Political discourse and representation in Solomon Islands are dominated by older men, making it easy to forget that this cohort of influential people are, in fact, the minority of the population. With seven in 10 Solomon Islanders under age 34, Solomon Islands’ youth population is particularly visible on the streets of Honiara, where large groups of young people can be seen in public spaces and at events.

There are, however, few youths in positions of influence or formal decision-making structures in Solomon Islands. Youths are rarely seen in politics and government, and are less likely to be employed.

This situation is shaped by economics and politics, as well as social norms that may support or obstruct their participation in these realms. The cultural diversity of Solomon Islands makes generalisations about social norms difficult, but it is commonly believed that youth must obey their parents and respect elders. In practice, this norm means that youth are often relegated to low status work as labourers.

This happens on a family level where youth will often be busy running errands and doing chores, leading to a feeling that they have little agency over their lives. In the formal economy, businesses take advantage of the low status of young women, intentionally hiring them to do low-paid work in shops, bars, and casinos.

More on this: How young people are reshaping the Pacific’s digital landscape

There has been a lot of talk at the political level about youth unemployment, but little action. Youth struggle to find stable, fulfilling employment, both in Solomon Islands and overseas, with many educated workers now doing menial tasks under seasonal and other non-ongoing arrangements.

In 2019, the government took over the administration of the successful Youth at Work project – which aimed to support young people into formal employment or entrepeurship – before sidelining and ultimately discontinuing it.

Moreover, the ability of youth to influence political decisions about work, foreign investment and employment is limited. It is common for established members of parliament to spend nominally apolitical constituency funds, as well as their own business profits, during elections.

Youth vying for election generally do not have access to either the funds or the status to ‘buy their way in to the game’ of running for national office.

Instead, youth leaders emerge at the local and provincial levels, often by working in partnership with established leaders and running local projects or services. For instance, there are currently some people under 35 years of age who serve as members of provincial assemblies. An analysis conducted in 2016 found that young women who are able to demonstrate service to their community, have support from chiefs, and are better educated, are able to win support in elections as community officers.

However, this local influence has not yet translated to increased representation in governmental structures and more formal decision-making processes, such as national government committees.

More on this: Is aid to Tonga reaching those who need it?

One major barrier for young Solomon Islanders, particularly young men, is that they are often characterised as ‘conflict risks’. However, as a recent report pointed out, blaming “wayward youth” for riots conveniently shifts the blame away from the adults and systems that socialise young men into violence.

However, young people today have more access to education and information than older generations and can find new ways to express their needs and aspirations. Increased access to education and new communication technologies provide opportunities for youth to engage with political discussions and civil society activities.

Civil society advocacy, particularly through social media in urban areas, is contributing to an increase in some young people’s political engagement on a variety of issues, including anti-corruption, the environment, climate change, and transport.

Young women are also being heard in more forums. For years, young women have endured a sort of invisibility, with many youth projects involving more men than women. Of the few women’s projects that exist, young, unmarried women have rarely been targeted, and reporting by gender, in the absence of age breakdowns, obscures whether or not young women are reached.

However, targeted programs for young girls, at least in urban and peri-urban areas, are increasing. Examples include established local non-government organisations (NGOs), such as the Young Women’s Christian Association, and newer initiatives, such as international NGO projects focusing on the safety and health of young women.

A number of international organisations like the World Bank, are also investing in efforts to specifically identify barriers young women face to employment, which is an encouraging sign of more intersectional approaches to gender and social inclusion.

However, more can be done. The connection between youth organisation and development needs to be strengthened, particularly in rural areas.

In various rural areas, youth groups are active, often organising sporting, cultural and economic activities. These groups can build trust and engagement among youths that can potentially broaden into other activities. Unfortunately, these networks tend to get little support from the development sector.

Encouragingly, many local community decision-making structures are inclusive of youth. For example, many councils of chiefs around the country have youth representatives in their decision-making meetings. Solomon Islands Development Trust, the oldest local NGO working nationally on development, has mandated youth representatives in their village committees and activities for a long time, and other agencies with committee work are frequently adopting this practice.

Layers of youth disadvantage, and the invisibility of young women, require further attention. This includes greater youth participation in research, policy and planning, and mandating their inclusion in decision-making processes. Policymakers need to pay particular attention to the specific disadvantage of young women, the establishment of activities for youth to inform and lobby elected representatives about their concerns, and levels of investment in youth employment and entrepreneurship programs.

Through these actions, Solomon Islands has the potential to transform the general view of young people from ‘risk’ to asset.

This article is based upon a paper published by ANU Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) as part of its ‘In brief’ series. The original paper can be found here.

The post Creating a new future for youth in Solomon Islands appeared first on Policy Forum.

Tonga is one of the most natural disaster prone nations on earth. From October to April each year, the Pacific Island kingdom is buffeted by frequent cyclones, which damage infrastructure, knock out mobile communication and destroy homes.

However, at the peak of the 2021-22 cyclone season, Tonga’s misfortune doubled. Between 20 December to 11 January, the Hunga Tonga–Hunga Haʻapai volcano experienced a series of massive eruptions, shooting ash 58 kilometres high and causing loud booms, which were heard as far away as Alaska.

The eruption – now known to be the largest the world has seen since Krakatoa in 1883 – subsequently caused a major tsunami, which smashed into Tonga’s coastal areas on 15 January.

Whilst the initial effects of these disasters have now subsided, the damage to people, livelihoods and the environment has been ongoing. The World Bank estimated that the damages amounted to US$90 million with 19,250 people affected, including 10,000 children.

To make matters worse, Tonga detected its first case of COVID-19 in the community only a few days after the eruption, even as volcanic ash was still visible in the air. Behind the headlines was the trauma caused by death and displacement.

More on this: Supporting climate displaced peoples

These events also led to an overwhelming outpouring of ‘ofa (love), through the mobilisation of resources by Tongans and others across the world. Yet whilst these ‘ofa have been gratefully accepted in ‘the friendly isles’, a number of important questions about the efficacy of this humanitarian assistance have come to the fore.

Not least amongst these have been concerns about the ability of the stretched Tongan government to absorb, coordinate and distribute assistance to its citizens.

The primairy providers of aid to Tonga after the disaster were Australia and New Zealand, who delivered emergency supplies including hygiene kits, kitchen kits and other essential supplies. This came in addition to the millions already committed to Tonga in development programs.

The Government of Tonga also received US$8 million in emergency funding from the World Bank to support response and recovery efforts. Other bilateral partners such as the United Kingdom, Japan, China and France also showed their ‘ofa by sharing their expertise in different areas to support Tonga in the aftermath of the disaster.

More on this: Tonga's transnational disaster response

Meanwhile, non-government organisations (NGOs) and their overseas partners have helped Tonga in the emergency response phase. The Church Leaders Forum and other leading NGOs targeted an area of care often neglected by aid providers in post-disaster assistance – psycho-social support.

The aim of such programs is to not only provide the material building blocks for recovery, but also to help victims share experiences and recover a sense of normalcy in the wake of the tragedy.

However, whilst much of this assistance has helped Tongans rebuild their lives, some may have languished in a state of bureaucratic and logistical limbo. At recent regional security conference, some people conveyed their anecdotal concerns about containers of aid being left at the docks.

As a developing nation, the capacity of the Tongan government to properly manage the large amounts of aid being delivered is limited. This is in large part due to logistical and bureaucratic capacity constraints, making coordination difficult – especially in times of crisis. This can mean that it is unclear what is needed where, making it difficult to distribute critical resources to the people who need them most.

As such, it is crucial that development partners work in concert with the Tongan government and communities to ensure that distribution is coordinated effectively and consistently across all levels.

With the next cyclone season looming, it’s the Tongan government and its international partners need to address these capacity issues now. This is no easy task, but with the frequency and severity of disasters set to increase as global temperatures increase and sea levels rise, it is vital to the kingdom’s future. Malo e ‘ofa!

The post Is aid to Tonga reaching those who need it most? appeared first on Policy Forum.

The introduction of Australia’s Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) represents a new era for Pacific migration. Commencing in mid-2023, the visa will allow for 3,000 workers to come to Australia annually.

In contrast to previous labour mobility schemes, the PEV offers the opportunity for permanent residency, including for family members. However, it is not clear how the new visas will be allocated across the Pacific.

While people from larger Pacific Island countries (PICs) may regard the visa as an opportunity to move to greener economic pastures, for the people of Kiribati, it could offer a lifeline in the face of climate displacement.

As part of the first permanent migration scheme for workers from the Pacific and Timor-Leste, the PEV is modelled on New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category, which began in 2001.

Visas will be allocated via ballot, although how many will be allocated to each country remains unknown. The Australian federal Labor government initially announced a proportional selection formula that offered higher quotas for countries with larger populations.

More on this: What do Pacific workers think about Australia’s Engagement Visa?

However, given that climate-displaced people are not specifically recognised under the 1951 United Nations refugee convention, many have argued that the visa should give consideration to the countries that are most impacted.

Kiribati is a prime example of a nation that could benefit massively from such a recalibration. Located in the Pacific Ocean, halfway between Australia and Hawai‘i, Kiribati is one of the most climate change vulnerable nations on earth. Beyond the droughts and famine it is already facing, expected sea-level rise will make its islands largely unhabitable within this century.

The PEV program could also offer significant material developmental benefits. The economy of Kiribati is small, and its prospects for growth are limited by its rapidly growing population of nearly 120,000 people.

With a minuscule private sector, the over-burdened government is in dire need of economic revenue expansion and access to markets, as well as employment for its citizens.

Importantly, many I-Kiribati have experience in the sectors in which Australia is facing a shortage of skilled workers. This has been shown most clearly via the large number of I-Kiribati healthcare professionals that have migrated since the introduction of the 2006 Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative.

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This growth has reinforced the demand for the skills of I-Kiribati workers from Australian employers, and demonstrates their value to the Australian economy and society. It also validates the Kiribati training and recruiting systems.

The result is a win-win relationship in which I-Kiribati workers meet skills needed in Australia whilst building their economic resilience and, via remittances, supporting families at home.

To maximise benefits for low-lying islands, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) could examine how to integrate the aims of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security – the Pacific’s primary framework for cooperation on security issues – into PEV-style migration programs.

This could help the PIF determine its position on the PEV program, and address the emerging concerns of some member states about the impacts of brain drain and the climate crisis. Simultaneously, this assures Australia of a fully utilised program.

The introduction of the PEV has reinforced Australia’s economic links with Pacific Island countries. However, it could also serve as an opportunity for the Australian Government to take on the mantle of regional climate leadership. By prioritising low-lying island states that have limited options in the face of sea-level rise, Australia could prove it is truly part of the Pacific family.

This article is based upon a paper published by ANU Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) as part of its ‘In brief’ series. The original paper can be found here.

The post Can the Pacific Engagement Visa support climate displaced peoples? appeared first on Policy Forum.

The rain arrived earlier than usual in Thailand this year. In May, Khon Kaen city’s Mittraphap railway community in the country’s northeast was inundated for several days, with flood waters rising to people’s knees. Since then, the informal settlement – which is home to over 700 families – has flooded frequently.

In September, Typhoon Noru crossed the South China Sea and the already-saturated northeast region braced for more floods from the Category 4 storm. Some cities along the typhoon’s path were prepared with evacuation and risk reduction action plans. But in the Mittraphap community, there were no flood mitigation measures or evacuation plans for the informal settlement. The community was inundated and remained underwater for weeks.

As a result of climate change and unplanned urbanisation, flood patterns are changing and flood risks are growing. For communities on the margins like Mittraphap, each flood is a serious economic setback, and the increased frequency of floods means that they may never fully recover before the next disaster strikes.

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Cities are at the front line of climate change and other crises such as conflicts and the COVID-19 pandemic. But what’s clear from the experience of the Mittraphap community – and others like it – is that their impacts are unevenly distributed within cities, with marginalised groups often bearing the greatest burden.

In response, policymakers need to better plan for more inclusive, equitable, resilient, and sustainable cities to address the current problems and prepare for future challenges. To achieve this, cities must plan for a better future for those people on the margins, including the urban poor and people living in informal settlements. This is a major challenge, especially in cities in the Global South, where most rapid urbanisation has occurred over the last decade.

One issue facing communities like Mittraphap in Khon Kaen is that planning decisions are often made with limited public participation from marginalised communities.

For example, in 2015, authorities decided to relocate a regional bus terminal further away from the community. This removed a major source of income from local people, many of whom made a living selling food to passengers at the bus terminal. With limited access to welfare and state assistance, decisions like these can have serious consequences.

More on this: Should cities be built with pandemics in mind?

The relocation of the bus terminal nine kilometres out of town also did not consider commuters’ needs, much less the dependence of the community on the bus terminal for daily income. Better consideration of the local communities could have helped.

But poorly considered planning decisions don’t just lead to material changes in communities’ wellbeing – they are interconnected with environmental changes and can have devastating consequences.

The vulnerability of the Mittraphap community to the impacts of climate change isn’t simply a result of limited resources, poor housing conditions, and tenuous land rights and tenures. Their climate vulnerability is also a result of policy and planning decisions. In order to protect its business centre, Khon Kaen city diverts floodwaters, leaving low-lying settlements more vulnerable.

Cities are shaped by policy decisions that are shaped by political and economic influence. Often this means that special interests with greater resources and access to those in power, such as developers, have an outsized impact on decision-making. The informal economy accounts for 55.7 per cent of the overall labour force in Thailand, but there is little recognition or representation of these workers in the planning decisions that affect them.

It shouldn’t be that way. In Thailand and throughout the Global South, the urban poor and low-income communities build and maintain cities with their labour. It’s incumbent on policymakers to engage with these people and consider their needs before making planning decisions with potentially catastrophic consequences.

But as the interwoven issues of urbanisation, urban poverty, vulnerability, and disasters are become more complex, as cities in the Global South continue to grow and the climate changes, the future of cities needs to be defined by more than just participation. For our cities to truly thrive, they must be shaped by marginalised people – like those of Thailand’s Mittraphap railway community – based on principles of human rights and justice.

The post Cities of the future in an unequal world appeared first on Policy Forum.

People in some nations are more philanthropic than in others – that is, they give more money away.

This isn’t just about who is most generous. It’s a matter of the role of governments. For instance, while American citizens donate a lot more money than Swedes, citizens of Sweden pay much more tax on average than Americans.

In this comparison, rather than donating directly themselves, Swedish citizens vote for an approach to government that results in the same thing – their money going to help the less fortunate and build a better society. In the United States, and many other places, giving directly to support these things is more common.

The deeper difference is what ‘needs’ financial support in the community is determined collectively in Sweden and individually in the United States.

This is not superficial – especially when one of these approaches doesn’t seem to work very well.

A collective system lowers transaction costs, reduces the incentive for charities to spend on marketing themselves, and provides government resources to ensure the charities that benefit from the community’s donations are achieving their goals.

An individual system has none of these strengths. While its advocates can say that people should have a right to directly choose who benefits from their money, they cannot hide from its weaknesses.

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Australia’s system is a funny mix of both. Individual donors elect to donate to a charity, but the government then uses collective funds to subsidise that choice by forgoing revenue on it. This is because all donations to designated charities in Australia are ‘tax-deductible’, meaning that any income an Australian earns, but then donates, is not counted as part of their taxable income, lowering their overall tax rate burden.

The new Assistant Minister for Competition, Charities and Treasury, Andrew Leigh, has a plan to double giving in Australia by 2030 under this system.

He has also made clear that the government will work to remove past constraints on charities lobbying for better policies for the sector.

This is an admirable goal. While governments are better suited than private charities to tackle systemic poverty issues, citizens, of their own volition, getting together to improve their community is crucial to a healthy society.

In Australia, one of the world’s wealthiest countries, about three million live below the poverty line. While the government must increase support to tackle this, citizen-based organisations, or not-for-profits, are often better suited to helping communities directly.

While most in the sector are involved in education and religious activities, it’s important to note the supplementary role some charities play when it comes to relieving poverty.

Ensuring charities keep playing this supplementary role, and enabling them to lobby to do so better, solves a number of problems with charitable giving. It encourages citizens to contribute to their communities, while those in poverty are still entitled to the government support they need.

More on this: The politics of aid in a crisis

However, it does not solve everything. Australia’s tax-deductible donation system needs a rethink.

As it stands, every deductible dollar is worth the same. This means that when a dollar is donated to a wealthy private school to construct a luxurious building, the taxpayer subsidises it just as much as a donation to a charity doing crucial work with those living rough.

Under this system, any charity, no matter its specific values and goals, and whether they reflect the majority of the Australian community, is subsidised – just as long as it can qualify for tax-deductible status.

For one, this system means that Australians support international development in two capacities – as taxpayers directly via the government, and as donors.

But only eight per cent of charities provide aid to people outside Australia. Reforming Australia’s system could help it better assist developing countries, where a donated dollar can go much further when it comes to improving lives.

If the government does achieve its plan to double giving, it also needs to consider that the current system is not always sending resources to where they are most needed.

As it stands, the giving system is uncoordinated and blind to genuine public need – the personal preferences of donors entirely direct government subsidies.

Charities play roles the government cannot, especially when it comes to building communities and they need support, but nobody could fairly say every charity is of exactly equal value.

The government needs to facilitate the meeting of the greatest needs by charities and ensure they have the resources to do the work they are best at. A system where one dollar given to a privileged private school or elite sporting club is subsidised just the same as one dollar given to a homelessness relief or to lift people out of poverty in the developing world isn’t capable of this – it needs change.

The post Australia’s ‘doNation Building’ project appeared first on Policy Forum.

In 2012, the Asia-Pacific region came together and designed the world’s first set of disability-specific development goals: the Incheon Strategy to “Make the Right Real” for Persons with Disabilities in Asia and the Pacific. This week, they meet again to assess how governments have delivered on their commitments, to secure those gains and develop the innovative solutions needed to achieve fully inclusive societies.

Ministers, government officials, persons with disabilities, civil society and private sector allies from across Asia and the Pacific will gather from 19 to 21 October in Jakarta to mark a new era for 700 million persons with disabilities and proclaim a fourth Asian and Pacific Decade of Persons with Disabilities.

Our region is unique, having already declared three decades to protect and uphold the rights of persons with disabilities; 44 Asian and Pacific governments have ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and we celebrate achievements in the development of disability laws, policies, strategies, and programmes.

Today, the Asia-Pacific has more parliamentarians and policymakers with disabilities. Their everyday business is national decision-making. They also monitor policy implementation. We find them active across the Asia-Pacific region: Australia, Bangladesh, China, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Türkiye.

They have promoted inclusive public procurement to support disability-inclusive businesses and accessible facilities, advanced sign language interpretation in media programmes and parliamentary sessions, focused policy attention on overlooked groups, and directed numerous policy initiatives towards inclusion.

Less visible but no less important are local-level elected politicians with disabilities in India, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Indonesia witnessed 42 candidates with disabilities standing in the last election. Grassroots disability organisations have emerged as rapid responders to emerging issues such as COVID-19 and other crises.

More on this: Disability in Indonesia – from charity to human rights

Organisations of and for persons with disabilities in Bangladesh have distinguished themselves in disability-inclusive COVID-19 responses, and created programmes to support persons with psychosocial disabilities and autism.

The past decade saw the emergence of private sector leadership in disability-inclusive business. Wipro, headquartered in India, pioneers disability inclusion in its multinational growth strategy. This is a pillar of Wipro’s diversity and inclusion initiatives. Employees with disabilities are at the core of designing and delivering Wipro digital services.

Yet, there is always more unfinished business to address.

Even though we applaud the increasing participation of persons with disabilities in policymaking, there are still only eight persons with disabilities for every 1,000 parliamentarians in the region.

On the right to work, three in four persons with disabilities are not employed, while seven in 10 persons with disabilities do not have any form of social protection.

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This sobering picture points to the need for disability-specific and disability-inclusive policies and their sustained implementation in partnership with women and men with disabilities.

One of the first steps to inclusion is recognising the rights of persons with disabilities. This model focuses on the person and their dignity, aspirations, individuality and value as a human being. As such, government offices, banks and public transportation and spaces must be made accessible for persons with diverse disabilities.

To this end, governments in the region have conducted accessibility audits of government buildings and public transportation stations. Partnerships with the private sector have led to reasonable accommodations at work, promoting employment in a variety of sectors.

Despite the thrust of the Incheon Strategy on data collection and analysis, persons with disabilities still are often left out of official data because the questions that allow for disaggregation are excluded from surveys and accommodations are not made to ensure their participation.

This reflects a continued lack of policy priority and budgetary allocations. To create evidence-based policies, we need reliable and comparable data disaggregated by disability status, sex, and geographic location.

There is hope in the technology leap to 5G in the Asia-Pacific region. The implications for the empowerment of persons are limitless: from digital access, e-health care and assistive devices at affordable prices to remote learning and working, and exercising the right to vote. This is a critical moment to ensure disability-inclusive digitalisation.

We live in a world of volatile change. A disability-inclusive approach to shape this world would benefit everyone, particularly in a rapidly ageing Asia-Pacific region where everyone’s contributions will matter.

As we stand on the precipice of a fourth Asian and Pacific Decade of Persons with Disabilities, it remains our duty to insist on a paradigm shift to celebrate diversity and disability inclusion. When we dismantle barriers and persons with disabilities surge ahead, everyone benefits.

The post Persons with disabilities are integral players in determining innovative solutions to fully inclusive societies appeared first on Policy Forum.

China’s energy companies are all aboard the global clean power bullet train.

According to China’s National Energy Administration’s national power industry statistics, Chinese power generators installed 37.7 gigawatts (GW) of solar capacity from January to July 2022, up 110 per cent per cent from a year earlier.

This installation, over a period of only seven months, is roughly equivalent to India’s total solar build-up since the mid-2010s and total generation capacity in New South Wales and Queensland combined in 2021-22. By the end of the decade, China is aiming to bring total wind and solar capacity to 1200 GW, a massive increase from the 635 GW it recorded at the end of last year.

But this dramatic expansion of clean power generation is still not even close to enough change to power the world’s second-largest economy and its largest manufacturing industry. And if China goes before it is ready, its energy security will be in even more danger.

Since mid-July, some Chinese provincial governments have enforced power rationing across various manufacturing hubs along the Yangtze River. Sichuan province, a net power exporter on the upper reaches of the river, has been the worst affected. Provinces mostly focused their efforts on industrial users, but in some cases were forced to compel homes, office buildings, and shopping malls to cut usage too.

The immediate cause is extreme weather – the region is experiencing its worst heatwave in more than half a century, sending demand soaring.

More on this: Gendering just transition

Meanwhile, in Chongqing, a megacity in Sichuan, rainfall has been 60 per cent less than the seasonal norm and 66 rivers spread across 34 counties have dried up, according to state media.

This has massively reduced the hydropower supply Sichuan relies on. At the peak of the drought, Sichuan’s hydropower fell to 440 million kilowatt hours, less than half of its normal level.

Other cities and regions are affected too, because Sichuan typically exports about a third of its hydropower to other provinces, and is still doing so.

Yet, diverting this power back to locals is not an option. Much of these exports go through dedicated network facilities with limited connectivity to local grids and are backed by fixed long-term supply contracts.

Sichuan’s struggles are a great example of a much deeper crisis of inflexibility in an era of transition. The availability of renewable energy is heavily linked to the availability of sunlight, the speed of wind, and water. To balance it out flexibly requires sufficient storage and network infrastructure.

China, like many other countries, doesn’t have this infrastructure in place yet. After all, when China’s power system was developed, it wasn’t designed to handle huge variations in renewable energy. While China is not alone in this struggle, it is handling a transition of far greater scale than other countries.

More on this: India’s road to a sustainable energy future

As it accelerates its clean power transition, China needs to heavily invest in its power system, especially in storage and its network. This will help it respond to abrupt changes in renewable energy, especially under long-lasting, extreme weather conditions.

Of course, this is not an easy task.

China will need to invest in battery storage and pumped hydropower, and smarter and more flexible grid technology. It must reform electricity markets to enable more flexible use of existing supply. And it will have to promote emerging technologies like hydrogen and thermal energy storage to help plug gaps in electricity generation.

Demoting China’s large coal-fired power station fleet to playing the supportive role of responsive back-up capacity, while clean energy provides the core of supply, is one attractive short-term solution.

However, China’s energy planners should look to the long-term. If they focus on attaining the country’s climate obligations – including achieving net zero emissions before 2060 – then China would only need to use coal-fired power as a last resort throughout its transition.

China’s recurring power crises highlight its need to rebuild its power system around clean energy. It must find a balance between its current energy security and its goal of achieving a clean energy future as soon as possible.

To do this, the country needs a long-term plan that not only invests in clean power generation, but also steps up investment in storage, transmission, and grid flexibility. This will do more for its transition than any generation target and stabilise its energy security in the process.

As China embarks on its truly massive energy transition journey, its leaders must remember that keeping the ship steady is just as important as seeing how fast it can go.

The post Executing China’s ‘Transition: Impossible’ appeared first on Policy Forum.

In 2015, Pacific Island nation signatories to the United Nations (UN) committed to addressing sustainable development challenges as outlined in the UN General Assembly 2030 agenda. The agenda included 17 goals identified as necessary to transform the world and achieve a better and more sustainable future for all. Each of these sustainable development goals (SDGs) was premised on the identification of a specific global challenge.

Though more than five years have passed since countries have committed to actioning these goals, reports coming out of the Pacific on achieving SDG 16 – promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and strong institutions – remain few and far apart.

This is not to say that there is not work being done across the region that speaks directly to meeting the 2030 Agenda. This work, however, often goes unrecognised as they do not align with the UN’s frequently western-centric understandings of development.

More on this: Culture as a foundation for development in the Pacific

This dichotomy, between contextually specific development and the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, is well reflected in two recent country-specific reports on SDG 16 efforts in the Pacific: the 2019 Solomon Islands Access to Justice Study and the 2019 report on Justice Needs and Satisfaction in Fiji.

The first reflects a greater sense of local context, local stakeholders, locally relevant variables and an underlying understanding of place, space, cultural context, and local actors. This is imbued in its approach, use of reporting language and focal areas.

The second, conversely, does not appear to paint an accurate picture of ethnic compilation, local or traditional justice mechanisms, or context. Perhaps the biggest fault in this approach is that it underemphasises local or non-state justice frameworks and how these impact on legal and societal outcomes.

This emphasises that, despite the significant attention given to access to justice by international bodies, there continue to be deficiencies in how ‘access to justice’ is understood in non-Western contexts. Such definitions remain largely limited in their understanding of Indigenous forms of justice and the interface between state and non-state systems.

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Unfortunately, where countries lack clear guidelines to inform interpretations of access to justice, it becomes more difficult to determine appropriate measures for what systems and which individuals should be included or excluded.

For example, despite the existence of legislation that acknowledges local justice frameworks such as the 1997 Falekaupule Act in Tuvalu and the 1990 Village Fono Act in Samoa, descriptions of access to justice found within government documents still focus on Western-orientated state-centric models. This lack of formalised recognition of local justice mechanisms further contributes to their invisibility in non-contextualised assessments.

As new and complex issues such as climate change come to the fore, we need to move towards whole-of-society solutions, which recognise the contextual realities of the Pacific Islands and the strength of non-state systems of authority.

Models for assessing the actioning of SDG 16 in Pacific Island contexts should therefore be developed locally or at least in consultation with local stakeholders. This would allow an understanding of development that is situated within local cultures and consciousness that is more truly representative of the challenges and opportunities in the region. The language of assessment used to measure success should also be representative and reflect contextual accuracy.

The way forward necessitates we acknowledge the criticality of rethinking conceptualisations of access to justice. To do this, we must better recognise and understand indigenous forms of justice, as well as the nature of non-state power structures and how they interface with state regimes. If we cannot do this in the face of recurrent regional crises, we risk not only missing the forest, but the trees as well.

The post It’s time to move beyond a Western understanding of development appeared first on Policy Forum.

In the years since the fall of former President Suharto’s authoritarian regime – a period known as the reformasi (reform) era – women’s representation in Indonesia has increased in both the legislative and executive branches of government.

The share of female legislators increased from eight per cent in 1999 to 20.52 per cent in 2019. Similarly, the number of female cabinet ministers has nearly tripled, growing from 5.56 per cent to 14.63 per cent between the same period. The executive branch reached its apex of female representation in 2014, when nine out of 50 cabinet ministers were women.

Women have also recently served in key portfolios – namely finance, trade, and foreign affairs. Many of these women came from professional backgrounds and have gained strong recognition from their peers throughout their careers for their performance.

The current speaker of the People’s Representative Council is also female, meaning Indonesia is among 41 countries with female leadership in their lower – or in some cases only – legislative chambers.

Indonesia has also made progress in its diplomatic missions. As of the end of 2021, women comprised 9.42 per cent of all ambassadors appointed during reformasi. This number is much improved compared to the pre-reformasi period, when women made up less than three per cent of ambassadors.

This promising progress towards gender equality has followed a series of affirmative action policies.

In politics, at least 30 per cent of Indonesia political parties’ legislative candidates must be women, in line with a gender quota that has been in place since 2009. Gender mainstreaming policies are also shaping institutional reform in the ministry of foreign affairs, where female diplomats are encouraged to pursue their careers.

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For example, the Ministry released its first gender equality in foreign policy blueprint in 2013, which was then followed by the publication of gender budgeting guidelines in 2015. Its regulations have also been changed to allow couples to accept diplomatic assignments abroad together or to take sabbatical leave to accompany their spouses.

The fact that more women are now working as lawmakers, ministers, and ambassadors indicates that gender diversity is becoming more socially acceptable in Indonesia.

With more women attaining higher education qualifications and other key skills, the Indonesian labour market is also becoming more competitive.

However, it is crucial to note that women’s political representation in Indonesia is still a work in progress. For some, progress has been too slow.

It’s true that the country’s movement towards gender parity in parliament has been outshone by other countries. The average worldwide has nearly doubled from 14 per cent in 1999 to 25 per cent in 2019.

Part of the reason for this is the electoral system.

The larger house of Indonesia’s parliament, the People’s Representative Council, is elected under an open-list proportional representation system.

While voters can vote for candidates in any order, parties get to decide the order in which their candidates appear on the ballot paper. While it is required that women appear on a ballot paper in a ‘zipper’ pattern, with one woman after at most two men, parties tend to nominate more men than women in the best positions on the ballot, and very few women are placed in the first position on the ballot paper.

As their ultimate goal is to win seats, parties will pursue what that perceive to be the most effective short-term strategy, rather than focusing on long-term goals in the interest of gender equality.

As legislative elections are prohibitively expensive, only those with strong financial and political resources or external backing can be viable candidates. In this context, it’s important to take an intersectional approach and acknowledge that gender is not the only factor to consider.

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The prevalence of dynastic parliamentarians is also critical in shaping Indonesian democracy. Left unchecked, elites who are connected with regional heads, former and current lawmakers, and party leaders will continue to dominate leadership positions.

For instance, ministerial appointments continue to be dominated by party elites. Despite claims by President Joko Widodo during his 2014 presidential campaign that he would not let orang partai (people affiliated with political parties) control his cabinet, seven out of his 15 combined female ministers represent ruling coalition parties. This number is higher than any administration during reformasi.

As both ministerial and ambassadorial appointments are the president’s choice, it is very unlikely that these decisions will be made free from political considerations.

Among other factors that shape these appointments, the request from political parties to have their representatives sit in the cabinet or serve as ambassador will continue to affect professionalism and gender diversity.

Nevertheless, there are policy strategies that may help to improve women’s representation.

Aside from electoral reform, it is pivotal for Indonesia to build and nurture strategic partnerships in promoting the values of gender equality. Professional associations could provide and recommend lists of prominent females who have excelled in their respective fields.

This peer recognition will help civil society organisations that promote women’s political activism to persuade the president to appoint more women cabinet ministers and ambassadors.

Parties should also be encouraged to openly nominate women for these positions. Although success with this might vary across parties, the talent pool in each party should serve as an excellent starting point to make women more visible and discoverable.

Further, leaders must continue to make the case to the public that more female representation will make for a more inclusive and dynamic society. A growing body of research has shown that female leadership offers a more diverse perspective and brings out the best possible results.

Finally, it is important for female leaders to support other women to climb the ladder through mentorship. This will allow women to learn from each other and to ensure emerging female talent is able to break through the ‘glass ceiling’.

By undertaking institutional reforms, educating the public about the benefits of gender equality, and establishing peer-to-peer support networks, Indonesia can continue to make progress on women’s political representation. It must do this, not just for the status of women, but for the benefit of all Indonesians.

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Many economic indicators of gender equality in Indonesia improved over the last 20 years.

From those born in early 1950s to those born in the late 1980s, each new cohort of Indonesian women became more likely to be more educated, have fewer children, and participate more in the labour force in the years immediately following the completion of their education than the last. According to data from the Indonesian National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS), women’s tertiary educational attainment has also overtaken that of men since the 1976 cohort.

These improvements are largely driven by increased living standards and better economic opportunities for women. The country’s previous model of economic growth, which was driven by export-oriented manufacturing, stopped working after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. However, between the early 2000s and mid 2010s, a resource boom helped Indonesia grow at the relatively fast rate of around six per cent every year.

This sustained period of economic growth in the post-Suharto era has led to a substantial expansion of Indonesia’s middle class. In turn, this new middle class has demanded more and higher quality consumer goods and services, such as manufactured food and beverages, tourism, health, and education. Crucially for gender equality, many of these industries employ more women than men.

At the same time, Indonesia has improved education for girls due to the demand from middle class families. As a result, economic opportunities for women have improved.

This change is illustrated by the growing share of working age women who are employed in high-end services, such as legislators, senior officials, managers and professionals. The percentage for women has increased from four per cent in 2001 to seven per cent in 2021, while the share for men has not changed, according to data from the Indonesian National Labour Force Survey (SAKERNAS).

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Considering the size of the population of working age women in Indonesia, which numbers in the tens of millions, this is a huge increase in the number of high-end jobs for women.

Notwithstanding a general increase in economic opportunities, women still face significant barriers to entering the labour market. Although each new generation of women in urban areas is more likely to be employed in the formal sector at the start of their career, our research shows that they are also likely to drop out of the formal workforce and begin informal work around the time they get married, especially in cities.

While the number of jobs in high-end services for women have dramatically increased, the gender wage gap in these jobs has also widened in the last 20 years.

These two phenomena could be interrelated, as wage growth for women is hampered by the fact that they enter high-end service jobs at the bottom of the pay scale, before dropping out when they get married and have children.

Another recent trend is that, contrary to the overall improvement in gender equality, SUSENAS data shows that women born after 1980 are getting married and having their first child earlier than previous cohorts.

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This is happening for women across all education levels and in both urban and rural areas, and is likely driven by an increasingly conservative attitude towards dating and marriage across the country. When seen together with the trend of women dropping out of the workforce at this point in their lives, this can exacerbate the negative career and economic impacts for women, making them more economically dependent on their husbands.

So how can the Indonesian government help women overcome these constraints?

The phenomenon of women dropping out of the formal sector at around child-bearing age in urban areas deserves government attention.

The nature of formal sector work in urban areas, with long and inflexible working hours, and even more time spent commuting, can mean that many women with a young family are not able to do this paid work while also in many cases acting as their child’s primary caregiver.

Addressing the lack of affordable and reliable childcare would be a start. Investing in better transport infrastructure would also help to alleviate the commuting burden, making life as a working mother more achievable.

The pandemic has also shown that working from home can be a genuine option for many professionals, and better Internet infrastructure can facilitate this – allowing both women and men greater flexibility.

Although the government can play limited role in affecting cultural change in dating and marriage, enforcing the recently legislated higher minimum age of marriage can help to ensure that young women have at least a chance to obtain education and explore economic opportunities before they get married.

For Indonesian women with young families, caring responsibilities can often mean they drop out of the formal labour market, and in many cases never return. By investing in measures that enhance flexibility, such as affordable childcare, transport, and Internet infrastructure, Indonesian policymakers can ensure women don’t have to choose between family and their career.

This piece is published as part of our new In Focus: Indonesia section, ahead of this year’s ANU Indonesia Update. The authors’ full study will be published as part of a collection following the conference. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ own.

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