Over the last 15 years, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have ramped up their involvement international hydropower development, particularly in the Mekong River basin, which flows south from China through Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

The Mekong River is crucial to the livelihood of those living near its banks, providing fresh water for irrigation, aquaculture, transportation, and fishing. While experts continue to analyse China’s development of dams on its portion of the Mekong, Chinese dam funding and construction in neighbouring countries in the lower Mekong basin (LMB) remain understudied.

The LMB encompasses five countries, but Laos contains over 80 per cent of the dams constructed by Chinese companies in the area.

Contrary to ‘debt trap’ arguments, Laos seems to be pursing these agreements with China with agency and freedom. While China is providing funding and know-how, these dam projects are being pursued of Laos’ own accord.

After all, these projects provide some big benefits. Between 2010 and 2011 alone, the total hydroelectric capacity in Laos from Chinese investments jumped from 200 megawatts (MW) to around 1,900 MW. As of 2019, it was estimated that Laotian hydroelectric capacity from dams with known Chinese involvement had reached 5,000 MW – enough electricity to power millions of homes.

However, these developments also have their have negative impacts. Officials view dams as a means of generating economic development, but many locals, experts, and non-government organisations contend that they are detrimental to the environment, especially fishing stocks, and that they exacerbate socio-economic issues.

Broadly, hydropower is viewed as a ‘green’ technology, but this is a reductive view. Researchers have shown that artificial bodies of water often contribute to decomposition in an area, accelerating the release of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide from organic matter.

More on this: Provincial players in China’s Belt and Road Initiative

In all, greenhouse gases from dams and reservoirs account for between one and two per cent of global emissions caused by humans, and this should factor into the calculations of decision-makers developing hydropower policies.

Further, the upfront cost of dams are deceptive, since dams regularly experience cost blowouts, and engineering difficulties in dam development often require costly adjustments to construction.

Finally, sometimes dams break – including while they are being built.

In 2018, Laos suffered a catastrophic dam collapse in the southern province of Attepeu. The collapse resulted in 71 confirmed deaths, at least 1,000 people missing, and tens of thousands impacted by the floodwaters, which reached as far south as Cambodia.

This collapse was of a relatively small dam, and it must serve as a warning to the Laotian government, which is supporting the construction of much larger dams.

Moreover, environmental assessments are not optimistic about the health of the Mekong basin in Laos.

The Xayaburi dam on the main stem of the Mekong has already affected the quality of sediment for agriculture, access to migratory fish, and water levels. Further construction along the tributaries in the basin has only added to the pain.

Yet Laos isn’t slowing down. It’s now entering phase two of the Nam Ou River Cascade Hydropower Project in northern Laos, which consists of seven dams with a combined hydroelectric capacity of 1,270 MW. Although the development predates the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has since been brought under the BRI umbrella.

This presents significant challenges to northern Laos, a region with low population density and high poverty levels. The dams will worsen water quality issues, disrupt transportation, impact agricultural production, and could reduce fish biodiversity by more than two thirds.

Laos also faces significant financial commitments on these projects. The country has a foreign debt crisis, and its difficulty paying down this debt has resulted in concessions to China for the use of its projects.

In September 2020, the state-owned China Southern Power Grid Company obtained majority control of Electricite du Laos, the Laotian SOE which maintains its electrical grid.

Then, in March 2021, the terms of this concession were finalised, with a 25-year agreement allowing China Southern Power Grid Company ‘to build and manage its power grid, including electricity exports to neighboring countries’ forming part of the deal.

More on this: China’s path to decarbonisation

Effectively, Laos handed over its control of its power to a Chinese SOE. This alarmed skeptics of China’s infrastructure investments and means Laos can’t challenge China if their electricity interests diverge.

From the Laotian government’s perspective, the opportunity to expand on its energy generation is seen as an avenue to generate economic productivity. Its objective is to become the centre of electrical generation and a major exporter of electricity to the region – or the ‘battery of Southeast Asia’.

This is also why Laos is upgrading its domestic grid to handle larger loads for export, which also aligns with regional ambitions for an upgraded Southeast Asian grid.

To understand China’s motivations, it is important to examine the role Yunnan province plays.

Bordering Laos and containing the Chinese portion of the Mekong, China’s Yunnan province has been a key advocate of downstream investment. China has constructed dams on its portion of the Mekong, but the availability of space in the province is limited for future dams.

To accelerate the development of China’s inner provinces, there have been calls to use infrastructure in Yunnan to connect Chinese firms to Southeast Asian markets and resources via a ‘bridgehead strategy’.

It would include projects such as roads, railways, and dams, which would in turn see electricity demand grow. With pre-existing ambitions for a regionally connected grid and Laos willing to host more dams, there is massive scope for Chinese enterprises to construct more dams. They could then use Laos’ grid concessions to import energy generated from these projects into China. Energy shortages in China make this a near certainty.

While these projects have potential and align with the region’s energy ambitions, policymakers in China need to carefully consider the environmental and social impacts of their dams. In Laos, leaders must ensure projects don’t develop beyond their means.

Ultimately, both countries must remember that the Mekong River continues to flow beyond their borders – if their projects aren’t carefully and responsibly executed, the whole of Southeast Asia will feel the pain.

The post Giving a dam in the Mekong basin appeared first on Policy Forum.

There has always been a significant level of suspicion among democratic nations when it comes to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and for good reason.

Powerful democratic states in Asia have long sought to influence regional neighbourhoods to bolster support for, and adoption of, liberal economic policies, aiming to reward transparent economic and financial relationships while contributing to more sustainable and mutually beneficial relations among states. The BRI, to be sure, poses a threat to this.

If current international norms have explicitly discouraged and delegitimised autocratic behaviour, it would make sense for autocratic nations such as China to seek to influence their neighbourhoods to counter liberal trends and remake them in their own image.

Outwardly at least, the BRI does just this. While scholars have been right to point out that some governments have been too quick and unthinking in their criticism of the project, there are still valid concerns that need addressing.

In particular, the emergence of relationships of dependence between participating states and Chinese funders, notwithstanding the notable lack of transparency surrounding the BRI’s many agreements, has clouded BRI projects, strengthening accusations that Chinese loans are in some cases predatory or have primarily geopolitical ends.

In fact, it has often been the case that only after a change in government in participating states that the true circumstances of some of these opaque deals are revealed.

For instance, when the new government of Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia undertook a feasibility study of the East Coast Railway Link (ECRL), a multi-billion-dollar BRI project, it found giant gaps in spending justifications. This caused the new Minister for Finance Lim Guan Eng to call on the China Communication Construction Company to explain the costs and ultimately reduce them by a drastic amount.

More on this: The future of the Belt and Road Initiative in Australia

The ECRL was later caught up in the investigations into the infamous 1Malaysia Development Berhad scandal, and was even threatened with cancellation.

From a good governance perspective, where voice and accountability, rule of law, regulatory quality, political stability, and government effectiveness are considered integral to positive project outcomes, the results have been more broadly problematic.

In Sri Lanka in 2015, for example, the new government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was voted into office following a campaign to examine the former government’s opaque deals with China, which had led to a domestic balance of payments crisis over the Hambantota Port development project.

By 2016, Wickremesinghe was forced to extend the government’s financial outreach to Beijing to service the debt from non-performing loans, having no alternative option.

Elsewhere, guarantees that projects meet their broader justifications have often run aground. In Pakistan, for instance, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has caused considerable dilemmas for the government in Islamabad. Soaring debt, unprofitable projects, and unfavourable equity stakes to Chinese firms have discredited the rationale for partnership.

Many projects have employed Chinese labour and machinery, creating as a result few local jobs, while most of the profits are repatriated to China. Excess costs in the billions are often incurred as a result of insufficient planning.

More on this: Australia, China and the Belt and Road Initiative with Jane Golley

The Qasim and Sahiwal power plants, for example, have cost a further $1.8 billion than was projected due to tariffs, and further examination of the flagship projects in Pakistan (Gwadar Port and Gwadar Free Zone) reveals significant fluctuations in loan rates, in some cases exceeding 13 per cent.

Meanwhile, special privileges for the China Overseas Port Holding Company of a 40-year lease with a 91 per cent share in profits and a 23-year exemption from most taxes, have caused further headaches.

Clearly, the rationale for these projects – to establish a base for Pakistan’s industrial growth – has not been achieved, thanks in part to exorbitant tariffs, high electricity prices, and generous tax breaks for Chinese companies.

As these examples illustrate, non-transparency has often led to an abandonment of responsible credit lending principles, as established by the OECD and the Paris Club of global creditors. The United Nations’ Principles of Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, to which China is committed, has been similarly neglected.

In more tangible terms, this means a loss of evaluation and reporting mechanisms, post-disbursement audits, stated borrowing objectives, and a loosening of accounting norms, all of which have contributed to BRI project troubles and the erosion of democratic governance mechanisms more broadly.

And what does this mean for the region’s norms? In short, the splintering of aid and development into bilateral relationships has undermined regulatory bodies and left governments dependent on powerful neighbours. If the BRI continues to expand, it could lead to the further adoption of authoritarian control in the region, impacting countries where minor reductions in liberal norms are registered the most.

At the very least, these trends in BRI practice have strengthened some nations’ obligations to and dependencies on China, and it can now actively pull strings to exploit disagreements, weaken democratic institutions, and divide voices on key national priorities.

Until such issues are addressed more broadly, international repudiation of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy will continue.

The post The battle for Asia’s norms appeared first on Policy Forum.

Since 2013, Australia has been at pains to adopt a cautious approach towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is worth noting that during this period, the Australian Government has been led by the same party, allowing a level of policy consistency and continuity toward the BRI.

Early in the program’s evolution, the government wasn’t opposed the contribution of the BRI to infrastructure and economic development, but cited concern at its lack of international standards of governance and transparency.

Before 2017, while remaining prudent, Canberra was much more conciliatory towards the BRI. Discussions between Australia and China mostly revolved around potential alignment of Australia’s Northern Development Strategy with the BRI, and even direct participation in the BRI seemed a possibility for the Federal Government.

During former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s two meetings with President Xi Jinping in April 2016 and September 2016, Xi repeatedly proposed the alignment. In both instances, Turnbull did not accept the call directly, but also did not outright reject it.

Then, in February 2017 at a joint press conference between Australian and Chinese Foreign Ministers Julie Bishop and Wang Yi, Bishop explained that both countries “intend to link the BRI with Australia’s vision for developing Northern Australia” under conditions of “transparency, private sector engagement, and strong development outcomes”.

More on this: Australia, China and the Belt and Road Initiative with Jane Golley

However, in March 2017, just days prior to Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit, the government refused to officially endorse an alignment with the BRI. The reported reason behind this was that it did not see tangible benefits from signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and claimed China’s BRI was short on details. This was a turning point for the BRI in Australia. After 2017, Australia’s federal BRI policy has been unambiguous, and direct participation off the table.

Accordingly, the government signed an MoU that approved Australian work with the BRI in third countries, but not on Australian soil. This essentially meant that BRI projects in Australia would not serve the country’s national interest. Importantly, BRI projects were not forbidden outright, and could be considered on a case-by-case basis in Australia. Individual Australian corporations were also allowed to be part of the BRI, since their involvement and growth would be beneficial to Australian employment.

Meanwhile, Australia began seeking other infrastructure project alternatives that met its demands regarding international standards of governance and transparency, and in November 2019, it joined the United States and Japan in the Blue Dot Network (BDN). The declared intent of the BDN is to bring together governments, the private sector, and civil society under open, inclusive, and transparent international standards for global infrastructure development.

In contrast to the Federal Government’s shift away from the BRI, the Victorian State Government signed two BRI MoUs with the goal of building local economic prosperity and employment, a choice that attracted fierce criticism from federal politicians.

In 2020, the Australian Parliament passed Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Bill to strengthen federal authority and foreign policy consistency over state and territory foreign affairs.

More on this: Just how efficient is China’s Belt and Road?

While the Federal Government has not said officially that one of the bill’s intentions would to cancel Victoria’s BRI MoUs in the future, some politicians have admitted that giving the government this choice was “one of the reasons the bill was necessary”.

As of the end of 2020, Victoria’s BRI deals have remained intact. Still, the Federal Government has the power to ditch concrete projects under the BRI framework, such as the Victoria-Jiangsu Program for Technology and Innovation Research and Development, and it may still exercise that power.

Even though this may make the future of the Victorian BRI projects seem gloomy, the government will likely keep from tearing up what is mostly just a piece of paper, at least for now. There are four main reasons for this.

Firstly, Victoria’s deal is a vague and non-legally binding document that does not actually commit the state to any specific projects.

Secondly, revoking Victoria’s BRI deal will potentially cause a much tougher response from China, as the Chinese embassy in Australia has been vocal its opposition against any such cancellation. This is because the BRI is linked strongly with the personal brand of Chinese President Xi Jinping, and with legitimacy an imperative of China’s foreign policy doctrines and culture, it would be an ill-advised move for Australia’s relationship with China to inadvertently damage that brand.

Thirdly, in response to such a slight, China may commit to an all-out Sino-Australian trade war, which would lead to the catastrophic loss of six per cent of Australia’s economic power.

Fourthly, Australia needs to keep its primary ally, the United States, happy. Newly elected President Joe Biden’s BRI policy is emerging, but still not totally certain, and it would be wise to wait this out given the geopolitical volatility in the region.

In all, rescinding these agreements is likely more trouble than it’s worth. Australian leaders should only consider it if what they want for the near future is even more testy and confrontational Sino-Australian relations than have characterised the recent past.

The post The future of the Belt and Road Initiative in Australia appeared first on Policy Forum.

It’s barbecue season, and if you’re not running low on tomato sauce, the Policy Forum team has a few prime cuts of podcasting meat to throw on your holiday hotplate. To kick off the year, we’re bringing you our most popular podcast episodes of 2020, and first on the menu is the year’s top five episodes of Democracy Sausage with Mark Kenny.

The pod covered enormous ground across 94 episodes in 2020, from Australian politics to the United States election, and from the COVID-19 pandemic to Brexit. With another big year of politics and public affairs ahead, we hope this countdown of your favourite shows is just what you need to whet your appetite for all the Democracy Sausage to come in 2021. 

5. Leadership in the time of COVID-19 with Niki Savva

What does it take to be a political leader? What’s the magic mix of talent and time? And do Australia’s treasurer and shadow treasurer have that mix? Commentator Niki Savva and political scientist Marija Taflaga joined host Mark Kenny to discuss what it takes to do the top job on our fifth most popular episode of the year. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3bK4t6r

4. China’s rise – is history repeating? 

In launching Australia’s new Defence Strategy Update, Prime Minister Scott Morrison drew parallels between the strategic and economic threat Australia currently faces with that faced by the world in the 1930s and 40s. While China’s growing assertiveness is not the only cause of this uncertainty, it is likely front of mind for many in the Australian government. On this episode of Democracy Sausage, Mark Kenny is joined by former long-time public servant Allan Behm to discuss community values in the COVID-19 crisis, the “serious vacancies in leadership” around the world, and learning the lessons of history to understand China’s behaviour. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3oL3yWV

3. Scott Morrison and pandemic politics with Katharine Murphy

What has the COVID-19 crisis revealed about Australia’s prime minister? This is what we discussed on this year’s third most popular episode, featuring Guardian Australia’s political editor Katharine Murphy. Recorded in September, Mark talked to Katharine about Scott Morrison, pandemic politics, and her new Quarterly Essay, The end of certainty, as part of the Canberra Times/ANU Meet the Author series. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3sz2nMX

2. Is Trump cooked?

In August, an interview between Donald Trump and US-based journalist Jonathan Swan went viral. Days later, Mark Kenny chatted to another stateside Aussie journalist, Matthew Knott, about the interview and Trump’s re-election prospects in what became our second most popular episode for the year. With Trump’s numerous legal challenges to the election result and his claims about voting fraud, Mark and Matthew’s discussion about whether the United States needs an independent, non-partisan federal electoral service like the Australian Electoral Commission to sure-up its famous democracy remains highly relevant even after the election. Listen here: https://bit.ly/2N5zqrA

1. Annabel Crabb on Australia’s moment of change

In March this year, Australia established the National Cabinet composed of the prime minister and state and territory leaders in order to better respond to the coronavirus crisis. By July, when we recorded this, the success of the Cabinet had shown politicians the value Australians place on cooperation. In our most popular episode of the year, Mark Kenny spoke with Annabel Crabb of the ABC to talk about how the country and its politics have changed as a result of the crisis, and whether Morrison can turn his political capital into substantial, lasting policy reform. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3qgIvMg

What issues would you like to see covered on Democracy Sausage in 2021? Leave us a comment below or share your thoughts via Twitter.

The post Top five episodes of Democracy Sausage in 2020 appeared first on Policy Forum.

Already powered through your summer reading list? Or perhaps you got distracted by Netflix or the test cricket and your stack still looms large? Never fear, you can still start the working year feeling virtuous by diving back into some of Policy Forum’s most popular pieces from the last 12 months.

From China’s engagement with the Pacific to feminist research during COVID-19 to improving Australian migration policy, we look back at the articles you liked most throughout the ‘year like no other’.

10. China’s military engagement with Pacific Island countries by Denghua Zhang (17 August 2020)

More on this: China's military engagement in the Pacific

2020 saw tensions rise between China and a number of countries, including the United States and Australia. One of the causes of concern for Washington and Canberra has been Beijing’s increased military engagement with Pacific Island countries.

In this article from August ranked 10th, Denghua Zhang from The Australian National University (ANU) shed light on Chinese military modernisation and what it means for the Indo-Pacific.

9. China’s foreign direct investment flows by Chunlai Chen and Christopher Findlay (10 June 2020)

In the wake of the global COVID-19 pandemic, foreign direct investment (FDI) took a hit in China, falling by 13 per cent. But with China successfullly suppressing the coronavirus, investment bounced back quickly in April, rising 8.6 per cent as compared to the previous month.

In this piece coming in ninth on our list, ANU Crawford School’s Chunlai Chen and Christopher Findlay examioned data on FDI in China and changing investment patterns to challenge the view that businesses would withdraw from China in the wake of the pandemic.

8. Conducting feminist research during lockdown by Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, Arnab Chakraborty, and Sourav Bag (9 June 2020)

More on this: Feminist research during lockdown

The global pandemic has left no one untouched, but its impact differs greatly depending on a number of factors, including race/ethnicity, gender, and age.

In this June article, Crawford School’s Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, and Arnab Chakraborty and Sourav Bag from Professorial Assistance for Development Action, discussed what qualitative researchers can do to engage with research participants in remote communities in times when international travel restrictions prevent researchers from travelling. They reported on their research using the Rapid Phone Appraisal tool in a remote community in India to find out how COVID-19 has affected women and their livelihoods.

7. Freedom of navigation and the Law of the Sea by Sam Bateman (21 January 2020)

The South China Sea remained a regional hotspot in 2020, and our readers were keen to hear more about it. This this piece by Sam Bateman from the University of Wollongong was the seventh most popular article on Policy Forum in 2020.

Sam examined the terms ‘freedom of navigation’ and ‘international waters’, what they actually mean in the context of the South China Sea, and why the law of the sea is notoriously complex and often misused.

6. Mapping the Pacific COVID-19 response (18 June 2020)

More on this: Mapping the Pacific COVID-19 response

Issues in the Pacific Island region are often underreported and misunderstood. Amidst the great uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 crisis, ANU Department of Pacific Affairs, the Australia Pacific Security College and ANU CartoGIS developed the Pacific COVID-19 response map. The map provided an accessible way for researchers and the general public to get up-to-date data on the ongoing response to COVID-19 in the Pacific region.

Published as part of the Pacific: In Focus section and becoming our sixth most popular post in 2020, the map has been a fantastic tool, providing a snapshot of case numbers, local response measures, and what they mean on the ground.

5. Sums, germs, and fear by Quentin Grafton and Tom Kompas (30 March 2020)

Back in March, the first, deadly waves of COVID-19 were causing havoc in countries such as Italy and the United States, showing how infection numbers could get out of hand quickly if not countered by appropriate and fast public health measures. Australia, too, was seeing increased numbers back then, with experts worried that the situation could also get out of control. As a result, many were wondering: Is strictly physical distancing a price worth paying?

In this piece coming fifth in our ranking, Crawford’s Quentin Grafton and Tom Kompas from the University of Melbourne used data to explain what Australia might expect, and discuss some of the costs and benefits of strong physical distancing measures.

4. Crimes against women in Pakistan by Tahmina Rashid (3 December 2019)

More on this: Crimes against women in Pakistan

This piece by Tahmina Rashid from December 2019 discussing crimes against women in Pakistan snuck into this year’s top 10.

Ranked fourth, the article took a closer look at new laws for the protection of women, but also at the many shortfalls the country is still facing in this space, from the low status of women to violence.

3. The opportunities and risks of taking education online by Shreya Upadhyay (30 March 2020)

In March, COVID-19 was surging around the world and with it came a rise in remote learning. At this time, more than 100 countries had closed their educational institutions, impacting half of the world’s student population, forcing them to stay at home and in many cases attend online classrooms.

Our third most popular piece of 2020 was by Shreya Upadhyay from Jawarharlal Nehru University, who examined the opportunities and challenges for digital learning, from advances in technology to issues around access in less developed countries.

2. The impact of COVID-19 on livelihoods in Papua New Guinea by Elizabeth Kopel (12 June 2020)

More on this: The impact of COVID-19 in PNG

In June, Papua New Guinea had so far avoided the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic, though concerns grew throughout the year as confirmed case numbers climbed. The country reacted swiftly, but the harsh lockdown measures came at a price, particularly for the poor.

Our readers were particularly interested in this piece by Elizabeth Kopel discussing the impact of COVID-19 on livelihoods in Papua New Guinea, which suggested six strategies to tackle negative outcomes.

1. Improving Australian migration policy in the COVID-19 crisis by Marianne Dickie (21 May 2020)

More on this: Improving Australian migration policy

In March 2020, Australia closed its borders to everyone but citizens and residents. As travel bans came into effect, many people who had been granted a visa to enter Australia but had not finalised their travel were left to navigate a complex process.

In our most popular piece of 2020, Marianne Dickie proposed some simple fixes to Australian migration policy in light of COVID-19.

What issues would you like to see covered on Policy Forum in 2021? Leave us a comment below or share your thoughts via Twitter.

The post Policy Forum’s top 10 of 2020 appeared first on Policy Forum.

Martyn is the founding Editor of Policy Forum and has inspired us since we began in November 2014. We owe him a great debt. Martyn’s vision was to create a place where Crawford School, The Australian National University, and global experts from academia, business, and the policy world could share ideas and analysis on the policy challenges affecting our region and beyond. This has been achieved, and much more besides.

Under Martyn’s editorship, Policy Forum has published more than 2,400 pieces from around 1,700 authors, including not only academics, but senior business leaders, politicians, and prime ministers, and leaders of multilateral institutions.

Policy Forum has been unapologetically broad in its coverage and provided a platform for academics everywhere to engage with policy audiences from around the world. Some of the academics with whom we have worked had their first ‘break’ on Policy Forum before going on to becoming leading public commentators in their areas of expertise.

Our first podcast series, Policy Forum Pod, commenced in 2016. We now have a well-established weekly series that is very popular and listened to around the world. Thanks again to Martyn, we later added the National Security Podcast and Democracy Sausage with Mark Kenny to our podcast repertoire. Combined, these podcasts had more than half a million downloads this year alone, and they have a rapidly growing audience.

Along with the written pieces and podcasts, Policy Forum also has highly engaged social media audiences. Our engagement effectively bridges the divides that ordinarily exist between academia and mainstream social media users.

Martyn leaves Policy Forum at the end of 2020 to take on exciting new challenges. He leaves behind a great team in Angus, Connie, Julia, Gil and Pat, and all the great things that you have come to expect from Policy Forum will continue.

On Martyn’s departure, Angus Blackman, a key, established member of the Policy Forum team, will take on the editorship role and oversee the podcasts.

Please join me in thanking Martyn and wishing him the very best in his new role in 2021.

My best wishes to you all, and especially for the new year.

The post Moving on, stepping forward appeared first on Policy Forum.

A three-decade, $1 trillion infrastructure investment plan that currently involves over 60 countries, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a vast economic and foreign policy initiative led by Chinese President Xi Jinping. But the scheme hasn’t been universally welcomed – indeed Victoria’s 2018 to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with China on the deal has been met with criticism by the Federal Government. But what are the economic and foreign policy factors driving the BRI? How valid are the national security concerns about the scheme, including those about so-called ‘debt-trap diplomacy’? And how should Australia be responding? On this special extra Democracy Sausage Extra, we’re joined by one of Australia’s leading China scholars, Professor Jane Golley, to help us understand the BRI and Australia-China relations. Listen here: https://bit.ly/2QYXb3c

Professor Jane Golley is an economist and Director of the Australian Centre on China in the World at The Australian National University.

Martyn Pearce is a presenter for Policy Forum Pod and the Editor of Policy Forum.

The post Australia, China and the Belt and Road Initiative with Jane Golley appeared first on Policy Forum.

What do Australian attitudes towards surveillance amidst the COVID-19 crisis suggest about trust in society? After weeks of icy diplomatic exchanges, what is the Australian government’s long-term goal for its relationship with Beijing? And why are Australia’s security agencies taking to social media? On the 100th episode of Democracy Sausage, we’re joined by national security expert Jacinta Carroll, historian Professor Frank Bongiorno, regular podleague Dr Marija Taflaga and, taking a break from his holiday to appear as guest, Professor Mark Kenny. Listen here: https://bit.ly/34MhDwa

Jacinta Carroll is Senior Research Fellow at ANU National Security College and was the inaugural Head of ASPI’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Centre.

Professor Frank Bongiorno AM is the Head of the School of History at ANU and is an Australian labour, political and cultural historian.

Mark Kenny is a Professor in the ANU Australian Studies Institute. He came to the university after a high-profile journalistic career including six years as chief political correspondent and national affairs editor for The Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, and The Canberra Times.

Dr Marija Taflaga is Director of the Australian Politics Studies Centre in the ANU School of Politics and International Relations. Her major research is on political parties and particularly the Liberal Party of Australia. She has previously worked in the Australian Parliamentary Press Gallery as a researcher at The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age.

Martyn Pearce is a presenter for Policy Forum Pod and the Editor of Policy Forum.

Democracy Sausage with Mark Kenny is available on Acast, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Google Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. We’d love to hear your feedback for this podcast series! Send in your questions, comments, or suggestions for future episodes to podcast@policyforum.net. You can also Tweet us @APPSPolicyForum or join us on the Facebook group.

This podcast is produced in partnership with The Australian National University.

The post Democracy Sausage: In the national interest appeared first on Policy Forum.

China’s fast-growing presence in the Pacific Island countries (PICs) have triggered traditional powers’ increasing concerns about China’s military ambition in the region. In April 2018, in response to media speculation about China’s plan to build a military base in Vanuatu, Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull said that “[w]e would view with great concern the establishment of any foreign military bases in those Pacific Island countries and neighbours of ours.”

In 2019, China Sam Enterprise Group’s plan to lease the island of Tulagi in Solomon Islands – later vetoed by the Solomon Islands government – caused alarm in the United States and Australia.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) uses the term ‘military and security cooperation’ for its external engagement. According to China’s Military Strategy – the first white paper of its kind released by the PLA in May 2015 – this includes ‘developing all-round military-to-military relations’, ‘pushing ahead with pragmatic military cooperation’ and ‘fulfilling international responsibilities and obligations’. ‘Pragmatic military cooperation’ takes the form of dialogues, personnel training, material assistance and bilateral/multilateral joint exercises and training in both traditional and non-traditional security areas.

Regarding the Pacific, the white paper states that the PLA will ‘continue the traditional friendly military ties with their African, Latin American and Southern Pacific counterparts’. In reality, the PLA has been focusing its Pacific Island engagement on the military forces of Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Tonga, as well as Vanuatu’s small mobile police force. PLA delegations paid 24 visits to the Pacific Islands between 2006 to 2019, more than 60 per cent of which involved PLA naval ships. Medical tours of the Peace Ark accounted for one-third of PLA visits to the region, which could be perceived as an effort to build their image as a benign force dedicated to human security.

More on this: Mentoring to support women’s leadership in the Pacific

In contrast to Chinese non-military aid, which predominantly consists of concessional loans, PLA military aid to the aforementioned PICs is in the form of grants for infrastructure, uniforms, equipment and training. Examples of Chinese military aid to the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) include the 2007 renovation of the Taurama Barrack hospital (US$500,000); a 2017 donation of 62 vehicles – including troop carriers, armoured vehicles, buses and mobile kitchen vans worth K17.5 million (US$5.3 million); and the training of 83 PNGDF officers in China.

In January 2013, visiting PLA Major General Qian Lihua pledged more military aid to Fiji. According to a Fijian government statement, this would entail ‘increased assistance in vehicles, uniforms and stationery equipment as well as training opportunities for defence personnel’.

In December 2018, the PLA donated a hydrographic and surveillance vessel to the Fijian navy. Another 47 military vehicles were provided to Fiji by PLA in April 2020. In November 2008, China donated eight military trucks worth US$500,000 to Tonga. The PLA also supplied musical instruments, military uniforms and 14 military vehicles to Vanuatu’s mobile force in 2016 and 2017.

Other Chinese activities in the Pacific have also raised security concerns among traditional powers. According to China’s official reports, Chinese marine research vessels have increased their geological and geophysical survey operations in the western Pacific Ocean in recent years, such as in 2019 and 2020, triggering concerns that the collected oceanic data could be used for both scientific research and military purposes.

China’s Yuanwang space-tracking vessels have been frequent visitors to the Pacific, with some analysts arguing that these vessels can support both civilian and military launches. There are reports that China has deployed acoustic sensors that can monitor United States submarine movements in the Challenger Deep of the Mariana Trench and near Yap, Micronesia. Some analysts argue that the PLA is using Chinese fishing fleets operating in the Pacific for military surveillance

Speculation has also arisen that after resuming its diplomatic relations with Kiribati in September 2019, China may rebuild its satellite tracking station on Tarawa Island, which was constructed in 1997 and dismantled in 2003 after the island country switched allegiance to Taiwan. The station had been used to monitor China’s space programs, including its first manned space flight. Some suspect it was also used to monitor United States missile testing at the Reagan Test Site at the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.

The three island chains theory provides a lens through which to analyse PICs’ relevance to China’s military strategy. Countries in the northern Pacific – including Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands – sit along the second island chain. This 1950s United States-created theory has been an important driver of PLA Navy development. Successive PLA Navy leaders have developed different strategies to break through these island chains, including ‘coastal defence’ (1950–85), ‘offshore waters defence’ (1985–2008) and a ‘combination of offshore waters defence and open-seas protection’ (since 2008). The island chains have also appeared in PLA reports, a testimony to their military relevance.

Chinese scholars have also flagged that PICs have a role to play in China’s national security strategy. Yang Zheng and Fang Xiaozhi from the PLA Nanjing Political College and the PLA University of International Relations argue that China needs to become a dominant sea power capable of breaking through the first and second island chains in order to enable military operations in more extensive sea waters. Dr Chen Xulong, Director of the Department for International and Strategic Studies at the China Institute of International Studies, an affiliate of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, notes that ‘the lack of supply depots for China’s ocean-going navy has become prominent. Enhancing cooperation with PICs can help solve this issue’. Rigorous censorship in China and these institutions’ affiliations with the PLA and the government could suggest that these views have some currency in the policy world.

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Professor Gao Wensheng from Tianjin Normal University argues that the Pacific Islands sit astride the energy transportation route between China and the Americas; to protect this route, China could establish ‘strategic pivot ports’ in Suva, Apia, Port Moresby and Luganville (Vanuatu) for both civilian and military uses – such as materials supply, staff rest and vessel repairs.

This view is supported by Qi Huaigao, an associate professor at Fudan University, who suggests that in order to compete with the United States in the Western Pacific, China needs to establish port bases in Solomon Islands, Samoa and Vanuatu for commercial and military supply purposes. It is unclear how representative these scholars’ views are.

Other scholars hold different views of China’s naval development more generally. For example, Liang Yabin, an associate professor from the Party School of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, insists that given China’s position as a continental and coastal country that always needs to devote substantial attention to land-based threats – such as those related to the instability in Central Asia – China should aim to develop limited sea power, be defensive and resort to international cooperation to address maritime challenges. This suggestion, proposed five years ago, seems outdated as the PLA Navy has been modernising at a much faster pace in recent years under Xi Jinping.

Looking ahead, China’s naval modernisation is expected to continue. Breaking through the second island chain could likely be on the PLA’s future agenda. The escalation of tensions in China–United States relations will further fuel the two superpowers’ competition in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, PICs will undoubtedly receive more attention from the PLA, affecting the current regional order.

This article is based upon a paper published by the ANU Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) as part of its ‘Policy brief’ series. The original paper can be found here.

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COVID-19 is a challenge that needs to be addressed at the global level, despite the very real differences in the strategic aims and domestic politics of the major players in the international system.

On the international cooperation front, one of the most striking threads in news reports and commentary on the pandemic has been the origin, direction, and size of aid and relief efforts. These are not, as it may first seem, a welcome sign of solidarity among nations, but more a harbinger of growing major power rivalry.

Not a day passes without yet another tally of who sent medical supplies, equipment, and experts to whom and how quickly. Since the international system appears to have become more perilously multipolar than ever in the post-war era, the provision of aid and trade in medical goods is seen as yet another realm of contestation for those who want to challenge the status quo. In that vein, the deeds of ‘bad Samaritans’ such as China and Russia as of late have been justifiably scrutinised.

There is no doubt both of these states are instrumentalising their contribution to relief efforts in a manner that complements the pursuit of their broader geopolitical goals. Both have a vested interest in furthering a narrative of the collapse of the existing international order.

Furthermore, those who have traditionally been in the driver’s seat of global public goods provision, such as the United States and the European Union, no longer appear willing or able to take the lead. Recent developments in Europe are perhaps the most telling case of these dynamics.

In March, in a televised address Serbia’s president Aleksandar Vucic dismissed European solidarity as “a fairy-tale” and singled out China as the only country that “can help us in this difficult situation.” Soon after that, European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen thanked China for offering to provide medical supplies to European states.

More on this: Confronting the regional challenge of COVID-19

These stories, along with those of China’s aid and fast-track exports to Europe’s most severely affected nations, such as Italy and Spain, have been reverberating around European and world capitals. It did not take long before Russia followed suit, albeit with substantially smaller relief packages, but with an unmatched ability to capitalise on its nuggets of goodwill.

Ever since, there has been a lot of handwringing about China’s and Russia’s actions. Clearly, the leaders of these two states are driven by motives other than charity and altruism. Yet, the relief-tracking exercise poses a serious moral conundrum.

As the pandemic ramps up and each day brings stark new evidence of the severe strain even the major developed nations are under, the talk of geopolitical competition appears to be a quaint luxury reserve for those who are fortunate enough not to have fallen ill.

If we posit there is such a thing as undesirable aid in times when some of the largest European economies are reeling, who has the right to ask them to refuse it? The easy part of the answer is – those who are ready to offer an alternative.

The hard part, however, concerns putting it into practice. In this sense, aid-tracking that focuses on China’s and Russia’s largesse in Europe has missed the mark on three important counts.

First, China and Russia have mostly been successful in their aid-related PR in recipient states where the domestic politics and conditions preceding the pandemic have enabled them to be portrayed as the saviours.

More on this: The post-pandemic world

For instance, Serbia’s Vucic has taken a page from the European Union’s authoritarians such as Hungary’s Viktor Orban. He is Europhilic when he can extract benefits from the EU, and Eurosceptic when there are higher bidders in town.

In a different example, in order to boost its lacklustre economic growth, Italy has been getting closer to China, which explains why it became the first G7 state to sign on to the Belt and Road Initiative in 2019. It has also been one of the leading European voices for a rapprochement with Russia, from well before the pandemic.

Second, the narrative that reinforces the stereotypes of the European Union as a whole being disjointed and lagging in response does not account for several vital counterpoints. It is rightly held to a greater account than external powers getting involved in crisis mitigation.

However, it is imperative to note there is no common European health policy because organising and delivering public health care is exclusively in the purview of member states’ national governments. This creates a paradox whereby the EU was better equipped to come to China’s aid when the outbreak began in Hubei province than it was mobilising as a collective to help its member-states when COVID-19 came to Europe.

Lastly, there is the issue of soft power build-up. Even if the premise that foreign aid is primarily an instrument in topping up China’s and Russia’s soft power caches holds, it neglects the size of that aid, and the fact European Union member states have by far accounted for the largest share of aid within the Union’s borders.

This pandemic has only reaffirmed the European Union’s long-standing issue with getting bad press in times of crisis. Clearly, this is not a problem that can be solved with the colourful data visualisations and apologetic statements the European Commission has published in the aftermath.

Yet, it only highlights the control over narrative that the bad Samaritans have, especially given their authoritarian nature. Moreover, it points to some of the pre-set reporting schemas in the European and international media.

After all, apparent lack of European solidarity regularly receives more coverage than the instances of inter-governmental cooperation.

There is no escaping the hard truth that China and Russia are determined not to let this crisis go to waste. It is a unique opportunity to paint themselves as the white knights, even when their aid turns out to be faulty, and when it comes with an invoice attached.

Yet, what is more worrying is not understanding the deep-seated problems that have enabled the bad Samaritans to assert themselves in such a prominent way. For the COVID-19 pandemic has merely amplified existing worrying trends, rather than created a distinct set of new challenges.

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