerment. However, wrangling 198 parties that are negotiating for 7.9 billion people is no easy task.

Held hostage by the COVID-19 pandemic, the entire negotiation process took a year to get back on track ahead of the Glasgow conference. But as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Executive Secretary Patricia Espinosa warned, “we don’t have the luxury of time when it comes to the biggest threat to humanity”.

More on this: Cities of the future in an unequal world

The latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found that global surface temperatures have increased by 0.8-1.3 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. It warns that further warming will be extremely damaging, causing additional human and natural systems to reach their adaptation limits.

Concerningly, several observers pointed out that the roadmap to achieve global mitigation and adaptation goals remained unclear after Glasgow, and there was a lack of unity on key agenda items.

As such, negotiators at COP27 will have to address the agreement’s ambiguities to restore faith in the negotiation process. But how?

First, while achieving mitigation goals and net-zero targets remains key, adaptation measures will be equally important. For developing countries, the annual cost of adaptation efforts could reach $140-300 billion by 2030. As temperatures rise, so do the costs – undermining the ability of the most vulnerable nations to adapt – so it’s vital the Paris Agreement goals are met.

Even so, negotiators need to emerge from COP27 with a clear roadmap for doubling adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, which was one of the commitments at the Glasgow conference.

There also needs to be progress on enhancing adaptation action, reducing finance gaps, and national adaptation plans, all of which must take into account local contexts in order to ensure a just transition.

More on this: Why there is no such thing as a painless transition

Second, in the face of growing climate change impacts, the issue of ‘loss and damage’ remains critical. Between 2000-2019, over 475,000 people lost their lives as a direct result of more than 11,000 extreme weather events globally, with economic losses amounting to around $2.56 trillion. This damage is expected to worsen as global temperatures rise and severe weather events become more frequent. Moreover, evidence has shown that climate impacts disproportionately affect developing countries.

As such, there is growing pressure on major polluters to pay for the loss and damage they caused through their emissions. Prior to COP27, the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said, “failure to act on loss and damage will lead to more loss of trust and more climate damage. This is a moral imperative that cannot be ignored and COP27 must be the place for action on loss and damage.”

Progress on loss and damage so far has been mixed, with negotiators in Glasgow failing to reach an agreement on the issue. Instead, a Glasgow Dialogue was launched to discuss arrangements for funding by 2024, though the parties were not able to reach a consensus to include this as an agenda item during the June 2022 inter-sessional meeting in Bonn.

But developing countries are calling for a finance facility for loss and damage to be agreed upon at COP27 and, after significant negotiations over recent days, the issue was added as a formal agenda item to reach conclusions “no later” than 2024. But for meaningful progress to be achieved at this conference, countries must unite to address loss and damage through adequate and fit-for-purpose financing, differentiating it from mitigation, adaptation, and humanitarian aid.

Third, the voices of communities at the forefront of the climate crisis must continue to be heard. The interlinked global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss were recognised at COP26, as well as the central role Indigenous peoples and youth will have in dealing with the future consequences of present failures. COP27 needs to build on this momentum to empower Indigenous people and youth in ongoing climate discussions.

Finally, there are high expectations for stronger commitments on finance. Finance is a cross-cutting issue that flows from mitigation to loss and damage, and the funding gaps have been growing each year.

At COP26, parties noted with “deep regret” that the goal of jointly mobilising $100 billion per year by 2020 had not been met. In fact, between 2013-2020, only 67 per cent on average of committed funds had actually been distributed. At this conference, developed nations must step up and do more to supporting developing countries that need additional financial resources, especially in the form of grants.

What’s clear is that the outcomes of COP27 will have a significant impact on levels of trust in climate negotiations. Without commitments on the full and timely delivery of financial support, as well as meaningful progress on loss and damage, adaptation, and long-term mitigation goals, the trust and goodwill that are critical in this process may well be impossible to restore.

The post What can we expect at COP27? appeared first on Policy Forum.

In December 2021, New Caledonians were faced with their third and final independence referendum provided for by the 1998 Nouméa Accord. The vote was meant to provide clarity about the future of the Pacific territory, which was first colonised by France in 1853, following a period of violence between 1976-1988. Unfortunately, it did anything but.

The referendum proved controversial after a request by pro-independence parties to delay the vote on account of the devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was denied by French President Emmanuel Macron. In response, the independence movement called on their supporters to boycott the vote.

The result was a landslide victory for the French loyalists, with approximately 96.5 per cent of votes cast against independence, but a referendum in which more than half of Caledonia’s registered voters abstained.

With such a large proportion of New Caledonians seemingly questioning the legitimacy of the referendum, the territory’s future is still clouded by uncertainty. So what happens next?

In the wake of the vote, the French Council of State rejected a legal challenge attempting to dismiss the result as illegitimate. According to the council, the fact that only 43 per cent of eligible voters participated did not ‘invalidate the sincerity of the vote’.

More on this: Is New Caledonia’s referendum a double dead end?

Loyalist Philippe Dunoyer from the Caledonia Together party claimed the ruling ‘put an end to the Nouméa Accord’.

He said the first target for change would be the restricted electoral rolls, which have limited voting on key issues to those with New Caledonian citizenship since the 1990s. This has meant that 40,000 French residents, who pay taxes in the territory and in some cases were born there, have been restricted from voting.

Despite Dunoyer’s claims, however, it seems that the Accord may remain in effect for the foreseeable future. Enshrined in the French constitution, the Accord describes the transfer of administrative power to local authorities as ‘irreversible’. According to Mathias Chauchat, a law professor at the University of New Caledonia, there is a contradiction between the irreversibility of this power transfer and the notion of the accord lapsing.

“The two concepts cannot be made to coexist,” he said. “Either the Accord is void or it is irreversible.”

The chair of a delegation of the French Senate Law Commission who visited New Caledonia agreed, saying that it will remain in effect until a new agreement has been reached. If that fails, the ‘irreversible’ delegation of self-governing powers is protected, according to the French Senate Law Commission.

Reaching a new agreement may be difficult, however, given the number of parties and amount of division on the issue of sovereignty in New Calendonia.

Even among pro-independence parties, there are diverging visions of territorial sovereignty. The Palika party suggested negotiating an agreement of sovereign independence in ‘partnership’ with France, which could be ratified by a United Nations-run referendum. On the other hand, the largest pro-independence party Caledonian Union still prefers complete independence, also through a United Nations-administered vote.

Meanwhile, moderates in the anti-independence camp – such as the Caledonia Together party – have often shared the concerns of the indigenous Kanak people about the management of the nickel-dependent economy, the importance of expanding trade and diplomatic relations in the region, and the need to address the high cost of living and inequality.

More on this: New Caledonia’s thirty-year referendum process may fall at the final hurdle

Caledonia Together founder Philippe Gomès envisioned a self-governing New Caledonian ‘nation’ that remains officially part of France. He argued that the referendum question should not have asked for a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to independence, but that a third, less polarising option should have been offered.

Other local politicians have suggested independence in ‘association’ with France, a United Nations concept that sites between full integration and complete independence, which has been adopted by several Pacific Island states. The Cook Islands and Niue have a such a relationship with New Zealand, meaning their people are citizens of both countries, they use New Zealand currency, and they receive financial aid from their larger Pacific neighbour.

Yet, hardline anti-independence groups like the Future with Confidence group want a more radical post-Accord agenda that recognises the cultural identity of the mostly non-Kanak Southern Province, favours majority rule in the cabinet, and expands the electorate to include new French migrants.

Kanak leaders fear that if such changes to New Caledonian citizenship are introduced, they would be demographically drowned and essentially recolonised. Indigenous Kanak people remain the largest ethnic group at about 41 per cent of the total population, but are still short of a majority – and their representation would only dilute further if French migrants were offered citizenship.

A potential game changer to these demographic politics, however, is Polynesian migration to New Caledonia. The 2019 census showed that Polynesians comprised approximately 12 per cent of the territory’s population, meaning that together Polynesian and Kanak are in majority.

Whilst Polynesians have long made up a significant portion of the population, since the late 1980s they have become an increasing political force via the establishment of a number of minor political parties, such as Oceanian Awakening (OA).

In 2019, OA won seats in municipal councils, the southern provincial assembly, the Congress, and the executive cabinet, and its stated aim is to be an independent ‘communitarian’ party that ‘go[es] beyond hateful, radical and racist discourses’.

Whether this Pasifika demographic majority tips the domestic political balance in favour of Kanak pro-independence groups remains to be seen, and to this point OA have remained neutral on the question of New Caledonian sovereignty, despite supporting Palika in their formation of coalition government.

However, the outlook for post-referendum discussions is already looking bleak. In September 2022, France’s new overseas minister Jean-François Carenco announced that no more referendums would be held, and instead invited all sides to discuss the territory’s future status in Paris in October. Pro-independence groups have refused to attend, maintaining that they will only talk to negotiate New Caledonia’s transition to full sovereignty.

In the challenging times ahead, it’s important that the French government heed the words of former overseas minister Edouard Philippe, who said that ‘the art of peace’ is rooted in ‘uninterrupted dialogue’ and a ‘custom of working together’.

This article is based on part two of a paper published by ANU Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) as part of its ‘In brief’ series. Part one of the original paper can be found here.

The post Nouméa discord appeared first on Policy Forum.

Is the elevation of Rishi Sunak to the prime ministership the end of the Conservative Party’s leadership turmoil? What impact might this instability have at the next national election? And what will a new prime minister mean for the United Kingdom’s relationships with Europe and beyond? On this episode of Democracy Sausage, Chair of the Menzies Australia Institute at King’s College London Elizabeth Ames and Head of Foreign Policy and UK Resilience at Policy Exchange Sophia Gaston join Professor Mark Kenny to discuss the recent upheaval in British politics. Listen now: https://bit.ly/3TXNn8s

Sophia Gaston is Head of Foreign Policy and UK Resilience at Policy Exchange, one of the United Kingdom’s leading think tanks. She is also a Research Fellow in the Institute for Global Affairs at the London School of Economics and Political Science and an Academic Fellow at the European Policy Centre in Brussels.

Elizabeth Ames is the Chief Operating Officer of Atalanta, a mission-driven firm with a focus on advancing women’s leadership worldwide. She is the Chair of the Menzies Australia Institute at King’s College London and a Director of the Britain-Australia Society.

Mark Kenny is a Professor at ANU Australian Studies Institute. He came to the university after a high-profile journalistic career including six years as chief political correspondent and national affairs editor for The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, and The Canberra Times.

Democracy Sausage with Mark Kenny is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum or join us on the Facebook group.

This podcast is produced in partnership with The Australian National University.

The post Democracy Sausage: Britain’s bad decade? appeared first on Policy Forum.

Across political, military, and economic domains, the United States and the post-Cold War international order it leads is being challenged, especially by China and Russia. This reality suggests that the world is never static — and it offers middle powers an opportunity to play a role in calibrating the international order.

In recent years, Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index noted the emergence of the Philippines as a ‘middle power’, with diplomatic influence and defence networks as its greatest strengths.

But what exactly does it mean to be a middle power?

Giovanni Botero defined middle powers as entities that possess “force and authority sufficient to maintain itself without the need for the help of another.” Andrew Cooper observed that middle powers form a “niche” in building a world order.

In essence, a middle power, as Andrew Carr suggested, “can protect its core interests and initiate or lead a change in a specific aspect of the existing international order.”

More on this: Inclusive development in the Philippines

Tanguy Struye de Swielande said that there are five determinants of a middle power: it should have medium-sized (material and immaterial) capabilities, a status that’s recognised by other states, self-conception about that status, and have both regional and systemic impact. Among the five, he argued, regional impact and self-conception are the most prominent indicators.

So how does the Philippines measure up?

The Philippines Government made a regional impact when it won the arbitration in 2016 against China’s claim in the South China Sea. The United States, Australia, Japan, and Western European states, among others, expressed support for the ruling.

Former President Rodrigo Duterte, who was perhaps the country’s most anti-American leader in recent times, even acknowledged that the ruling contributes to strengthening the rules-based international order at the United Nations in 2020 and 2021.

These acknowledgements of the country’s regional and systemic impact are significant – but what about the country’s self-conception?

The new government seems to be warming to the idea that the country can occupy a middle power role. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, under the presidency of the recently elected Ferdinand Marcos Jr, officially celebrated its inclusion as middle power in the Lowy rankings in August.

In his speeches before the United Nations General Assembly and Asia Society this September, Marcos Jr consistently reiterated his government’s support for the international rules-based order. This demonstrates a willingness to embrace a ‘niche’ leadership role, identified by scholars as key for middle powers.

More on this: Should the Philippines’ helicopter deal with Russia go ahead?

However, these are only initial steps. For decades, the Philippines’ strategic culture has been geared toward reliance on the United States for its external defence rather than building its own capabilities, undermining its legitimacy as a middle power candidate.

Further, Bruce Gilley argued that middle power status is an unstable category in an unstable world. It requires “a delicate psychological disposition: to accept that one is near the top of global leadership, that one can make a difference, but to avoid falling into delusions of grandeur because it will lead to great regrets, a massive hangover, every time reality snaps back into place.”

In other words, the Philippines may ultimately lose its middle power status if it fails to fully recognise itself as one. This means policymakers need to recognise the county’s agency in shaping the region’s future, rather than just accepting whatever major powers dish up.

For example, in recent engagements with the United States, some have framed the Philippines as victims or dependents of “American imperialism.” But these binary narratives betray international realities, which beg for a more nuanced view and a more active approach.

Of course, one-time rhetoric does not necessarily have a meaningful impact on foreign policy, but recent studies argue that narratives are increasingly becoming a significant part of international affairs. They are a significant tool used to influence foreign policy, and provide guidance for strategic communication, policy implementation, and national mobilisation.

If the Philippines is to be a middle power, it must also consider policy. For instance, the country’s defence modernisation must befit a middle power. That is, the administration should not just focus on acquiring platforms, munitions, and enabling technologies to replace old ones – it should also consider the tactical, doctrinal, operational, and strategic implications of these decisions.

Since defence networks are one of its key strengths, the Philippines’ leadership must recognise the value of its military’s interoperability with key allies and partners. In so doing, the Philippines could enhance its diplomatic credibility in shaping a favourable regional order which reflects its national interests.

Embracing a middle power narrative will be a litmus test for the country’s statecraft in the turbulent years to come. There is much work to do to make this a reality, but hard times also create opportunities – it’s up to the Philippine state to make the most of them.

The post The Philippines must embrace a middle power narrative appeared first on Policy Forum.