Aviation safety vs commercial profits

The push to make airlines more competitive and affordable for travellers could also mean that safety is compromised

Desmond Ross

Trade and industry, Law | Australia, Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, The Pacific, The World

2 October 2015

Is a flawed system of aviation safety being challenged by competition and financial pressures brought about by relaxation on the issuing of airline licences?

The Dutch report on the destruction of Malaysian Airlines MH17 in Ukrainian airspace is imminent, but it is now clear that the aircraft was shot down by a missile fired from the ground. This criminal act must be properly investigated and prosecuted.

But who is responsible in the end? The man who fired the missile, the politicians prolonging the war, the Ukrainian government for failing to close their airspace. or the airline itself and the captain of the aircraft for flying through that airspace knowing there was a war in progress?

Perhaps it is a flawed system of aviation safety being challenged at every turn by competition and immense financial pressures brought about by Open Skies policies and relaxation on the issuing of airline licences.

Malaysian Airlines, like many others, would have wanted to fly the shortest route between Amsterdan and Kuala Lumpur on that fateful night.  It aimed to minimise the amount of fuel burned (equals cost) during the flight. So it planned a direct route which took it over the Ukrainian territory. They had been told it was safe to fly above 32,000 feet because weapons known to be used in the conflict could not reach that height. Other airlines had also followed the same route without incident.

Image by Bernal Saborio on Flickr.  https://www.flickr.com/photos/44073224@N04/16225395606/

Image by Bernal Saborio on Flickr. https://www.flickr.com/photos/44073224@N04/16225395606/

Airline management cannot deny that costs are their major consideration and some airlines are known to have offered pilots financial rewards for cost saving. This practice is contrary to a proper safety culture and encourages operational decisions to be made on economic rather than safety considerations.

Liberalisation of airspace over the last decades and the growth of airline companies has generated an intensely competitive market, which is exactly what the architects of the policy had in mind, as more competition generates lower ticket costs for the consumer. However, this also generates the risk that some air carriers may reduce their expenditure on training and maintenance.

Passengers now have the choice to fly on a low cost carrier (LCC), or a full service airline – but at a greater cost for the full in-flight service and highly experienced crews.

The queston then is whether the lower cost ticket entitles the passenger to the same standards of safety and security as with a more costly ticket on a full service carrier.

In theory it should, and protection is provided by the various national aviation authorities whose job is to ensure that proper safety and security standards are maintained by all air operators under their jurisdiction. The International Civil Aviation Organization, (ICAO) is responsible for developing the rules with the aim of maintaining a consistent standard across all international borders.

Unfortunately this lofty objective is not always achieved.

Many of the worlds’ national aviation regulators are deficient in their operations and are not sufficiently resourced by their governments. This is revealed in safety audit documents published by ICAO.

The European Union takes action to safeguard its airspace by prohibiting the operation of many airlines in European skies, a decision based on the capability of the national regulatory authority to manage aviation safety.

Now turn back to MH17, QZ8501 and other similar incidents.

Were the pilots under pressure from company management to save money and shave their safety margins? Would they have had to undergo an inquisition if they diverted or turned back from their assigned routes for safety reasons?

Pilots’ salaries are lower now than they were before the advent of LCCs and there are some airlines where inexperienced pilots can pay for the opportunity to gain flight experience. These pilots are not employees on a salary. Do the passengers know of this situation?

The safety culture of any organisation, particularly an air operator, starts with the Directors of the company. The CEO and Chairman are responsible for ensuring that a good safety culture permeates the entire organisation. But, in the reality of the commercial world, is this entirely possible? The costs of maintaining high safety standards is high but it is certainly less expensive than having a disaster!

Should MH17 have diverted and flown an extra hour to ensure it was clear of the war zone? Should the pilots of Air Asia QZ8501 have turned back to Surabaya to avoid the massive storm system in their path?

In either of these cases would the pilots have still had their jobs the following day or would they have been penalised for adding to the costs of their flights?

It is ironic that the very policy of making airlines more competitive and affordable for travellers could also mean that safety is compromised, and nobody in the aviation industry would argue that profit is more important than safety. However, there is call for better policy in an increasingly competitive market.

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2 Responses

  1. Wayne Farley says:

    Organizations are in a management dilemma where there is a narrow area of operation bordered by bankruptcy and disaster. Too often they choose to tether near the boundary of disaster just to survive the fierce competition. Competition is necessary to keep air travel tickets affordable, but the issuance of air operator certificates needs to be measured if the healthy balance of affordability and safety are to be met. That I believe should be the starting point, then all the other elements including safety management should be closely monitored.

  2. Mike A Ambrose says:

    For 49 years I have been proud to work in air transport. I have been fortunate enough to participate in an industry that leads the world in learning from its mistakes, distributing information on problems and solutions to both colleagues and competitors worldwide, and implementing both a ‘no blame’ culture to encourage the reporting of safety events.and crew resource management cultures.

    The industry has consistently reinvested in safety improvement and yet now in Europe we are faced with regulations which act wholly against the interests of the safety of passengers and crew. Yes, some airlines do, on occasions, get into financial difficulties and their employees are then generally aware that jobs could be at risk. In such circumstances, a crew might do all possible to avoid incurring ‘unnecessary’ expenditure by operating outside their normal considerations of prudence – even though they might still be ‘legal’.

    These situations have in recent years been greatly exacerbated by the ill-advised and ill-informed judgements of the European Court of Justice in its interpretations of the infamous Regulation 261/2004 on Passenger Compensation and Assistance – surely the most ineptly drafted legislation ever to escape the corridors of the European Commission?

    The Regulation imposes compensation payments for flight cancellations and delays that can vary from €250 to €600 per passenger depending on circumstances. For example, a cancelled intra-EU flight of more than 1500kms carrying 250 passengers could incur compensation payments of €100000 in addition to passenger care costs. The economic pressure on crews to operate when experience and common sense says ‘no’ could be enormous.

    It is true that the Regulation does include an ‘extraordinary circumstances’ exemption. However, the ECJ’s interpretation of what constitutes ‘extraordinary circumstances’ is not just absurd [it is tantamount to ‘if anything can happen, it is by definition, not extraordinary] it shows a woeful disregard on the potential adverse effects on operating safety arising from their flawed judgements.

    The Transport Committee has in the past admitted that the ECJ’s interpretation of the Regulation has been contrary to the will and intent of the European Parliament. In effect, the ECJ has manipulated the law. By doing so, it has introduced economic pressures that are totally unnecessary and act directly against the industry’s efforts to improve the safety of passengers and crew.

    What a fiasco !!

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